A comparative Analysis of John Foster Dulles and Henry A. Kissinger and the Impact Their Personalities Had on the Formulation of American Foreign Policy



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A Comparative Analysis of John Foster Dulles and Henry A. Kissing



Western Michigan University 
Western Michigan University 
ScholarWorks at WMU 
ScholarWorks at WMU 
Master's Theses 
Graduate College 
12-1981 
A Comparative Analysis of John Foster Dulles and Henry A. 
A Comparative Analysis of John Foster Dulles and Henry A. 
Kissinger and the Impact Their Personalities Had on the 
Kissinger and the Impact Their Personalities Had on the 
Formulation of American Foreign Policy 
Formulation of American Foreign Policy 
Denis Joseph Sullivan 
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https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses 
Part of the 
Political Science Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Recommended Citation 
Sullivan, Denis Joseph, "A Comparative Analysis of John Foster Dulles and Henry A. Kissinger and the 
Impact Their Personalities Had on the Formulation of American Foreign Policy" (1981). 
Master's Theses. 
3844. 
https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses/3844 
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ScholarWorks at WMU. It has been accepted for inclusion 
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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JOHN FOSTER DULLES AND 
HENRY A. KISSINGER AND THE IMPACT THEIR PERSONALITIES HAD ON THE 
FORMULATION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
by 
Denis Joseph Sullivan 
A Thesis 
Submitted to the 
Faculty of The Graduate College 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the 
Degree of Master of Arts 
Department of Political Science 
Western Michigan University 
Kalamazoo, Michigan 
December 1981 


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I am deeply indebted to Professor Lawrence Ziring for his advice 
and guidance during not only the writing of this thesis, but also 
throughout my career as a political science student. I thank my 
entire family for their prayers and interest in this project. 
Thank you, Mother, for your support. Thank you, Stephanie, for 
your love and encouragement. And, thank you, Lord, for bringing 
me through these many years healthy, happy, and always learning 
something new. 
Denis Joseph Sullivan 
ii 


A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JOHN FOSTER DULLES AND 
HENRY A KISSINGER AND THE IMPACT THEIR PERSONALITIES HAD ON THE 
FORMULATION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
' Denis Joseph Sullivan, M.A. 
Western Michigan University, 1981 
This thesis examines the impact of personality on the making of 
American foreign policy. John Foster Dulles and Henry A. Kissinger 
dominated the American foreign policy process. Their performance 
allows the political analyst to study the relationship between per­
sonality and policy-making. 
What follows is a study of John Foster Dulles and Henry Kissinger, 
their personal background and development, and especially the problems 
they faced as presidential advisors. Both men were challenged by wars 
in the Middle East. These Middle East conflicts are here presented as 
case studies and they reveal how each of these figures met the test. 
Efforts are made to show how early-life experience influences the han­
dling of world events. 


TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Chapter 
I. 
II. 
III. 
IV. 
Discussion of Content 
John Foster Dulles . .
Dulles: The maturing years 
Dulles: Emerging statesman 
Dulles: National leadership 
Republican idealogue on foreign affairs 
Psychological considerations 
Henry Alfred Kissinger 
Kissinger at Harvard . 
Council on Foreign Relations 
Teaching at Harvard 
Foreign policy advisor 
Kissinger's writings . 
Psychological considerations 
Dulles: Presidential Advisor and Secretary of 
State (1953-59) 
Liberation . . . . 
Agonizing reappraisal 
Massive retaliation 
Brinkmanship . . .
Suez 1956: A case study 
The impact of personality on policy 
iii 
ii 

10 
14 
20 
24 
27 
31 
38 
43 
45 
47 
48 
52 
55 
63 
65 
66 
69 
75 
77 
95 


Chapter 
V. 
VI. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
(Continued) 
Kissinger: Presidential Advisor and Secretary of 
State (1969-77) . • . . . . . . . . •
The Vietnam negotiations and settlement 
The Soviet Union: Detente, SALT, and Linkage 
Playing the China hand 
Neglected allies 
Watergate's impact on Kissinger's career 
·
The October War . . .
Psychological conclusions
Dulles and Kissinger in American Foreign Policy
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
iv 
100 
101 
106 
110 
llS 
llS 
ll7 
132 
135 
146 


CHAPTER I 
Discussion of Content 
This thesis focuses on the influence of personality in the making 
of American foreign policy. The persons under examination are John 
Foster Dulles and Henry A. Kissinger. The two men were chosen for 
this study because they revealed powerful intellectual ability, 
dominated those around them, and held strong convictions. They man­
aged U.S. foreign policy virtually alone and neither depended on nor 
trusted the State Department apparatus or other agencies of govern­
ment. Each man proved to be a one-man show. Foreign policy there­
fore was an extension of their ideas, attitudes, assumptions, exper­
iences, backgrounds, and personalities. 
Analyzing background and experience helps to explain the develop­
ment of personality. This thesis suggests that to analyze foreign 
policy decisions, personality must be studied, and to study person­
ality, background and experience must first be analyzed. There are 
many theories about personality development. James David Barber and 
Erik Erikson, two personality theorists from opposite ends of the 
theoretical spectrum, have been adopted for use in this thesis. 
Together, they offer insight into theories concerned with the develop­
ment of personality and its impact on the decision-making process. 
Barber is a behaviorist who describes how early childhood exper­
iences shape a person's character, way of seeing the world, and way 



of acting in response to his perceptions. He says that these early 
developments remain with a person throughout his life and continue 
to influence, if not actually dictate, the decisions he will make 
when confronted with various situations. Barber's (1977) analysis 
appears in The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the 
White House. Although a study of presidents, the analysis is also 
helpful in predicting behavior of other politicians, if not all human 
beings. 
Erikson is a developmentalist. He believes personality contin­
ues to develop throughout the entire life span. Behavior of an in­
dividual depends on what stage of development the person is in and 
how well he has progressed through the previous stages. Erikson 
(1950) offers eight stages and explains the benefits of successfully 
completing each and the consequences of failure to complete any or all 
of them. His analysis may be found in Childhood and Society. The 
Growth of Personality by Gordon R. Lowe (1972) gives the layman a 
clear picture not only of Erikson's neo-Freudian theory, but also 
of Freudian psycho-analysis. 
Survey material used in studying general foreign policy trends in 
the U.S. include An Introduction to American Foreign Policy (Knappen, 
1956). This work outlines the domestic influences on foriegn policy 
formulation. It describes the alliances, pacts, and treaties the U.S. 
is involved in. And it analyzes the Containment Theory as enunciated 
by George Kennan. World Politics: Trend and Transformation (Kegley & 
Wittkop£, 1981) studies the development of international relations, 
the origins and evolution of the cold war, oil politics, disarmament 



and arms control, and various other topics. 
Since 1945: Politics and Diplomacy in Recent American History 
(Divine, 1979) gives an overview of the major foreign and domestic 
issues as they were dealt with by successive presidents, Truman through 
Carter. The U.S. Since 1945: The Ordeal of Power (Grantham, 1976) 
surveys U.S. foreign policy decisions while attempting to point out 
the continuity between pre-World War II America and the years since 
then. 
The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Readings and Documents (Moore, 1977) 
provides readings on the underlying causes of the conflict, articles 
relating to each of the four major wars, the role of the U.N. in 
dealing with the conflict, and personal thoughts on settling the 
disputes. 
Biographies of and others works dealing specifically with Dulles 
include John Foster Dulles (Beal, 1957). This biography views Dulles 
in a favorable light and reads as if Dulles never made a mistake and 
as if all his actions were justifiable when handling American foreign 
policy. Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen and John Foster Dulles 
and Their Family Network (Mosley, 1978) deals with John Foster Dulles 
in a more critical way. While recognizing that Dulles had some suc­
cesses, Mosley sees him more as a ruthless and arrogant manipulator 
of world events while at the helm of the U.S. foreign policy ship. 
He also describes the close familial and political relationship which 
John Foster enjoyed with Eleanor and Allen. 
Michael A. Guhin's John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and His 
Times (1972) studies the political philosophy of Dulles, its origins, 



and its influence on the direction of U.S. foreign policy. It is 
biographical and somewhat psycho-historical in that it hopes to ex­
plain his policies based on his philosophy, which is rooted in his 
personality and background. John Fpster Dulles: A Reappraisal (Goold­
Adams, 1962) is a critique of Dulles' record as Secretary of State. 
The author wrote that he tried to look dispassionately at that record. 
Although he did allow that Dulles dealt with some crises with success, 
he seemed overly critical of Dulles' handling of the Suez Crisis of 
1956. Duel at the Brink: John Foster Dulles' Command of American 
Power (Drummond & Coblentz, 1960) is that even-handed discussion of 
Dulles as Secretary of State which previously-mentioned authors claimed 
to be writing but failed to achieve. This work sets up a balance 
sheet of Dulles' major foreign policies and assigns to each a PLUS 
or MINUS, designating a policy that succeeded by benefitting the U.S. 
leadership role or one that failed by backfiring to the benefit of the 
Communist bloc. 
Dulles on Diplomacy (Bertling, 1965), as the title suggests, con­
centrates on Dulles' views on negotiating with the Soviets, disarma­
ment, Communist China's threat to American interests, and the U.N.'s 
role in achieving a peaceful world. 
Dulles wrote two books: War, Peace and Change (1939) and War or 
Peace (1950). These are outlined in detail in Chapter II. 
Kissinger's biographical material includes a favorable work by 
Marvin and Bernard Kalb entitled Kissinger (1974). The work outlines 
Kissinger's pre-National Security Council days from Germany to New 
York, Harvard, and Washington. It also gives a detailed account of 



the war and negotiations with the Vietnamese. And it discusses detente, 
SALT and linkage, the opening to China, and the Middle East diplomacy 
up through early 1974. Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind (Graubard, 
1973) describes Kissinger the intellectual, the scholar of foreign 
affairs, the critic of American foreign policy as practiced by various 
presidents, and the American with the European mind. The author, a 
friend of Kissinger, tells his readers not to be surprised or startled 
by any policy Kissinger may announce. The policy undoubtedly will be 
found, however generally, in Kissinger's writings. 
Another friend and colleague of Kissinger who wrote a book about 
him is John C. Stoessinger. His book is Henry Kissinger: The Anguish 
of Power (1976). Stoessinger also relies on Kissinger's writings to 
explain the latter's philosophy on various subjects--e.g., power and 
force, history and destiny, stability and peace. But this is only a 
small part of the book and therefore not as extensive as Graubard's 
work. The majority of this work deals with Kissinger the Statesman 
and his foreign policy achievements in Vietnam, China, the Soviet 
Union, and the Middl� East. Kissinger: The European Mind in American 
Policy (Mazlish, 1976) is a biography and a discussion of his philo­
sophy, policies, and actions. It is a fine psychological survey, but 
it approaches incredulity when it attempts to explain Kissinger's 
supposed neuroses as the result of a love-hate relationship with his 
father. For example, Mazlish says this relationship caused Kissinger 
to retain his accent, give up his faith, and have a penchant for things 
German. 



Kissinger: The Adventures of Superkraut (Ashman, 1972) is part 
biography, part expose of Kissinger's secret sex life. Kissinger: The 
Uses of Power (Landau, 1972) was written before Kissinger concluded a 
peace agreement with Le Due Tho, but it asserts that Kissinger's 
Vietnam policy was a failure. But more than just Vietnam, Landau 
asserts that Kissinger's entire approach to international relations 
was a failure. The Kissinger Experience: American Policy in the 
Middle East (AlRoy, 1975) suggests that Kissinger manipulated the 
October 1973 War to achieve a stalemate so his diplomatic efforts 
would find anxious participants. 
Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy 
(Morris, 1977) claims to be the inside story to Kissinger's handling 
of foreign policy. Morris worked for Kissinger on the National Se­
curity Council until May 1970, when he resigned as a protest to the 
bombing of Cambodia. He criticizes Kissinger for his Machiavellian 
handling of foreign policy in Vietnam, Chile, Cyprus, Angola, and 
Biafra, among other areas. 
Four major works by Kissinger used in the present report are: 

A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 
1812-22 (1957); Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (1957); The Necessity 
for Choice (1961); and White House Years (1979). These works are dis­
cussed in detail in Chapters III and V. 
A New History of the Cold War (Lukacs, 1966) attempts a descrip­
tion of how and why the Cold War evolved. It is not a definitive 
history, as the author admits, but it does cover the main events of 
this era of tension between East and West. I. F. Stone's The Haunted 


Fifties (1969) is a collection of his articles written between 1953 
and 1961. The work outlines the foreign and domestic policy issues 
relevant to the 1950's--McCarthyism, Civil Rights, the Cold War, the 
Warren Court, to name but a few. 
The Compact History of the Korean War (Middleton, 1965) describes 
how the war started and gives details of various military campaigns. 
The diplomatic efforts are not analyzed to the same extent but do 
describe the results of those efforts. The Korean Knot (Berger, 
1957) fills in what Middleton's work leaves out. It describes the 
diplomatic 
·
efforts before and during the war. 
A Short History of the Vietnam War (Millett, 1978) is a collection 
of articles on the military, political and diplomatic aspects of the 
conflict. It also provides a useful chronology of events at the end 
of the book. George C. Herring wrote America's Longest War (1979). 
This is a history which analyzes U.S. policies toward Indochina from 
World War II to 1975. It describes how each president from Roosevelt 
to Ford viewed the region and any U.S. involvement there. 
Suez: The Seven Day War (Barker, 1964) is a description of the 
military operation carried out by Israel, France, and Britain against 
Egypt in 1956. Suez Thrombosis (Bindra, 1969) gives a brief account 
of the origins of Arab-Israeli tensions. The work is mainly concerned 
with the 1956 and 1967 closures of the Suez Canal, why these occurred, 
and what hopes there are for peace in the region. 
Crisis: The Inside Story of the Suez Conspiracy (Robertson, 1965) 
reveals an account of the Israeli-British-French collusion to invade 
Egypt. Robertson, a Canadian, also stresses the diplomatic efforts of 



Lester Pearson, then-Canadian Ambassador to the U.N., to find a peace­
ful solution to the long-standing Middle East conflict. Dulles Over 
Suez (Finer, 1964) is severely critical of Dulles, Nasser, and to 
some extent, Eisenhower. It is also highly supportive of the British­
French-Israeli hostilities taken against Egypt. Due to Finer's ob­
vious biases, the work cannot be viewed as an objective piece of 
analysis and therefore has no substantial contribution to serious 
literature. 
Suez and After (Adams, 1958) is a compilation of a journalist's 
news dispatches regarding the 1956 Suez Crisis. As such, the work 
contains some analysis by an author who was, admittedly, untrained in 
the field of Arab or Middle East politics. But the work is useful 
in cases where the straight facts are presented. 
Insight on the Middle East War (Insight Team of the Sunday Times, 
1974) describes events leading to the Arab attack on Israel in 1973 
and the course of the ensuing war. Israel and the Arabs: The October 
1973 War (Sobel, 1974) presents the straight facts, without analysis, 
on a wide range of interrelated issues. This work gives information 
about mounting tensions in 1972 and 1973, the outbreak of hostilities, 
and the subsequent peace efforts. Peace-Making in the Middle East 
(Sobel, 1980) takes up where the previous work left off in 1974 .. 
This work ends with the presentation of the facts surrounding the 
signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979. 
The Road to Ramadan (Heikal, 1975), in addition to reporting the 
Arab view of the 1973 War, reports the events which led to the Arab 
attack on Israel. Heikal says the Arabs could have defeated Israel 



if they had continued on the offensive while relying on their moral 
strength. 
Suez 1956 (Bowie, 1974) is concerned primarily with the legal 
position each side of the crisis relied on in their quest for justice. 
It explores the role international law played in the decisions and 
actions of the major participants to the dispute. Decisions in Crisis 
(Brecher, 1980) is a comparison of the decisions made and how they were 
made in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars. It describes the deci­
sion makers and what psychological factors were working on them. 
Decade of Decisions (Quandt, 1977) gives accounts of the 1967 and 
1973 Middle East Wars. It also describes the inter-war period and the 
U.S. initiatives to avoid another war. Further, this work details 
Kissinger's ·step-by-step diplomacy, which resulted in disengagement 
agreements between adversaries. This is an objective, fair, and 
well-informed account of American foreign policy making in the Middle 
East between the years of 1967 and 1976. 



CHAPTER II 
John Foster Dulles 
John Foster Dulles was born on February 25, 1888 in the home of 
his maternal grandparents in Washington, D.C. John Foster's mother, 
Edith, was the daughter of John Watson Foster, who became Secretary 
of State in the Benjamin Harrison Administration (1889-1893) four 
years after John Foster was born. John Watson Foster was a man of 
great influence in the Republican Party, as well as in the business 
and banking world. John Watson Foster's father, Matthew, was an 
Indiana farmer whose parents--George and Jane Watson Forster* of 
England--emigrated in 1815 to America following the end of the Napa-
leonic Wars. 
John Watson Foster loved the frontier life and tried to pass 
along to John Foster Dulles a living sense of the pioneer American 
spirit. In 1955, Secretary Dulles spoke of his family history after 
receiving an honorary degree from the University of Indiana: 
My grandfather, whose name I bear, exerted a great in­
fluence over my life, and he had ideals and purposes 
which I have tried to make my own. He was a deeply 
patriotic American. He belonged to the period which 
saw this country rapidly developing from a small Atlan­
tic coast group into a nation that spread across the 
continent. He fought to preserve the union; and then '.I 
on diplomatic missions and as Secretary of State he 
helped to spread the influence of this nation through­
out the world both in Europe and Asia. (Beal, 1957, 
pp. 25-26) 

The Forster name changed to Foster when the family emigrated 
to America. 
10 


As a youth, John Foster would spend most of his summers with 
his maternal grandfather in Henderson, New York, and the two would 
go on fishing trips which sometimes included renowned financiers, 
senators, and statesmen. John Foster's uncle, Robert Lansing, who 
later became Secretary of State under Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921), 
often joined the fishing party. William Howard Taft, Andrew Carnegie, 
and Bernard Baruch were but a few of the many guests in Henderson. 
John Foster greatly admired his grandfather and enjoyed listening 
to his stories about his travels in China, Mexico, Russia, and Japan. 
These moments with his grandfather served as John Foster's introduction 
to international affairs. 
11 
Allen Macy Dulles, John Foster's father, was pastor of the First 
Presbyterian Church in Watertown, New York. Allen's grandfather, 
Joseph, was the first of the Dulles clan to arrive in the United States. 
In 1776, Joseph arrived in Charleston, South Carolina, but moved to 
Philadelphia in 1792 where he became a wealthy merchant. He died 
in 1818. John Foster's paternal grandfather, the son of Joseph, died 
one year after John Foster was born. 
Allen Macy Dulles was the major influence in John Foster's reli­
gious development. The Reverend Dulles was a theological moderate 
with some liberal tendencies. He disassociated himself from the die­
hard clergy and the fundamentalists by supporting and encouraging 
intellectual inquiry and science. He encouraged John Foster to adopt 
moderate religious views. But the five Dulles children still had 
a strict religious upbringing. Each week they attended Sunday school, 


three Sunday worship services, Monday night young people's service, 
Wednesday prayer meeting, and Friday preparatory service whenever 
Communion was to be served the following Sunday. Sundays also en­
tailed learning a poem, a chapter of the Bible--either from Psalms 
or the New Testament--and one or two verses of a hymn. 
John Foster soon learned all of John's Gospel and eventually 
became proficient at citing the Bible. He was a fervent Christian, 
so much so that he often made others feel sinful and guilty when they 
did something with which John Foster did not approve. Early in life 
he developed a rigid code that controlled his behavior. Learning 
seemed to come naturally to him. Aside from the Bible, John Foster 
read the classics at an early age. He devoured Shakespeare, Dickens, 
Spencer and Scott and read Voltaire, Moliere, and La Fountaine in the 
original French. He also traveled widely with his family to France, 
Germany, and Switzerland, usually touring by bicycle. 
John Foster's childhood was not all work and no play. He was 
not above playing hooky from school to go fishing. He admitted to 
getting his hands caned and his ears cuffed for throwing spitballs 
in class. 
(He eventually praised his public school education be-
cause it preached a good old Americanism and pride in country.) 
John Foster joined boys' gangs and threw snowballs after school. He 
also enjoyed playing with his brother and sisters. But, "though there 
were five children, it was always as a triad that Eleanor, Allen and 
Foster Dulles spent the formative years in Watertown and Henderson, 
and this grouping was something that would continue throughout their 
lives, each of them symbiotically feeding on the other emotionally, 
12 


professionally, and politically." (Hosley, 1978, p. 20) And there 
was never any doubt that Foster was the strong personality and leader 
of the trio. The three trained themselves to be tough. They would 
jump out of John Foster's dinghy, Boat No. 5 as it was called, and take 
a swim (as long as the water was above 50 degrees Farenheit). John 
Foster always outlasted his two siblings, who neither could equal 
his record of swimming the five-mile round-trip of Henderson Harbor. 
No. 5 was a gift to John Foster by his grandfather, John Watson Foster. 
The gift was a recompense when John Foster had to miss a 1901 Pan­
American exposition due to an illness. 
John Foster developed into an adept sailor. Sailing taught him 
self-reliance, for many times his life literally depended on how 
well he handled his ship. It taught him patience, since there was no 
sense worrying during periods of calm. It taught him courage, re­
straint, and steadiness when management of the craft required calm, 
taut-nerved operation. No. 5 instilled a love of sailing that stayed 
with John Foster all through life. 
As children of a minister, the Dulleses never felt a conflict 
between what they believed and how they lived. There was no sense 
of inferiority on Foster's part as a son of a preacher. In fact, he 
may even have felt a sense of superiority because of his religious 
fervor and his quest for perfection in the human condition. His 
family had the "usual" family problems, but they adjusted to them. 
Reverend Dulles earned $3,000 annually, which in itself represented 
considerable buying power in the late 1800's and early 1900's. But he 
had a private income (source unknown) which paid the costs of family 
13 


travel abroad. 
John Foster Dulles experienced a generally normal and probably 
exceptionally happy childhood. He was born into an aristocratic 
family which emphasized Christian values, intellectual inquiry, and 
sportsmanship; a family which traveled extensively, and which bene­
fitted from the wealth of experiences and connections of a family 
patriarch, world traveler and statesman: John Watson Foster. 
Dulles: The maturing years 
In 1904, when Foster was 16, his parents and his grandfather de­
cided that only a university could continue to challenge Foster's men­
tal capacity and he was enrolled in Princeton University. John Foster 
found his studies easy. He had a quick mind and excellent power of 
concentration. But he continued to play hard, too. Though he joined 
no clubs, he passed his leisure time playing whist, bridge, and poker. 
He took part in debate but never tried out for varsity. He also en­
joyed chess. 
John Foster's first English paper was turned in September 24, 
1904 and was entitled, "My Preparation for English". The work was 
full of misspellings, but what showed through the piece was "a curious 
combination of shyness, intellectual self-confidence, conventional 
modesty, and unconventional tendency toward iconolasm." (Beal, 1957, 
p. 31) He admitted that he never had an English course yet asserted
that he knew basic grammatical rules from what he picked up from study­
ing Latin and Greek. He told how his knowledge of literature came 
from reading the "masterpieces"--reading not as a task, which entails 
14 


dissecting them piecemeal, but rather as a whole, to get a clearer 
picture of their entirety. He admitted he wrote few essays and told 
of his surprise that he was ever allowed to enter college--"as far 
as English preparation is concerned". 
Near the end of his junior year, John Foster was invited by his 
grandfather to attend the International Peace Conference at The Hague. 
This was the second such conference at The Hague. The first, held in 
1899, was attended by 26 nations. The second drew representation from 
44--virtually every nation on earth. This conference met from June 
15 to October 18 and encountered big-power opposition to disarmament 
recommendations. Nor could it prevent World War I. The conference 
however, achieved many successes. It encouraged the peaceful solution 
of international disputes; it adopted rules for warning would-be 
victims if hostilities were inevitable; and it urged nations to set 
up an international court of justice (which was established after 
World War I). 
John Foster Dulles was a secretary to the Chinese delegation to 
the conference. The delegation members spoke English but not French-­
the language of diplomacy. John Foster was fluent in French and be­
came the delegation's translator. But his first contribution to the 
conference related to protocol. The participants of the conference 
could not decide on the order of precedence for courtesy calls on one 
another. John Foster was helpful in getting the conference started 
by seeing to it that all calling cards were delivered simultaneously. 
It was exciting for John Foster to see the most noted statesmen of his 
day and the clash of national interests they represented. 
15 


His experiences at the conference convinced him that increased 
cooperation between the nations was possible. These experiences also 
deepened a conflict in John Foster--whether to be a Christian minister, 
like his father, or a lawyer and a diplomat, like his grandfather. 
All through his life, John Foster's father and grandfather repre­
sented positions that did not conflict and in fact that complemented 
each other. Each man, father and grandfather, had hopes of John Foster 
choosing a career following his own. John Foster was at a crossroads. 
He had to decide which career to pursue, for he only had one year left 
at college and it was necessary to make plans for whatever was to fol­
low. He left The Hague Conference still undecided and returned to his 
senior year at Princeton. 
John Foster's major at Princeton was philosophy, which also en­
tailed several courses in psychology. He was elected to Phi Beta 
Kappa and did his senior thesis on "The Theory of Judgment," a 19-
page paper on pragmatism. This paper won him the Chancellor Green 
Mental Science Fellowship, a $600 scholarship to the Sorbonne in Paris 
to study for a year under Henri Bergson, French philosopher and Nobel 
Prize winner. John Foster stood second in the Princeton class of 1908 
and gave the valedictory speech at the graduation ceremonies. He was 
20 years old. 
The Dulles family left for Paris in the summer of 1908. While at 
the Sorbonne, John Foster developed a life-long appreciation for the 
French heritage and a patience with France in her days of political 
impotence. This patience was to yield to an "agonizing" feeling when 
he felt compelled to "reappraise" U.S.-France relations when he became 
16 


17 
Secretary of State. In addition to philosophy, John Foster also studied 
international law at the Sorbonne, and he leaned toward law and diplo­
macy as a career. This development greatly pleased his grandfather. 
On his return to the United States, John Foster enrolled in George 
Washington Law School in Washington, D.C. He chose George Washington 
so he could live with his grandparents. John Foster not only completed 
the three-year law program in two years, he also kept an active social 
life. He was invited to parties which his grandparents also attended 
and he became well acquainted with Washington social circles. John 
Foster made the highest marks ever achieved at George Washington Law 
School, but despite this performance he was refused a degree because 
he did not meet the required three years of study. The University did 
not award him his degree until some 25 years later, when he was already 
a leader of the bar. 
After he finished his law program, John Foster returned to Auburn 
(where his family had moved a few years previously) to study for the 
New York State bar exams. On the one side he prepared for the exams 
by cramming, while on the other he took long study breaks so he could 
go canoeing with a friend. During the exams he answered enough ques­
tions to satisfy himself that he had passed and he left the test early 
because he had a date with his canoeing friend, Janet Avery. "It was 
while they were canoeing on Owasco Lake that he asked Janet to marry him 
and she accepted at once." (Mosley, 1978, p. 28) That night, Foster 
told his parents of his engagement and they did not object. Janet's 
parents, however, were not so calm about the idea. They knew little 
about John Foster and they wondered if he was worthy enough to be 


admitted to their family circle. The Averys need not have worried. 
John Foster passed the bar exams, as he knew he would, and he was on 
his way to New York City to find a job. 
For six weeks John Foster applied for jobs with the more notable 
New York attorneys without success. These attorneys had their choice 
from Harvard, Yale and Columbia Law School graduates, many of whom 
also had post-graduate degrees from Oxford and Cambridge. Princeton 
was, in those days, a provincial college for would-be clergymen. 
Harvard-bred lawyers told Foster they considered his alma mater a 
"country club". Washington Law School did not have much standing in 
New York. And any tourist could enroll for a summer course at the 
Sorbonne. Thus, what John Foster considered to be excellent qualifi­
cations for international law, including his mastery of French and 
Spanish and his adequate German, the law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell 
found to be "commonplace" and did not hire him. 
Discouraged but far from crushed, John Foster enlisted the help 
of his grandfather. Prior to the Civil War, John Watson Foster had 
been associated with the Cincinnati law firm of Algernon S. Sullivan. 
Sullivan later moved to New York and founded Sullivan & Cromwell. 
Grandfather Foster gave his grandson a letter to the surviving part­
ner, William Cromwell, recalling their old association and outlining 
young John Foster's qualifications. It was not Cromwell's practice to 
interview applicants for his firm, but he made an exception for John 
Foster. He decided to give him a chance. 
John Foster Dulles received $50 a month as a starting law clerk, 
but the experience proved far more rewarding. Sullivan & Cromwell 
18 


had extensive legal business with Latin America and John Foster, with 
his command of the Spanish language, became the firm's representative 
in the region. On one of his trips to British Guyana, John Foster con­
tracted malaria and nearly died. He was treated with heavy doses of 
quinine, a drug which affected his optic nerve and left his sight im­
paired. Afterwards, he wore glasses and had a tic in his left eye for 
the rest of his life. But by the end of John Foster's first year with 
Sullivan & Cromwell, his salary had risen to $100 a month, and he be­
came an established member of the firm. 
John Foster and Janet were married in Auburn on June 26, 1912. 
His grandfather intended to leave $20,000 to each of his grandchild­
ren when he died, but he told John Foster he could start drawing on 
his inheritance to further his career. With this financial support, 
Janet was able to accompany John Foster on his trips abroad. One trip 
Janet did not go on, however, was one made by John Foster in 1917 at 
19 
the prodding of his uncle, Robert Lansing, then Secretary of State under 
Woodrow Wilson. 
John Foster Dulles accepted a secret assignment in Central America 
where he gained the assurances from the Nicaraguan, Costa Rican, and 
Panamanian governments that they would align their policies with the 
United States in the impending war against Germany. The Latin Ameri­
cans also promised they would hunt down German spies and saboteurs 
who might interfere with the passage of military supplies through the 
Panama Canal. 


Dulles: Emerging statesman 
Returning to the U.S., John Foster Dulles applied for active 
military service but was turned down because of his poor eyesight. 
Instead he was commissioned as an Army captain (and was promoted to 
major by the end of the war). He was assigned to the War Trade Board 
superintending shipments to neutral countries as the assistant to 
Vance McCormick, the Board's chairman. Dulles' position also brought 
him into contact with Bernard Baruch, one of the more influential 
men of the day. Baruch ran the War Industries Board, which mobilized 
domestic production. Dulles' position would better serve him in his 
future career than would active duty. He learned firsthand how to 
deal with foreign governments and with domestic bureaucracies, such 
as the War and Navy Departments. Dulles regretted the fact that a 
physical infirmity kept him out of the active service. 
World War I ended on November 11, 1918. Dulles heard that 
President Wilson would personally lead the U.S. delegation to the 
treaty negotiations at Versailles and he asked his Uncle Bert (Lansing) 
if he (Dulles) might go along to Versailles. But Lansing had had a 
falling out of sorts with the President and felt himself lucky to be 
going and therefore did not want to press his luck by asking that his 
nephew go along with the delegation. There were other ways for Dulles 
to get to Versailles. Bernard Baruch was impressed by Dulles' clear­
mindedness and his legal and organizing abilities. When Baruch was 
named head of the American Delegation on Reparations, he asked Dulles 
to serve as the delegation's counsel. 
20 


The Allies were in bad financial shape after the war. Their 
21 
citizens had suffered considerable property damage and they also faced 
the burden of wartime taxes. Some leaders falsely asserted that Germany 
was able and should be requested to pay large amounts of reparations 
to the victorious allies. Baruch later reported on this spirit of 
vengeance or selfish advantage that was present in the minds of the 
framers of the treaty. The U.S., however, was the only delegation 
with a definite reparations scheme, and it had been drafted by Dulles. 
The scheme would exact from Germany the cost of damages resulting 
directly from acts clearly in violation of international law as well 
as damages to civilian populations and their property. Other delega­
tions merely filed general statements demanding compensation for all 
damages--direct and indirect. 
It was up to Dulles to argue the U.S. position. He said America 
joined with the others in condemning Germany's instigation of war as 
an international crime and that the U.S. had a substantial war debt, 
too. But he said the delegates must be bound by the pre-Armistice 
agreement, which the Allies offered and which the Germans accepted 
and which did not call for the heavy reparations that some of the 
delegates were seeking. 
Gentlemen, if we hold to the domain of reason, we cannot 
adopt such methods. To demand the gigantic total of war 
costs would be to jeopardize securing that specific re­
paration as to which Germany must clearly recognize her 
liability, and the satisfactions of which will tax her 
resources to the limit. (Beal, 1957, p. 68) 
Dulles found himself in agreement with John Maynard Keynes, who also 
attended the negotiations. They held to the position that exacting 


22 
a heavy toll from the Germans, who were unable to pay, would threaten 
starvation and sow the seeds of unrest. Dulles wanted Germany as a 
productive, stabilizing, consuming nation. 
President Wilson asked Dulles to stay on in Europe as American 
representative on the Reparations Commission. Dulles was 31 years 
old and he found it exciting working with prominent and powerful min­
isters from the other countries. Dulles' service ended in the fall of 
1919 when the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, under pressure 
from postwar isolationists, passed a resolution that the U.S. should 
not be represented on the reparations group. Dulles, a Republican, 
was disappointed with the isolationists because they were mostly 
members of his party. He saw American isolationism as the inability 
to face up to international responsibilities to insure the peace. 
When Dulles returned from Paris, he had earned international re­
spect and recognition as a diplomat and expert on reparations and in­
ternational finance. His experiences at Versailles conditioned his 
actions for the rest of his life. Thereafter, Dulles was interested 
in equitable solutions to international problems. He was also more 
sensitive to the need for Senate involvement in and support for Ameri­
ca's role in world affairs. 
Dulles became a junior partner of Sullivan & Cromwell in 1919 
and the senior partner in 1926. He continued to take an active inter­
est in German reparations and allied indebtedness to the U.S. Between 
1920 and 1923, most of his speeches and writings were on these problems. 
He continued to blame Germany for its crimes in World War I. But in 
December of 1922, he blamed Wilson for demanding huge reparations from 


Germany, which heavily taxed Germany's ability to pay any reparations. 
Dulles suggested a moratorium on reparation payments so Germany could 
"get its house in order". 
(New York Times, December 20, 1922) 
In 1924, the Dawes Plan was formulated to provide loans for 
Germany and to moderate Germany's payments for a few years. Dulles 
supported this plan but felt it was not enough because it did not set 
a fixed amount for Germany's obligations. Nor did it set a date when 
payments would cease. In 1926 and again in 1928, in speeches to the 
Foreign Policy Association, Dulles urged the continuance of loans to 
foreign countries, which could in turn buy U.S. exports. "Otherwise, 
our neighbors would starve while we had surplus goods rotting in our 
warehouses." (New York Times, March 25, 1928) 
At a Conference on the Causes of War, Dulles said the greatest 
danger to the peace lies in the "impulse to retain such wealth as 
we have. Under changing economic conditions men opt for the status 
quo. Government is a strong ally in this struggle to retain wealth 
and position. Under such conditions, a powerful and ruling class is 
apt to use its wealth and position to put into power ... a strong govern­
ment." (New York Times, January 21, 1925) 
After World War II started in 1939, Dulles formulated a Plan for 
Peace which called for limiting national sovereignty. His proposal 
involved a willingness on the part of nations to adhere to rules made 
by an international organization. 
(New York Times, October 29, 1939) 
Dulles argued that the U.S. must take the lead in developing an inter­
national organization but that it must avoid war in order to devote 
full attention to the project. 
23 


24 
Dulles presented his plans in his first book: War, Peace and 
Change. He started with the premise that change is inevitable and 
desirable. If change is not allowed to occur peacefully, then violent 
change will occur. His work was against status quo thinking and the 
ideology of nationalism. He hoped to find the causes of war and to 
eradicate them. Dulles did not justify the expansionist policies of 
Germany, Japan and Italy, as he had been criticized for doing. He 
merely explained why they happened. He criticized the self-righteous 
attempts to personify nations as either heroes or villains. He re­
jected isolationism and he rejected one-world government. The estab­
lishment of international agencies not limited or restricted by national 
sovereignty would begin "that dilution of sovereignty which all enlight­
ened thinkers agree to be indispensable." (New York Times, October 29, 
1939) 
Dulles: National leadership 
Dulles was named Chairman of the Commission on a Just and Durable 
Peace, created by the Federal Council of Churches in early 1941. The 
Federal Council of Churches was formed in 1908 for the purpose of 
greater Christian unity. Goals of the Council focused initially on 
the solution of industrial problems; the Council sought to effectuate 
the abolition of child labor, to shorten the work week, to establish 
a minimtnn wage and to insure the right to organize workers. The Council 
was also involved in political issues. It urged President Franklin D. 
·Roosevelt (1933-45) to stay out of World War II; it further advocated
a world organization in a letter to Roosevelt where the "sovereignty


25 
of the individual state would be limited to the interests of a world 
community". (Singer, 1975, p. 104) 
As Chairman of the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace, Dulles 
was in contact with hundreds of religious leaders (who were predominant­
ly Protestant). He sought to move public opinion by encouraging these 
leaders to preach to their congregations on the necessity for non­
involvement in the "European" war. Dulles defended, even demanded, 
Christian involvement in the political process to insure good govern­
ment. 
In his quest for a lasting peace, Dulles criticized the Atlantic 
Charter declaration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston 
Churchchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain, because it did not spe­
cifically provide for a world organization. Though the Charter pro­
vided for "a wider and permanent system of general security," Roosevelt 
rejected Churchchill's explicit plan to work for an international 
agency. 
(Knappen, 1956, pp. 235 & 249) Roosevelt was aware of past 
American opposition to international organizations. But friendly 
American reception to the Atlantic Charter persuaded him that such a 
project might again be politically feasible. Dulles felt the Charter 
did not go far enough in promoting a new international system of se­
curity. He said the end of the war would find a concentration of power 
in one or two hands and that this power must be used, not to per­
petuate itself, "but to create, support and eventually give way to 
international institutions drawing their vitality from the whole family 
of nations". (Beal, 1957, p. 91) 
Once the United States entered World War II, Dulles warned Americans 


not to think of victory as a "push over". It was an illusion to think 
that just because the U.S. was in the war, victory was at hand. Vic­
tory would come in the long run. The war itself should be viewed as 
a mission to achieve a lasting peace. 
As Chairman of the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace, Dulles 
formulated his plan for a lasting peace. His plan was known as "Six 
Pillars of Peace" and called for, among other things, collaboration 
between all nations, assurance of autonomy for subject peoples, con­
trol of armaments, and world organization. John D. Rockefeller spoke 
in favor of Dulles' plan. Dulles sought to promote his plan to the 
American public. Though not enthusiastic about Dulles' plan, Roosevelt 
was certain that the American public would support U.S. participation 
in a world organization. Roosevelt set Secretary of State Cordell 
26 
Hull to work on plans for the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, which developed 
the scheme for the United Nations. 
On April 6, 1945, Dulles became a general advisor to the U.S. 
delegation at the San Francisco Conference which formalized the estab­
lishment of the United Nations (U.N.). The U.S. delegation agreed not 
to leak anything to the press about the behind-the-scenes creation of 
the U.N. But everyday Dulles was reportedly out in the hotel corri­
dors leaking to newsmen details of the day's discussions. As a gen­
eral advisor, Dulles was at the conference to offer suggestions and to 
represent the Republicans. He was not an official spokesman. Demo­
crats saw Dulles' leaking of news to the media as an attempt by him to 
advertise his contributions to the conference, regardless of their 
actual importance, and to promote the Republican party. Dulles, 


although not on record in response to this point, always desired 
strong public support for governmental programs. He apparently justi­
fied his actions, correctly or incorrectly, as an attempt to get public 
opinion behind the conference's goals and to assure its success. 
Republican ideologue on foreign affairs 
27 
The above example of bipartisan participation was not the first 
program in which Dulles participated. In 1944, Thomas Dewey ran for 
President on the Republican ticket against Roosevelt. Dulles became 
Dewey's foreign policy advisor. The Republicans criticized the 
Dwn­
barton Oaks conference. Dewey and Dulles feared the proposed interna­
tional organization "smacked too much of big-power control of the world, 
without adequate representation for little nations". (Beal, 1957, p. 
97) The White House denied this accusation and at a press conference,
Secretary Hull announced he would confer with Dewey to explain the 
administration's policy. Dewey accepted the invitation but he sent 
Dulles to confer with Hull. Dulles and Hull spent hours quibbling 
over the terms to describe U.S. policy toward the U.N. Hull wanted to 
use the term 'non-partisan', which indicated that issues were not split 
by party lines or partisan sentiments. Dulles preferred 'bi-partisan', 
indicating that both parties worked together on a solution. Dulles 
preferred bi-partisanship because it granted the Republicans equal 
status in a politically profitable project. This was the same reason 
why Hull and Roosevelt rejected the term. Dulles finally conceded 
to Hull's demands. The two agreed that Roosevelt and Dewey should not 
campaign on a promise for world organization. Both favored the 


28 
organization, but they had different opinions on how it should be 
established. They and their advisors did not want these differences 
to be debated in the campaign, thus risking a division of the American 
public which could threaten public support for the United Nations. 
In 1945, Dulles was involved in another bipartisan conference. 
He was the Republican representative and the counselor to Secretary 
of State James Byrnes at the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in 
London. Byrnes was ready to yield to uncompromising Soviet demands 
which would have knocked France and China out of discussions at the 
meeting. The Soviets claimed the French and Chinese had no right to 

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