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which lay sixty-six miles off on the line of Kutuzov’s retreat.
If he reached Znaim before the French, there would be great
hope of saving the army; to let the French forestall him at
Znaim meant the exposure of his whole army to a disgrace
such as that of Ulm, or to utter destruction. But to forestall
the French with his whole army was impossible. The road
for the French from Vienna to Znaim was shorter and bet-
ter than the road for the Russians from Krems to Znaim.
The night he received the news, Kutuzov sent Bagration’s
vanguard, four thousand strong, to the right across the hills
from the Krems-Znaim to the Vienna-Znaim road. Bagra-
tion was to make this march without resting, and to halt
facing Vienna with Znaim to his rear, and if he succeeded in
forestalling the French he was to delay them as long as pos-
sible. Kutuzov himself with all his transport took the road
to Znaim.
Marching thirty miles that stormy night across roadless
hills, with his hungry, ill-shod soldiers, and losing a third
of his men as stragglers by the way, Bagration came out on
the Vienna-Znaim road at Hollabrunn a few hours ahead of
the French who were approaching Hollabrunn from Vien-
na. Kutuzov with his transport had still to march for some
days before he could reach Znaim. Hence Bagration with
his four thousand hungry, exhausted men would have to de-
tain for days the whole enemy army that came upon him
at Hollabrunn, which was clearly impossible. But a freak
of fate made the impossible possible.
The success of the
trick that had placed the Vienna bridge in the hands of the
French without a fight led Murat to try to deceive Kutuzov
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306
in a similar way. Meeting Bagration’s weak detachment on
the Znaim road he supposed it to be Kutuzov’s whole army.
To be able to crush it absolutely he awaited the arrival of
the rest of the troops who were on their way from Vienna,
and with this object offered a three days’ truce on condition
that both armies should remain in position without mov-
ing. Murat declared that negotiations for peace were already
proceeding, and that he therefore offered this truce to avoid
unnecessary bloodshed. Count Nostitz, the Austrian gener-
al occupying the advanced posts, believed Murat’s emissary
and retired, leaving Bagration’s division exposed. Another
emissary rode to the Russian
line to announce the peace
negotiations and to offer the Russian army the three days’
truce. Bagration replied that he was not authorized either to
accept or refuse a truce and sent his adjutant to Kutuzov to
report the offer he had received.
A truce was Kutuzov’s sole chance of gaining time, giv-
ing Bagration’s exhausted troops some rest, and letting the
transport and heavy convoys (whose movements were con-
cealed from the French) advance if but one stage nearer
Znaim. The offer of a truce gave the only, and a quite unex-
pected, chance of saving the army. On receiving the news he
immediately dispatched Adjutant General Wintzingerode,
who was in attendance on him, to the enemy camp. Win-
tzingerode was not merely to agree to the truce but also to
offer terms of capitulation, and meanwhile Kutuzov sent his
adjutants back to hasten to the utmost the movements of the
baggage trains of the entire army along the Krems-Znaim
road. Bagration’s exhausted and hungry detachment, which
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alone covered this movement
of the transport and of the
whole army, had to remain stationary in face of an enemy
eight times as strong as itself.
Kutuzov’s expectations that the proposals of capitula-
tion (which were in no way binding) might give time for
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