A comparative Analysis of John Foster Dulles and Henry A. Kissinger and the Impact Their Personalities Had on the Formulation of American Foreign Policy
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Western Michigan University Western Michigan University ScholarWorks at WMU ScholarWorks at WMU Master's Theses Graduate College 12-1981 A Comparative Analysis of John Foster Dulles and Henry A. A Comparative Analysis of John Foster Dulles and Henry A. Kissinger and the Impact Their Personalities Had on the Kissinger and the Impact Their Personalities Had on the Formulation of American Foreign Policy Formulation of American Foreign Policy Denis Joseph Sullivan Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses Part of the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Recommended Citation Sullivan, Denis Joseph, "A Comparative Analysis of John Foster Dulles and Henry A. Kissinger and the Impact Their Personalities Had on the Formulation of American Foreign Policy" (1981). Master's Theses. 3844. https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses/3844 This Masters Thesis-Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate College at ScholarWorks at WMU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please contact wmu-scholarworks@wmich.edu . A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JOHN FOSTER DULLES AND HENRY A. KISSINGER AND THE IMPACT THEIR PERSONALITIES HAD ON THE FORMULATION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY by Denis Joseph Sullivan A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of The Graduate College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts Department of Political Science Western Michigan University Kalamazoo, Michigan December 1981 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am deeply indebted to Professor Lawrence Ziring for his advice and guidance during not only the writing of this thesis, but also throughout my career as a political science student. I thank my entire family for their prayers and interest in this project. Thank you, Mother, for your support. Thank you, Stephanie, for your love and encouragement. And, thank you, Lord, for bringing me through these many years healthy, happy, and always learning something new. Denis Joseph Sullivan ii A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JOHN FOSTER DULLES AND HENRY A KISSINGER AND THE IMPACT THEIR PERSONALITIES HAD ON THE FORMULATION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY ' Denis Joseph Sullivan, M.A. Western Michigan University, 1981 This thesis examines the impact of personality on the making of American foreign policy. John Foster Dulles and Henry A. Kissinger dominated the American foreign policy process. Their performance allows the political analyst to study the relationship between per sonality and policy-making. What follows is a study of John Foster Dulles and Henry Kissinger, their personal background and development, and especially the problems they faced as presidential advisors. Both men were challenged by wars in the Middle East. These Middle East conflicts are here presented as case studies and they reveal how each of these figures met the test. Efforts are made to show how early-life experience influences the han dling of world events. TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Chapter I. II. III. IV. Discussion of Content John Foster Dulles . . Dulles: The maturing years Dulles: Emerging statesman Dulles: National leadership Republican idealogue on foreign affairs Psychological considerations Henry Alfred Kissinger Kissinger at Harvard . Council on Foreign Relations Teaching at Harvard Foreign policy advisor Kissinger's writings . Psychological considerations Dulles: Presidential Advisor and Secretary of State (1953-59) Liberation . . . . Agonizing reappraisal Massive retaliation Brinkmanship . . . Suez 1956: A case study The impact of personality on policy iii ii 1 10 14 20 24 27 31 38 43 45 47 48 52 55 63 65 66 69 75 77 95 Chapter V. VI. TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Kissinger: Presidential Advisor and Secretary of State (1969-77) . • . . . . . . . . • The Vietnam negotiations and settlement The Soviet Union: Detente, SALT, and Linkage Playing the China hand Neglected allies Watergate's impact on Kissinger's career · The October War . . . Psychological conclusions Dulles and Kissinger in American Foreign Policy BIBLIOGRAPHY iv 100 101 106 110 llS llS ll7 132 135 146 CHAPTER I Discussion of Content This thesis focuses on the influence of personality in the making of American foreign policy. The persons under examination are John Foster Dulles and Henry A. Kissinger. The two men were chosen for this study because they revealed powerful intellectual ability, dominated those around them, and held strong convictions. They man aged U.S. foreign policy virtually alone and neither depended on nor trusted the State Department apparatus or other agencies of govern ment. Each man proved to be a one-man show. Foreign policy there fore was an extension of their ideas, attitudes, assumptions, exper iences, backgrounds, and personalities. Analyzing background and experience helps to explain the develop ment of personality. This thesis suggests that to analyze foreign policy decisions, personality must be studied, and to study person ality, background and experience must first be analyzed. There are many theories about personality development. James David Barber and Erik Erikson, two personality theorists from opposite ends of the theoretical spectrum, have been adopted for use in this thesis. Together, they offer insight into theories concerned with the develop ment of personality and its impact on the decision-making process. Barber is a behaviorist who describes how early childhood exper iences shape a person's character, way of seeing the world, and way 1 of acting in response to his perceptions. He says that these early developments remain with a person throughout his life and continue to influence, if not actually dictate, the decisions he will make when confronted with various situations. Barber's (1977) analysis appears in The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House. Although a study of presidents, the analysis is also helpful in predicting behavior of other politicians, if not all human beings. Erikson is a developmentalist. He believes personality contin ues to develop throughout the entire life span. Behavior of an in dividual depends on what stage of development the person is in and how well he has progressed through the previous stages. Erikson (1950) offers eight stages and explains the benefits of successfully completing each and the consequences of failure to complete any or all of them. His analysis may be found in Childhood and Society. The Growth of Personality by Gordon R. Lowe (1972) gives the layman a clear picture not only of Erikson's neo-Freudian theory, but also of Freudian psycho-analysis. Survey material used in studying general foreign policy trends in the U.S. include An Introduction to American Foreign Policy (Knappen, 1956). This work outlines the domestic influences on foriegn policy formulation. It describes the alliances, pacts, and treaties the U.S. is involved in. And it analyzes the Containment Theory as enunciated by George Kennan. World Politics: Trend and Transformation (Kegley & Wittkop£, 1981) studies the development of international relations, the origins and evolution of the cold war, oil politics, disarmament 2 and arms control, and various other topics. Since 1945: Politics and Diplomacy in Recent American History (Divine, 1979) gives an overview of the major foreign and domestic issues as they were dealt with by successive presidents, Truman through Carter. The U.S. Since 1945: The Ordeal of Power (Grantham, 1976) surveys U.S. foreign policy decisions while attempting to point out the continuity between pre-World War II America and the years since then. The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Readings and Documents (Moore, 1977) provides readings on the underlying causes of the conflict, articles relating to each of the four major wars, the role of the U.N. in dealing with the conflict, and personal thoughts on settling the disputes. Biographies of and others works dealing specifically with Dulles include John Foster Dulles (Beal, 1957). This biography views Dulles in a favorable light and reads as if Dulles never made a mistake and as if all his actions were justifiable when handling American foreign policy. Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen and John Foster Dulles and Their Family Network (Mosley, 1978) deals with John Foster Dulles in a more critical way. While recognizing that Dulles had some suc cesses, Mosley sees him more as a ruthless and arrogant manipulator of world events while at the helm of the U.S. foreign policy ship. He also describes the close familial and political relationship which John Foster enjoyed with Eleanor and Allen. Michael A. Guhin's John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and His Times (1972) studies the political philosophy of Dulles, its origins, 3 and its influence on the direction of U.S. foreign policy. It is biographical and somewhat psycho-historical in that it hopes to ex plain his policies based on his philosophy, which is rooted in his personality and background. John Fpster Dulles: A Reappraisal (Goold Adams, 1962) is a critique of Dulles' record as Secretary of State. The author wrote that he tried to look dispassionately at that record. Although he did allow that Dulles dealt with some crises with success, he seemed overly critical of Dulles' handling of the Suez Crisis of 1956. Duel at the Brink: John Foster Dulles' Command of American Power (Drummond & Coblentz, 1960) is that even-handed discussion of Dulles as Secretary of State which previously-mentioned authors claimed to be writing but failed to achieve. This work sets up a balance sheet of Dulles' major foreign policies and assigns to each a PLUS or MINUS, designating a policy that succeeded by benefitting the U.S. leadership role or one that failed by backfiring to the benefit of the Communist bloc. Dulles on Diplomacy (Bertling, 1965), as the title suggests, con centrates on Dulles' views on negotiating with the Soviets, disarma ment, Communist China's threat to American interests, and the U.N.'s role in achieving a peaceful world. Dulles wrote two books: War, Peace and Change (1939) and War or Peace (1950). These are outlined in detail in Chapter II. Kissinger's biographical material includes a favorable work by Marvin and Bernard Kalb entitled Kissinger (1974). The work outlines Kissinger's pre-National Security Council days from Germany to New York, Harvard, and Washington. It also gives a detailed account of 4 the war and negotiations with the Vietnamese. And it discusses detente, SALT and linkage, the opening to China, and the Middle East diplomacy up through early 1974. Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind (Graubard, 1973) describes Kissinger the intellectual, the scholar of foreign affairs, the critic of American foreign policy as practiced by various presidents, and the American with the European mind. The author, a friend of Kissinger, tells his readers not to be surprised or startled by any policy Kissinger may announce. The policy undoubtedly will be found, however generally, in Kissinger's writings. Another friend and colleague of Kissinger who wrote a book about him is John C. Stoessinger. His book is Henry Kissinger: The Anguish of Power (1976). Stoessinger also relies on Kissinger's writings to explain the latter's philosophy on various subjects--e.g., power and force, history and destiny, stability and peace. But this is only a small part of the book and therefore not as extensive as Graubard's work. The majority of this work deals with Kissinger the Statesman and his foreign policy achievements in Vietnam, China, the Soviet Union, and the Middl� East. Kissinger: The European Mind in American Policy (Mazlish, 1976) is a biography and a discussion of his philo sophy, policies, and actions. It is a fine psychological survey, but it approaches incredulity when it attempts to explain Kissinger's supposed neuroses as the result of a love-hate relationship with his father. For example, Mazlish says this relationship caused Kissinger to retain his accent, give up his faith, and have a penchant for things German. 5 Kissinger: The Adventures of Superkraut (Ashman, 1972) is part biography, part expose of Kissinger's secret sex life. Kissinger: The Uses of Power (Landau, 1972) was written before Kissinger concluded a peace agreement with Le Due Tho, but it asserts that Kissinger's Vietnam policy was a failure. But more than just Vietnam, Landau asserts that Kissinger's entire approach to international relations was a failure. The Kissinger Experience: American Policy in the Middle East (AlRoy, 1975) suggests that Kissinger manipulated the October 1973 War to achieve a stalemate so his diplomatic efforts would find anxious participants. Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (Morris, 1977) claims to be the inside story to Kissinger's handling of foreign policy. Morris worked for Kissinger on the National Se curity Council until May 1970, when he resigned as a protest to the bombing of Cambodia. He criticizes Kissinger for his Machiavellian handling of foreign policy in Vietnam, Chile, Cyprus, Angola, and Biafra, among other areas. Four major works by Kissinger used in the present report are: 6 A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-22 (1957); Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (1957); The Necessity for Choice (1961); and White House Years (1979). These works are dis cussed in detail in Chapters III and V. A New History of the Cold War (Lukacs, 1966) attempts a descrip tion of how and why the Cold War evolved. It is not a definitive history, as the author admits, but it does cover the main events of this era of tension between East and West. I. F. Stone's The Haunted Fifties (1969) is a collection of his articles written between 1953 and 1961. The work outlines the foreign and domestic policy issues relevant to the 1950's--McCarthyism, Civil Rights, the Cold War, the Warren Court, to name but a few. The Compact History of the Korean War (Middleton, 1965) describes how the war started and gives details of various military campaigns. The diplomatic efforts are not analyzed to the same extent but do describe the results of those efforts. The Korean Knot (Berger, 1957) fills in what Middleton's work leaves out. It describes the diplomatic · efforts before and during the war. A Short History of the Vietnam War (Millett, 1978) is a collection of articles on the military, political and diplomatic aspects of the conflict. It also provides a useful chronology of events at the end of the book. George C. Herring wrote America's Longest War (1979). This is a history which analyzes U.S. policies toward Indochina from World War II to 1975. It describes how each president from Roosevelt to Ford viewed the region and any U.S. involvement there. Suez: The Seven Day War (Barker, 1964) is a description of the military operation carried out by Israel, France, and Britain against Egypt in 1956. Suez Thrombosis (Bindra, 1969) gives a brief account of the origins of Arab-Israeli tensions. The work is mainly concerned with the 1956 and 1967 closures of the Suez Canal, why these occurred, and what hopes there are for peace in the region. Crisis: The Inside Story of the Suez Conspiracy (Robertson, 1965) reveals an account of the Israeli-British-French collusion to invade Egypt. Robertson, a Canadian, also stresses the diplomatic efforts of 7 Lester Pearson, then-Canadian Ambassador to the U.N., to find a peace ful solution to the long-standing Middle East conflict. Dulles Over Suez (Finer, 1964) is severely critical of Dulles, Nasser, and to some extent, Eisenhower. It is also highly supportive of the British French-Israeli hostilities taken against Egypt. Due to Finer's ob vious biases, the work cannot be viewed as an objective piece of analysis and therefore has no substantial contribution to serious literature. Suez and After (Adams, 1958) is a compilation of a journalist's news dispatches regarding the 1956 Suez Crisis. As such, the work contains some analysis by an author who was, admittedly, untrained in the field of Arab or Middle East politics. But the work is useful in cases where the straight facts are presented. Insight on the Middle East War (Insight Team of the Sunday Times, 1974) describes events leading to the Arab attack on Israel in 1973 and the course of the ensuing war. Israel and the Arabs: The October 1973 War (Sobel, 1974) presents the straight facts, without analysis, on a wide range of interrelated issues. This work gives information about mounting tensions in 1972 and 1973, the outbreak of hostilities, and the subsequent peace efforts. Peace-Making in the Middle East (Sobel, 1980) takes up where the previous work left off in 1974 .. This work ends with the presentation of the facts surrounding the signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979. The Road to Ramadan (Heikal, 1975), in addition to reporting the Arab view of the 1973 War, reports the events which led to the Arab attack on Israel. Heikal says the Arabs could have defeated Israel 8 if they had continued on the offensive while relying on their moral strength. Suez 1956 (Bowie, 1974) is concerned primarily with the legal position each side of the crisis relied on in their quest for justice. It explores the role international law played in the decisions and actions of the major participants to the dispute. Decisions in Crisis (Brecher, 1980) is a comparison of the decisions made and how they were made in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars. It describes the deci sion makers and what psychological factors were working on them. Decade of Decisions (Quandt, 1977) gives accounts of the 1967 and 1973 Middle East Wars. It also describes the inter-war period and the U.S. initiatives to avoid another war. Further, this work details Kissinger's ·step-by-step diplomacy, which resulted in disengagement agreements between adversaries. This is an objective, fair, and well-informed account of American foreign policy making in the Middle East between the years of 1967 and 1976. 9 CHAPTER II John Foster Dulles John Foster Dulles was born on February 25, 1888 in the home of his maternal grandparents in Washington, D.C. John Foster's mother, Edith, was the daughter of John Watson Foster, who became Secretary of State in the Benjamin Harrison Administration (1889-1893) four years after John Foster was born. John Watson Foster was a man of great influence in the Republican Party, as well as in the business and banking world. John Watson Foster's father, Matthew, was an Indiana farmer whose parents--George and Jane Watson Forster* of England--emigrated in 1815 to America following the end of the Napa- leonic Wars. John Watson Foster loved the frontier life and tried to pass along to John Foster Dulles a living sense of the pioneer American spirit. In 1955, Secretary Dulles spoke of his family history after receiving an honorary degree from the University of Indiana: My grandfather, whose name I bear, exerted a great in fluence over my life, and he had ideals and purposes which I have tried to make my own. He was a deeply patriotic American. He belonged to the period which saw this country rapidly developing from a small Atlan tic coast group into a nation that spread across the continent. He fought to preserve the union; and then '.I on diplomatic missions and as Secretary of State he helped to spread the influence of this nation through out the world both in Europe and Asia. (Beal, 1957, pp. 25-26) * The Forster name changed to Foster when the family emigrated to America. 10 As a youth, John Foster would spend most of his summers with his maternal grandfather in Henderson, New York, and the two would go on fishing trips which sometimes included renowned financiers, senators, and statesmen. John Foster's uncle, Robert Lansing, who later became Secretary of State under Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921), often joined the fishing party. William Howard Taft, Andrew Carnegie, and Bernard Baruch were but a few of the many guests in Henderson. John Foster greatly admired his grandfather and enjoyed listening to his stories about his travels in China, Mexico, Russia, and Japan. These moments with his grandfather served as John Foster's introduction to international affairs. 11 Allen Macy Dulles, John Foster's father, was pastor of the First Presbyterian Church in Watertown, New York. Allen's grandfather, Joseph, was the first of the Dulles clan to arrive in the United States. In 1776, Joseph arrived in Charleston, South Carolina, but moved to Philadelphia in 1792 where he became a wealthy merchant. He died in 1818. John Foster's paternal grandfather, the son of Joseph, died one year after John Foster was born. Allen Macy Dulles was the major influence in John Foster's reli gious development. The Reverend Dulles was a theological moderate with some liberal tendencies. He disassociated himself from the die hard clergy and the fundamentalists by supporting and encouraging intellectual inquiry and science. He encouraged John Foster to adopt moderate religious views. But the five Dulles children still had a strict religious upbringing. Each week they attended Sunday school, three Sunday worship services, Monday night young people's service, Wednesday prayer meeting, and Friday preparatory service whenever Communion was to be served the following Sunday. Sundays also en tailed learning a poem, a chapter of the Bible--either from Psalms or the New Testament--and one or two verses of a hymn. John Foster soon learned all of John's Gospel and eventually became proficient at citing the Bible. He was a fervent Christian, so much so that he often made others feel sinful and guilty when they did something with which John Foster did not approve. Early in life he developed a rigid code that controlled his behavior. Learning seemed to come naturally to him. Aside from the Bible, John Foster read the classics at an early age. He devoured Shakespeare, Dickens, Spencer and Scott and read Voltaire, Moliere, and La Fountaine in the original French. He also traveled widely with his family to France, Germany, and Switzerland, usually touring by bicycle. John Foster's childhood was not all work and no play. He was not above playing hooky from school to go fishing. He admitted to getting his hands caned and his ears cuffed for throwing spitballs in class. (He eventually praised his public school education be- cause it preached a good old Americanism and pride in country.) John Foster joined boys' gangs and threw snowballs after school. He also enjoyed playing with his brother and sisters. But, "though there were five children, it was always as a triad that Eleanor, Allen and Foster Dulles spent the formative years in Watertown and Henderson, and this grouping was something that would continue throughout their lives, each of them symbiotically feeding on the other emotionally, 12 professionally, and politically." (Hosley, 1978, p. 20) And there was never any doubt that Foster was the strong personality and leader of the trio. The three trained themselves to be tough. They would jump out of John Foster's dinghy, Boat No. 5 as it was called, and take a swim (as long as the water was above 50 degrees Farenheit). John Foster always outlasted his two siblings, who neither could equal his record of swimming the five-mile round-trip of Henderson Harbor. No. 5 was a gift to John Foster by his grandfather, John Watson Foster. The gift was a recompense when John Foster had to miss a 1901 Pan American exposition due to an illness. John Foster developed into an adept sailor. Sailing taught him self-reliance, for many times his life literally depended on how well he handled his ship. It taught him patience, since there was no sense worrying during periods of calm. It taught him courage, re straint, and steadiness when management of the craft required calm, taut-nerved operation. No. 5 instilled a love of sailing that stayed with John Foster all through life. As children of a minister, the Dulleses never felt a conflict between what they believed and how they lived. There was no sense of inferiority on Foster's part as a son of a preacher. In fact, he may even have felt a sense of superiority because of his religious fervor and his quest for perfection in the human condition. His family had the "usual" family problems, but they adjusted to them. Reverend Dulles earned $3,000 annually, which in itself represented considerable buying power in the late 1800's and early 1900's. But he had a private income (source unknown) which paid the costs of family 13 travel abroad. John Foster Dulles experienced a generally normal and probably exceptionally happy childhood. He was born into an aristocratic family which emphasized Christian values, intellectual inquiry, and sportsmanship; a family which traveled extensively, and which bene fitted from the wealth of experiences and connections of a family patriarch, world traveler and statesman: John Watson Foster. Dulles: The maturing years In 1904, when Foster was 16, his parents and his grandfather de cided that only a university could continue to challenge Foster's men tal capacity and he was enrolled in Princeton University. John Foster found his studies easy. He had a quick mind and excellent power of concentration. But he continued to play hard, too. Though he joined no clubs, he passed his leisure time playing whist, bridge, and poker. He took part in debate but never tried out for varsity. He also en joyed chess. John Foster's first English paper was turned in September 24, 1904 and was entitled, "My Preparation for English". The work was full of misspellings, but what showed through the piece was "a curious combination of shyness, intellectual self-confidence, conventional modesty, and unconventional tendency toward iconolasm." (Beal, 1957, p. 31) He admitted that he never had an English course yet asserted that he knew basic grammatical rules from what he picked up from study ing Latin and Greek. He told how his knowledge of literature came from reading the "masterpieces"--reading not as a task, which entails 14 dissecting them piecemeal, but rather as a whole, to get a clearer picture of their entirety. He admitted he wrote few essays and told of his surprise that he was ever allowed to enter college--"as far as English preparation is concerned". Near the end of his junior year, John Foster was invited by his grandfather to attend the International Peace Conference at The Hague. This was the second such conference at The Hague. The first, held in 1899, was attended by 26 nations. The second drew representation from 44--virtually every nation on earth. This conference met from June 15 to October 18 and encountered big-power opposition to disarmament recommendations. Nor could it prevent World War I. The conference however, achieved many successes. It encouraged the peaceful solution of international disputes; it adopted rules for warning would-be victims if hostilities were inevitable; and it urged nations to set up an international court of justice (which was established after World War I). John Foster Dulles was a secretary to the Chinese delegation to the conference. The delegation members spoke English but not French- the language of diplomacy. John Foster was fluent in French and be came the delegation's translator. But his first contribution to the conference related to protocol. The participants of the conference could not decide on the order of precedence for courtesy calls on one another. John Foster was helpful in getting the conference started by seeing to it that all calling cards were delivered simultaneously. It was exciting for John Foster to see the most noted statesmen of his day and the clash of national interests they represented. 15 His experiences at the conference convinced him that increased cooperation between the nations was possible. These experiences also deepened a conflict in John Foster--whether to be a Christian minister, like his father, or a lawyer and a diplomat, like his grandfather. All through his life, John Foster's father and grandfather repre sented positions that did not conflict and in fact that complemented each other. Each man, father and grandfather, had hopes of John Foster choosing a career following his own. John Foster was at a crossroads. He had to decide which career to pursue, for he only had one year left at college and it was necessary to make plans for whatever was to fol low. He left The Hague Conference still undecided and returned to his senior year at Princeton. John Foster's major at Princeton was philosophy, which also en tailed several courses in psychology. He was elected to Phi Beta Kappa and did his senior thesis on "The Theory of Judgment," a 19- page paper on pragmatism. This paper won him the Chancellor Green Mental Science Fellowship, a $600 scholarship to the Sorbonne in Paris to study for a year under Henri Bergson, French philosopher and Nobel Prize winner. John Foster stood second in the Princeton class of 1908 and gave the valedictory speech at the graduation ceremonies. He was 20 years old. The Dulles family left for Paris in the summer of 1908. While at the Sorbonne, John Foster developed a life-long appreciation for the French heritage and a patience with France in her days of political impotence. This patience was to yield to an "agonizing" feeling when he felt compelled to "reappraise" U.S.-France relations when he became 16 17 Secretary of State. In addition to philosophy, John Foster also studied international law at the Sorbonne, and he leaned toward law and diplo macy as a career. This development greatly pleased his grandfather. On his return to the United States, John Foster enrolled in George Washington Law School in Washington, D.C. He chose George Washington so he could live with his grandparents. John Foster not only completed the three-year law program in two years, he also kept an active social life. He was invited to parties which his grandparents also attended and he became well acquainted with Washington social circles. John Foster made the highest marks ever achieved at George Washington Law School, but despite this performance he was refused a degree because he did not meet the required three years of study. The University did not award him his degree until some 25 years later, when he was already a leader of the bar. After he finished his law program, John Foster returned to Auburn (where his family had moved a few years previously) to study for the New York State bar exams. On the one side he prepared for the exams by cramming, while on the other he took long study breaks so he could go canoeing with a friend. During the exams he answered enough ques tions to satisfy himself that he had passed and he left the test early because he had a date with his canoeing friend, Janet Avery. "It was while they were canoeing on Owasco Lake that he asked Janet to marry him and she accepted at once." (Mosley, 1978, p. 28) That night, Foster told his parents of his engagement and they did not object. Janet's parents, however, were not so calm about the idea. They knew little about John Foster and they wondered if he was worthy enough to be admitted to their family circle. The Averys need not have worried. John Foster passed the bar exams, as he knew he would, and he was on his way to New York City to find a job. For six weeks John Foster applied for jobs with the more notable New York attorneys without success. These attorneys had their choice from Harvard, Yale and Columbia Law School graduates, many of whom also had post-graduate degrees from Oxford and Cambridge. Princeton was, in those days, a provincial college for would-be clergymen. Harvard-bred lawyers told Foster they considered his alma mater a "country club". Washington Law School did not have much standing in New York. And any tourist could enroll for a summer course at the Sorbonne. Thus, what John Foster considered to be excellent qualifi cations for international law, including his mastery of French and Spanish and his adequate German, the law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell found to be "commonplace" and did not hire him. Discouraged but far from crushed, John Foster enlisted the help of his grandfather. Prior to the Civil War, John Watson Foster had been associated with the Cincinnati law firm of Algernon S. Sullivan. Sullivan later moved to New York and founded Sullivan & Cromwell. Grandfather Foster gave his grandson a letter to the surviving part ner, William Cromwell, recalling their old association and outlining young John Foster's qualifications. It was not Cromwell's practice to interview applicants for his firm, but he made an exception for John Foster. He decided to give him a chance. John Foster Dulles received $50 a month as a starting law clerk, but the experience proved far more rewarding. Sullivan & Cromwell 18 had extensive legal business with Latin America and John Foster, with his command of the Spanish language, became the firm's representative in the region. On one of his trips to British Guyana, John Foster con tracted malaria and nearly died. He was treated with heavy doses of quinine, a drug which affected his optic nerve and left his sight im paired. Afterwards, he wore glasses and had a tic in his left eye for the rest of his life. But by the end of John Foster's first year with Sullivan & Cromwell, his salary had risen to $100 a month, and he be came an established member of the firm. John Foster and Janet were married in Auburn on June 26, 1912. His grandfather intended to leave $20,000 to each of his grandchild ren when he died, but he told John Foster he could start drawing on his inheritance to further his career. With this financial support, Janet was able to accompany John Foster on his trips abroad. One trip Janet did not go on, however, was one made by John Foster in 1917 at 19 the prodding of his uncle, Robert Lansing, then Secretary of State under Woodrow Wilson. John Foster Dulles accepted a secret assignment in Central America where he gained the assurances from the Nicaraguan, Costa Rican, and Panamanian governments that they would align their policies with the United States in the impending war against Germany. The Latin Ameri cans also promised they would hunt down German spies and saboteurs who might interfere with the passage of military supplies through the Panama Canal. Dulles: Emerging statesman Returning to the U.S., John Foster Dulles applied for active military service but was turned down because of his poor eyesight. Instead he was commissioned as an Army captain (and was promoted to major by the end of the war). He was assigned to the War Trade Board superintending shipments to neutral countries as the assistant to Vance McCormick, the Board's chairman. Dulles' position also brought him into contact with Bernard Baruch, one of the more influential men of the day. Baruch ran the War Industries Board, which mobilized domestic production. Dulles' position would better serve him in his future career than would active duty. He learned firsthand how to deal with foreign governments and with domestic bureaucracies, such as the War and Navy Departments. Dulles regretted the fact that a physical infirmity kept him out of the active service. World War I ended on November 11, 1918. Dulles heard that President Wilson would personally lead the U.S. delegation to the treaty negotiations at Versailles and he asked his Uncle Bert (Lansing) if he (Dulles) might go along to Versailles. But Lansing had had a falling out of sorts with the President and felt himself lucky to be going and therefore did not want to press his luck by asking that his nephew go along with the delegation. There were other ways for Dulles to get to Versailles. Bernard Baruch was impressed by Dulles' clear mindedness and his legal and organizing abilities. When Baruch was named head of the American Delegation on Reparations, he asked Dulles to serve as the delegation's counsel. 20 The Allies were in bad financial shape after the war. Their 21 citizens had suffered considerable property damage and they also faced the burden of wartime taxes. Some leaders falsely asserted that Germany was able and should be requested to pay large amounts of reparations to the victorious allies. Baruch later reported on this spirit of vengeance or selfish advantage that was present in the minds of the framers of the treaty. The U.S., however, was the only delegation with a definite reparations scheme, and it had been drafted by Dulles. The scheme would exact from Germany the cost of damages resulting directly from acts clearly in violation of international law as well as damages to civilian populations and their property. Other delega tions merely filed general statements demanding compensation for all damages--direct and indirect. It was up to Dulles to argue the U.S. position. He said America joined with the others in condemning Germany's instigation of war as an international crime and that the U.S. had a substantial war debt, too. But he said the delegates must be bound by the pre-Armistice agreement, which the Allies offered and which the Germans accepted and which did not call for the heavy reparations that some of the delegates were seeking. Gentlemen, if we hold to the domain of reason, we cannot adopt such methods. To demand the gigantic total of war costs would be to jeopardize securing that specific re paration as to which Germany must clearly recognize her liability, and the satisfactions of which will tax her resources to the limit. (Beal, 1957, p. 68) Dulles found himself in agreement with John Maynard Keynes, who also attended the negotiations. They held to the position that exacting 22 a heavy toll from the Germans, who were unable to pay, would threaten starvation and sow the seeds of unrest. Dulles wanted Germany as a productive, stabilizing, consuming nation. President Wilson asked Dulles to stay on in Europe as American representative on the Reparations Commission. Dulles was 31 years old and he found it exciting working with prominent and powerful min isters from the other countries. Dulles' service ended in the fall of 1919 when the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, under pressure from postwar isolationists, passed a resolution that the U.S. should not be represented on the reparations group. Dulles, a Republican, was disappointed with the isolationists because they were mostly members of his party. He saw American isolationism as the inability to face up to international responsibilities to insure the peace. When Dulles returned from Paris, he had earned international re spect and recognition as a diplomat and expert on reparations and in ternational finance. His experiences at Versailles conditioned his actions for the rest of his life. Thereafter, Dulles was interested in equitable solutions to international problems. He was also more sensitive to the need for Senate involvement in and support for Ameri ca's role in world affairs. Dulles became a junior partner of Sullivan & Cromwell in 1919 and the senior partner in 1926. He continued to take an active inter est in German reparations and allied indebtedness to the U.S. Between 1920 and 1923, most of his speeches and writings were on these problems. He continued to blame Germany for its crimes in World War I. But in December of 1922, he blamed Wilson for demanding huge reparations from Germany, which heavily taxed Germany's ability to pay any reparations. Dulles suggested a moratorium on reparation payments so Germany could "get its house in order". (New York Times, December 20, 1922) In 1924, the Dawes Plan was formulated to provide loans for Germany and to moderate Germany's payments for a few years. Dulles supported this plan but felt it was not enough because it did not set a fixed amount for Germany's obligations. Nor did it set a date when payments would cease. In 1926 and again in 1928, in speeches to the Foreign Policy Association, Dulles urged the continuance of loans to foreign countries, which could in turn buy U.S. exports. "Otherwise, our neighbors would starve while we had surplus goods rotting in our warehouses." (New York Times, March 25, 1928) At a Conference on the Causes of War, Dulles said the greatest danger to the peace lies in the "impulse to retain such wealth as we have. Under changing economic conditions men opt for the status quo. Government is a strong ally in this struggle to retain wealth and position. Under such conditions, a powerful and ruling class is apt to use its wealth and position to put into power ... a strong govern ment." (New York Times, January 21, 1925) After World War II started in 1939, Dulles formulated a Plan for Peace which called for limiting national sovereignty. His proposal involved a willingness on the part of nations to adhere to rules made by an international organization. (New York Times, October 29, 1939) Dulles argued that the U.S. must take the lead in developing an inter national organization but that it must avoid war in order to devote full attention to the project. 23 24 Dulles presented his plans in his first book: War, Peace and Change. He started with the premise that change is inevitable and desirable. If change is not allowed to occur peacefully, then violent change will occur. His work was against status quo thinking and the ideology of nationalism. He hoped to find the causes of war and to eradicate them. Dulles did not justify the expansionist policies of Germany, Japan and Italy, as he had been criticized for doing. He merely explained why they happened. He criticized the self-righteous attempts to personify nations as either heroes or villains. He re jected isolationism and he rejected one-world government. The estab lishment of international agencies not limited or restricted by national sovereignty would begin "that dilution of sovereignty which all enlight ened thinkers agree to be indispensable." (New York Times, October 29, 1939) Dulles: National leadership Dulles was named Chairman of the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace, created by the Federal Council of Churches in early 1941. The Federal Council of Churches was formed in 1908 for the purpose of greater Christian unity. Goals of the Council focused initially on the solution of industrial problems; the Council sought to effectuate the abolition of child labor, to shorten the work week, to establish a minimtnn wage and to insure the right to organize workers. The Council was also involved in political issues. It urged President Franklin D. ·Roosevelt (1933-45) to stay out of World War II; it further advocated a world organization in a letter to Roosevelt where the "sovereignty 25 of the individual state would be limited to the interests of a world community". (Singer, 1975, p. 104) As Chairman of the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace, Dulles was in contact with hundreds of religious leaders (who were predominant ly Protestant). He sought to move public opinion by encouraging these leaders to preach to their congregations on the necessity for non involvement in the "European" war. Dulles defended, even demanded, Christian involvement in the political process to insure good govern ment. In his quest for a lasting peace, Dulles criticized the Atlantic Charter declaration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain, because it did not spe cifically provide for a world organization. Though the Charter pro vided for "a wider and permanent system of general security," Roosevelt rejected Churchchill's explicit plan to work for an international agency. (Knappen, 1956, pp. 235 & 249) Roosevelt was aware of past American opposition to international organizations. But friendly American reception to the Atlantic Charter persuaded him that such a project might again be politically feasible. Dulles felt the Charter did not go far enough in promoting a new international system of se curity. He said the end of the war would find a concentration of power in one or two hands and that this power must be used, not to per petuate itself, "but to create, support and eventually give way to international institutions drawing their vitality from the whole family of nations". (Beal, 1957, p. 91) Once the United States entered World War II, Dulles warned Americans not to think of victory as a "push over". It was an illusion to think that just because the U.S. was in the war, victory was at hand. Vic tory would come in the long run. The war itself should be viewed as a mission to achieve a lasting peace. As Chairman of the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace, Dulles formulated his plan for a lasting peace. His plan was known as "Six Pillars of Peace" and called for, among other things, collaboration between all nations, assurance of autonomy for subject peoples, con trol of armaments, and world organization. John D. Rockefeller spoke in favor of Dulles' plan. Dulles sought to promote his plan to the American public. Though not enthusiastic about Dulles' plan, Roosevelt was certain that the American public would support U.S. participation in a world organization. Roosevelt set Secretary of State Cordell 26 Hull to work on plans for the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, which developed the scheme for the United Nations. On April 6, 1945, Dulles became a general advisor to the U.S. delegation at the San Francisco Conference which formalized the estab lishment of the United Nations (U.N.). The U.S. delegation agreed not to leak anything to the press about the behind-the-scenes creation of the U.N. But everyday Dulles was reportedly out in the hotel corri dors leaking to newsmen details of the day's discussions. As a gen eral advisor, Dulles was at the conference to offer suggestions and to represent the Republicans. He was not an official spokesman. Demo crats saw Dulles' leaking of news to the media as an attempt by him to advertise his contributions to the conference, regardless of their actual importance, and to promote the Republican party. Dulles, although not on record in response to this point, always desired strong public support for governmental programs. He apparently justi fied his actions, correctly or incorrectly, as an attempt to get public opinion behind the conference's goals and to assure its success. Republican ideologue on foreign affairs 27 The above example of bipartisan participation was not the first program in which Dulles participated. In 1944, Thomas Dewey ran for President on the Republican ticket against Roosevelt. Dulles became Dewey's foreign policy advisor. The Republicans criticized the Dwn barton Oaks conference. Dewey and Dulles feared the proposed interna tional organization "smacked too much of big-power control of the world, without adequate representation for little nations". (Beal, 1957, p. 97) The White House denied this accusation and at a press conference, Secretary Hull announced he would confer with Dewey to explain the administration's policy. Dewey accepted the invitation but he sent Dulles to confer with Hull. Dulles and Hull spent hours quibbling over the terms to describe U.S. policy toward the U.N. Hull wanted to use the term 'non-partisan', which indicated that issues were not split by party lines or partisan sentiments. Dulles preferred 'bi-partisan', indicating that both parties worked together on a solution. Dulles preferred bi-partisanship because it granted the Republicans equal status in a politically profitable project. This was the same reason why Hull and Roosevelt rejected the term. Dulles finally conceded to Hull's demands. The two agreed that Roosevelt and Dewey should not campaign on a promise for world organization. Both favored the 28 organization, but they had different opinions on how it should be established. They and their advisors did not want these differences to be debated in the campaign, thus risking a division of the American public which could threaten public support for the United Nations. In 1945, Dulles was involved in another bipartisan conference. He was the Republican representative and the counselor to Secretary of State James Byrnes at the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in London. Byrnes was ready to yield to uncompromising Soviet demands which would have knocked France and China out of discussions at the meeting. The Soviets claimed the French and Chinese had no right to Yüklə 3,51 Mb. Dostları ilə paylaş:
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