Animal Rites
(2003), for instance, continues the legacy of this
work. His focus on speciesism insists that we pay attention to the asymmetrical
material effects of anthropocentric discourse, the violent consequences of which
fall overwhelmingly on nonhuman animals (6). In other words, the reductive
objectifying language of speciesism both legitimizes and naturalizes animal
exploitation. Jacques Derrida in “The Animal That Therefore I Am,” famously
interrogated the homogenizing, objectifying effect of the word ‘animal,’ which he
describes as an “appellation that men have instituted, a name they have given
themselves the right and authority to give to the living other” (23). This word
encompasses the vast difference and heterogeneity of all nonhuman beings
and designates each one as inferior and exploitable. Unique individuals vanish
into this indistinguishable mass and we are left with identical, replaceable
objects devoid of personality or individual history. Likewise, the importance of
Allmark-Kent 14
speciesist language is revealed in our tendency to refer to nonhuman animals in
terms usually reserved for inanimate objects: ‘it’ or ‘something,’ rather than
‘she,’ ‘he,’ ‘they,’ and ‘someone.’ This attention to how we describe animals was
one of the earliest and most widespread features of animal studies. Throughout
the field it is now common practice to use ‘other animals’ or ‘nonhuman animals’
to remind readers that they too are encompassed in the word ‘animal.’ In this
thesis, I will use ‘animals’ and ‘nonhuman beings’ interchangeably, but I will also
refer to animals as individuals and, where possible, I will use non-objectifying
pronouns.
It is clear, then, that deconstruction of anthropocentric and speciesist
language is one of the ways literary animal studies can impact the ethical
treatment of animals. However, not everyone shares the opinion that it
should
be engaged with advocacy at all. As McHugh comments, literary animal studies
“likely will continue to foster unpredictable (and often conflicted) positions of
animal rights and welfare, establishing no clear foundations of political let alone
epistemological solidarity among researchers” (McHugh). Whilst “the most basic
questions” continue to produce “conflicting answers,” those “who want this work
to resolve the pressing problems of anim
als in human society” will remain
frustrated, and the “dream of a shared method or interpretation” may be
deferred (
Ibid
). It is clear that this type of wholesale cohesion within literary
animal studies is not possible, but perhaps solidarity within political or a-political
positions is achievable. This divide has been recognized by many but (perhaps
unsurprisingly in this characteristically diverse field) it has been conceptualized
in a number of ways.
In
The Postmodern Animal
(2000) Steve Baker draws on
Kate Soper’s
terms ‘nature-endorsing’ and ‘nature-sceptical’ to propose the admittedly
Allmark-Kent 15
“clumsier” animal-endorsing and animal-sceptical (9). He argues that an animal-
endorsing perspective “will tend to endorse animal life itself (and may therefore
align itself with the work of conservationists, or perhaps of animal advocacy),
rather than endorsing cultural constructions of the animal” (9). Whereas an
animal-
sceptic “is likely to be sceptical not of animals themselves (as if the very
existence of non-human l
ife was in question), but rather of culture’s means of
constructing and classifying the animal in order to make it meaningful to the
human” (9). Julie Smith, who uses the terms “pro-animal” and “pro-use” instead,
draws the divide along modernism and postmodernism; the former operating
from a position “established by animals rights philosophy” that “the evolutionary
continuity between humans and animals” allows “authoritative statements about
pain and pleasure,” and the latter asserting that “animal-rights philosophy
reinscribes animals as lesser human beings, failing to imagine a radical
egalitarianism” (296). Echoing the sentiments of McHugh and Tyler, Smith
recognizes that this “expert and engaging” diversity of animal studies holds the
potential to “gain respectability in humanities departments,” however she
concedes that as a consequence, animal studies will not be the “site of
unilateral advocacy” many (her included) had hoped for (297). Others, too, are
concerned about the increasing distance between animal advocacy and animal
studies. In “The Rise of Critical Animal Studies,” Steve Best expresses fears
that the field will be “co-opted, tamed, and neutralized by academia,” immersed
in “abstraction, indulgent use of existing and new modes of jargon [and] pursuit
of theory-for-
theory’s sake,” so that clear, lucid communication is “oiled over”
with “inscrutable language accessible only to experts” until the realities of living
Allmark-Kent 16
animals and their exploitation are completely “buried in dense theoretical webs”
(Best).
2
The distance between academic discourse and living animals is also a
concern for Charles Bergman, who wonders “what happens inside academe to
the sense of the presence of animals” (Bergman).
In “Making Animals Matter”
for
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