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Master's Theses
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12-1981
A Comparative Analysis of John Foster Dulles and Henry A.
A Comparative Analysis of John Foster Dulles and Henry A.
Kissinger and the Impact Their Personalities Had on the
Kissinger and the Impact Their Personalities Had on the
Formulation of American Foreign Policy
Formulation of American Foreign Policy
Denis Joseph Sullivan
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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JOHN FOSTER DULLES AND
HENRY A. KISSINGER AND THE IMPACT THEIR PERSONALITIES HAD ON THE
FORMULATION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
by
Denis Joseph Sullivan
A Thesis
Submitted to the
Faculty of The Graduate College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the
Degree of Master of Arts
Department of Political Science
Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo, Michigan
December 1981
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am deeply indebted to Professor Lawrence Ziring for his advice
and guidance during not only the writing of this thesis, but also
throughout my career as a political science student. I thank my
entire family for their prayers and interest in this project.
Thank you, Mother, for your support. Thank you, Stephanie, for
your love and encouragement. And, thank you, Lord, for bringing
me through these many years healthy, happy, and always learning
something new.
Denis Joseph Sullivan
ii
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JOHN FOSTER DULLES AND
HENRY A KISSINGER AND THE IMPACT THEIR PERSONALITIES HAD ON THE
FORMULATION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
' Denis Joseph Sullivan, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1981
This thesis examines the impact of personality on the making of
American foreign policy. John Foster Dulles and Henry A. Kissinger
dominated the American foreign policy process. Their performance
allows the political analyst to study the relationship between per
sonality and policy-making.
What follows is a study of John Foster Dulles and Henry Kissinger,
their personal background and development, and especially the problems
they faced as presidential advisors. Both men were challenged by wars
in the Middle East. These Middle East conflicts are here presented as
case studies and they reveal how each of these figures met the test.
Efforts are made to show how early-life experience influences the han
dling of world events.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Chapter
I.
II.
III.
IV.
Discussion of Content
John Foster Dulles . .
Dulles: The maturing years
Dulles: Emerging statesman
Dulles: National leadership
Republican idealogue on foreign affairs
Psychological considerations
Henry Alfred Kissinger
Kissinger at Harvard .
Council on Foreign Relations
Teaching at Harvard
Foreign policy advisor
Kissinger's writings .
Psychological considerations
Dulles: Presidential Advisor and Secretary of
State (1953-59)
Liberation . . . .
Agonizing reappraisal
Massive retaliation
Brinkmanship . . .
Suez 1956: A case study
The impact of personality on policy
iii
ii
1
10
14
20
24
27
31
38
43
45
47
48
52
55
63
65
66
69
75
77
95
Chapter
V.
VI.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
(Continued)
Kissinger: Presidential Advisor and Secretary of
State (1969-77) . • . . . . . . . . •
The Vietnam negotiations and settlement
The Soviet Union: Detente, SALT, and Linkage
Playing the China hand
Neglected allies
Watergate's impact on Kissinger's career
·
The October War . . .
Psychological conclusions
Dulles and Kissinger in American Foreign Policy
BIBLIOGRAPHY
iv
100
101
106
110
llS
llS
ll7
132
135
146
CHAPTER I
Discussion of Content
This thesis focuses on the influence of personality in the making
of American foreign policy. The persons under examination are John
Foster Dulles and Henry A. Kissinger. The two men were chosen for
this study because they revealed powerful intellectual ability,
dominated those around them, and held strong convictions. They man
aged U.S. foreign policy virtually alone and neither depended on nor
trusted the State Department apparatus or other agencies of govern
ment. Each man proved to be a one-man show. Foreign policy there
fore was an extension of their ideas, attitudes, assumptions, exper
iences, backgrounds, and personalities.
Analyzing background and experience helps to explain the develop
ment of personality. This thesis suggests that to analyze foreign
policy decisions, personality must be studied, and to study person
ality, background and experience must first be analyzed. There are
many theories about personality development. James David Barber and
Erik Erikson, two personality theorists from opposite ends of the
theoretical spectrum, have been adopted for use in this thesis.
Together, they offer insight into theories concerned with the develop
ment of personality and its impact on the decision-making process.
Barber is a behaviorist who describes how early childhood exper
iences shape a person's character, way of seeing the world, and way
1
of acting in response to his perceptions. He says that these early
developments remain with a person throughout his life and continue
to influence, if not actually dictate, the decisions he will make
when confronted with various situations. Barber's (1977) analysis
appears in The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the
White House. Although a study of presidents, the analysis is also
helpful in predicting behavior of other politicians, if not all human
beings.
Erikson is a developmentalist. He believes personality contin
ues to develop throughout the entire life span. Behavior of an in
dividual depends on what stage of development the person is in and
how well he has progressed through the previous stages. Erikson
(1950) offers eight stages and explains the benefits of successfully
completing each and the consequences of failure to complete any or all
of them. His analysis may be found in Childhood and Society. The
Growth of Personality by Gordon R. Lowe (1972) gives the layman a
clear picture not only of Erikson's neo-Freudian theory, but also
of Freudian psycho-analysis.
Survey material used in studying general foreign policy trends in
the U.S. include An Introduction to American Foreign Policy (Knappen,
1956). This work outlines the domestic influences on foriegn policy
formulation. It describes the alliances, pacts, and treaties the U.S.
is involved in. And it analyzes the Containment Theory as enunciated
by George Kennan. World Politics: Trend and Transformation (Kegley &
Wittkop£, 1981) studies the development of international relations,
the origins and evolution of the cold war, oil politics, disarmament
2
and arms control, and various other topics.
Since 1945: Politics and Diplomacy in Recent American History
(Divine, 1979) gives an overview of the major foreign and domestic
issues as they were dealt with by successive presidents, Truman through
Carter. The U.S. Since 1945: The Ordeal of Power (Grantham, 1976)
surveys U.S. foreign policy decisions while attempting to point out
the continuity between pre-World War II America and the years since
then.
The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Readings and Documents (Moore, 1977)
provides readings on the underlying causes of the conflict, articles
relating to each of the four major wars, the role of the U.N. in
dealing with the conflict, and personal thoughts on settling the
disputes.
Biographies of and others works dealing specifically with Dulles
include John Foster Dulles (Beal, 1957). This biography views Dulles
in a favorable light and reads as if Dulles never made a mistake and
as if all his actions were justifiable when handling American foreign
policy. Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen and John Foster Dulles
and Their Family Network (Mosley, 1978) deals with John Foster Dulles
in a more critical way. While recognizing that Dulles had some suc
cesses, Mosley sees him more as a ruthless and arrogant manipulator
of world events while at the helm of the U.S. foreign policy ship.
He also describes the close familial and political relationship which
John Foster enjoyed with Eleanor and Allen.
Michael A. Guhin's John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and His
Times (1972) studies the political philosophy of Dulles, its origins,
3
and its influence on the direction of U.S. foreign policy. It is
biographical and somewhat psycho-historical in that it hopes to ex
plain his policies based on his philosophy, which is rooted in his
personality and background. John Fpster Dulles: A Reappraisal (Goold
Adams, 1962) is a critique of Dulles' record as Secretary of State.
The author wrote that he tried to look dispassionately at that record.
Although he did allow that Dulles dealt with some crises with success,
he seemed overly critical of Dulles' handling of the Suez Crisis of
1956. Duel at the Brink: John Foster Dulles' Command of American
Power (Drummond & Coblentz, 1960) is that even-handed discussion of
Dulles as Secretary of State which previously-mentioned authors claimed
to be writing but failed to achieve. This work sets up a balance
sheet of Dulles' major foreign policies and assigns to each a PLUS
or MINUS, designating a policy that succeeded by benefitting the U.S.
leadership role or one that failed by backfiring to the benefit of the
Communist bloc.
Dulles on Diplomacy (Bertling, 1965), as the title suggests, con
centrates on Dulles' views on negotiating with the Soviets, disarma
ment, Communist China's threat to American interests, and the U.N.'s
role in achieving a peaceful world.
Dulles wrote two books: War, Peace and Change (1939) and War or
Peace (1950). These are outlined in detail in Chapter II.
Kissinger's biographical material includes a favorable work by
Marvin and Bernard Kalb entitled Kissinger (1974). The work outlines
Kissinger's pre-National Security Council days from Germany to New
York, Harvard, and Washington. It also gives a detailed account of
4
the war and negotiations with the Vietnamese. And it discusses detente,
SALT and linkage, the opening to China, and the Middle East diplomacy
up through early 1974. Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind (Graubard,
1973) describes Kissinger the intellectual, the scholar of foreign
affairs, the critic of American foreign policy as practiced by various
presidents, and the American with the European mind. The author, a
friend of Kissinger, tells his readers not to be surprised or startled
by any policy Kissinger may announce. The policy undoubtedly will be
found, however generally, in Kissinger's writings.
Another friend and colleague of Kissinger who wrote a book about
him is John C. Stoessinger. His book is Henry Kissinger: The Anguish
of Power (1976). Stoessinger also relies on Kissinger's writings to
explain the latter's philosophy on various subjects--e.g., power and
force, history and destiny, stability and peace. But this is only a
small part of the book and therefore not as extensive as Graubard's
work. The majority of this work deals with Kissinger the Statesman
and his foreign policy achievements in Vietnam, China, the Soviet
Union, and the Middl� East. Kissinger: The European Mind in American
Policy (Mazlish, 1976) is a biography and a discussion of his philo
sophy, policies, and actions. It is a fine psychological survey, but
it approaches incredulity when it attempts to explain Kissinger's
supposed neuroses as the result of a love-hate relationship with his
father. For example, Mazlish says this relationship caused Kissinger
to retain his accent, give up his faith, and have a penchant for things
German.
5
Kissinger: The Adventures of Superkraut (Ashman, 1972) is part
biography, part expose of Kissinger's secret sex life. Kissinger: The
Uses of Power (Landau, 1972) was written before Kissinger concluded a
peace agreement with Le Due Tho, but it asserts that Kissinger's
Vietnam policy was a failure. But more than just Vietnam, Landau
asserts that Kissinger's entire approach to international relations
was a failure. The Kissinger Experience: American Policy in the
Middle East (AlRoy, 1975) suggests that Kissinger manipulated the
October 1973 War to achieve a stalemate so his diplomatic efforts
would find anxious participants.
Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy
(Morris, 1977) claims to be the inside story to Kissinger's handling
of foreign policy. Morris worked for Kissinger on the National Se
curity Council until May 1970, when he resigned as a protest to the
bombing of Cambodia. He criticizes Kissinger for his Machiavellian
handling of foreign policy in Vietnam, Chile, Cyprus, Angola, and
Biafra, among other areas.
Four major works by Kissinger used in the present report are:
6
A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace
1812-22 (1957); Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (1957); The Necessity
for Choice (1961); and White House Years (1979). These works are dis
cussed in detail in Chapters III and V.
A New History of the Cold War (Lukacs, 1966) attempts a descrip
tion of how and why the Cold War evolved. It is not a definitive
history, as the author admits, but it does cover the main events of
this era of tension between East and West. I. F. Stone's The Haunted
Fifties (1969) is a collection of his articles written between 1953
and 1961. The work outlines the foreign and domestic policy issues
relevant to the 1950's--McCarthyism, Civil Rights, the Cold War, the
Warren Court, to name but a few.
The Compact History of the Korean War (Middleton, 1965) describes
how the war started and gives details of various military campaigns.
The diplomatic efforts are not analyzed to the same extent but do
describe the results of those efforts. The Korean Knot (Berger,
1957) fills in what Middleton's work leaves out. It describes the
diplomatic
·
efforts before and during the war.
A Short History of the Vietnam War (Millett, 1978) is a collection
of articles on the military, political and diplomatic aspects of the
conflict. It also provides a useful chronology of events at the end
of the book. George C. Herring wrote America's Longest War (1979).
This is a history which analyzes U.S. policies toward Indochina from
World War II to 1975. It describes how each president from Roosevelt
to Ford viewed the region and any U.S. involvement there.
Suez: The Seven Day War (Barker, 1964) is a description of the
military operation carried out by Israel, France, and Britain against
Egypt in 1956. Suez Thrombosis (Bindra, 1969) gives a brief account
of the origins of Arab-Israeli tensions. The work is mainly concerned
with the 1956 and 1967 closures of the Suez Canal, why these occurred,
and what hopes there are for peace in the region.
Crisis: The Inside Story of the Suez Conspiracy (Robertson, 1965)
reveals an account of the Israeli-British-French collusion to invade
Egypt. Robertson, a Canadian, also stresses the diplomatic efforts of
7
Lester Pearson, then-Canadian Ambassador to the U.N., to find a peace
ful solution to the long-standing Middle East conflict. Dulles Over
Suez (Finer, 1964) is severely critical of Dulles, Nasser, and to
some extent, Eisenhower. It is also highly supportive of the British
French-Israeli hostilities taken against Egypt. Due to Finer's ob
vious biases, the work cannot be viewed as an objective piece of
analysis and therefore has no substantial contribution to serious
literature.
Suez and After (Adams, 1958) is a compilation of a journalist's
news dispatches regarding the 1956 Suez Crisis. As such, the work
contains some analysis by an author who was, admittedly, untrained in
the field of Arab or Middle East politics. But the work is useful
in cases where the straight facts are presented.
Insight on the Middle East War (Insight Team of the Sunday Times,
1974) describes events leading to the Arab attack on Israel in 1973
and the course of the ensuing war. Israel and the Arabs: The October
1973 War (Sobel, 1974) presents the straight facts, without analysis,
on a wide range of interrelated issues. This work gives information
about mounting tensions in 1972 and 1973, the outbreak of hostilities,
and the subsequent peace efforts. Peace-Making in the Middle East
(Sobel, 1980) takes up where the previous work left off in 1974 ..
This work ends with the presentation of the facts surrounding the
signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979.
The Road to Ramadan (Heikal, 1975), in addition to reporting the
Arab view of the 1973 War, reports the events which led to the Arab
attack on Israel. Heikal says the Arabs could have defeated Israel
8
if they had continued on the offensive while relying on their moral
strength.
Suez 1956 (Bowie, 1974) is concerned primarily with the legal
position each side of the crisis relied on in their quest for justice.
It explores the role international law played in the decisions and
actions of the major participants to the dispute. Decisions in Crisis
(Brecher, 1980) is a comparison of the decisions made and how they were
made in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars. It describes the deci
sion makers and what psychological factors were working on them.
Decade of Decisions (Quandt, 1977) gives accounts of the 1967 and
1973 Middle East Wars. It also describes the inter-war period and the
U.S. initiatives to avoid another war. Further, this work details
Kissinger's ·step-by-step diplomacy, which resulted in disengagement
agreements between adversaries. This is an objective, fair, and
well-informed account of American foreign policy making in the Middle
East between the years of 1967 and 1976.
9
CHAPTER II
John Foster Dulles
John Foster Dulles was born on February 25, 1888 in the home of
his maternal grandparents in Washington, D.C. John Foster's mother,
Edith, was the daughter of John Watson Foster, who became Secretary
of State in the Benjamin Harrison Administration (1889-1893) four
years after John Foster was born. John Watson Foster was a man of
great influence in the Republican Party, as well as in the business
and banking world. John Watson Foster's father, Matthew, was an
Indiana farmer whose parents--George and Jane Watson Forster* of
England--emigrated in 1815 to America following the end of the Napa-
leonic Wars.
John Watson Foster loved the frontier life and tried to pass
along to John Foster Dulles a living sense of the pioneer American
spirit. In 1955, Secretary Dulles spoke of his family history after
receiving an honorary degree from the University of Indiana:
My grandfather, whose name I bear, exerted a great in
fluence over my life, and he had ideals and purposes
which I have tried to make my own. He was a deeply
patriotic American. He belonged to the period which
saw this country rapidly developing from a small Atlan
tic coast group into a nation that spread across the
continent. He fought to preserve the union; and then '.I
on diplomatic missions and as Secretary of State he
helped to spread the influence of this nation through
out the world both in Europe and Asia. (Beal, 1957,
pp. 25-26)
*
The Forster name changed to Foster when the family emigrated
to America.
10
As a youth, John Foster would spend most of his summers with
his maternal grandfather in Henderson, New York, and the two would
go on fishing trips which sometimes included renowned financiers,
senators, and statesmen. John Foster's uncle, Robert Lansing, who
later became Secretary of State under Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921),
often joined the fishing party. William Howard Taft, Andrew Carnegie,
and Bernard Baruch were but a few of the many guests in Henderson.
John Foster greatly admired his grandfather and enjoyed listening
to his stories about his travels in China, Mexico, Russia, and Japan.
These moments with his grandfather served as John Foster's introduction
to international affairs.
11
Allen Macy Dulles, John Foster's father, was pastor of the First
Presbyterian Church in Watertown, New York. Allen's grandfather,
Joseph, was the first of the Dulles clan to arrive in the United States.
In 1776, Joseph arrived in Charleston, South Carolina, but moved to
Philadelphia in 1792 where he became a wealthy merchant. He died
in 1818. John Foster's paternal grandfather, the son of Joseph, died
one year after John Foster was born.
Allen Macy Dulles was the major influence in John Foster's reli
gious development. The Reverend Dulles was a theological moderate
with some liberal tendencies. He disassociated himself from the die
hard clergy and the fundamentalists by supporting and encouraging
intellectual inquiry and science. He encouraged John Foster to adopt
moderate religious views. But the five Dulles children still had
a strict religious upbringing. Each week they attended Sunday school,
three Sunday worship services, Monday night young people's service,
Wednesday prayer meeting, and Friday preparatory service whenever
Communion was to be served the following Sunday. Sundays also en
tailed learning a poem, a chapter of the Bible--either from Psalms
or the New Testament--and one or two verses of a hymn.
John Foster soon learned all of John's Gospel and eventually
became proficient at citing the Bible. He was a fervent Christian,
so much so that he often made others feel sinful and guilty when they
did something with which John Foster did not approve. Early in life
he developed a rigid code that controlled his behavior. Learning
seemed to come naturally to him. Aside from the Bible, John Foster
read the classics at an early age. He devoured Shakespeare, Dickens,
Spencer and Scott and read Voltaire, Moliere, and La Fountaine in the
original French. He also traveled widely with his family to France,
Germany, and Switzerland, usually touring by bicycle.
John Foster's childhood was not all work and no play. He was
not above playing hooky from school to go fishing. He admitted to
getting his hands caned and his ears cuffed for throwing spitballs
in class.
(He eventually praised his public school education be-
cause it preached a good old Americanism and pride in country.)
John Foster joined boys' gangs and threw snowballs after school. He
also enjoyed playing with his brother and sisters. But, "though there
were five children, it was always as a triad that Eleanor, Allen and
Foster Dulles spent the formative years in Watertown and Henderson,
and this grouping was something that would continue throughout their
lives, each of them symbiotically feeding on the other emotionally,
12
professionally, and politically." (Hosley, 1978, p. 20) And there
was never any doubt that Foster was the strong personality and leader
of the trio. The three trained themselves to be tough. They would
jump out of John Foster's dinghy, Boat No. 5 as it was called, and take
a swim (as long as the water was above 50 degrees Farenheit). John
Foster always outlasted his two siblings, who neither could equal
his record of swimming the five-mile round-trip of Henderson Harbor.
No. 5 was a gift to John Foster by his grandfather, John Watson Foster.
The gift was a recompense when John Foster had to miss a 1901 Pan
American exposition due to an illness.
John Foster developed into an adept sailor. Sailing taught him
self-reliance, for many times his life literally depended on how
well he handled his ship. It taught him patience, since there was no
sense worrying during periods of calm. It taught him courage, re
straint, and steadiness when management of the craft required calm,
taut-nerved operation. No. 5 instilled a love of sailing that stayed
with John Foster all through life.
As children of a minister, the Dulleses never felt a conflict
between what they believed and how they lived. There was no sense
of inferiority on Foster's part as a son of a preacher. In fact, he
may even have felt a sense of superiority because of his religious
fervor and his quest for perfection in the human condition. His
family had the "usual" family problems, but they adjusted to them.
Reverend Dulles earned $3,000 annually, which in itself represented
considerable buying power in the late 1800's and early 1900's. But he
had a private income (source unknown) which paid the costs of family
13
travel abroad.
John Foster Dulles experienced a generally normal and probably
exceptionally happy childhood. He was born into an aristocratic
family which emphasized Christian values, intellectual inquiry, and
sportsmanship; a family which traveled extensively, and which bene
fitted from the wealth of experiences and connections of a family
patriarch, world traveler and statesman: John Watson Foster.
Dulles: The maturing years
In 1904, when Foster was 16, his parents and his grandfather de
cided that only a university could continue to challenge Foster's men
tal capacity and he was enrolled in Princeton University. John Foster
found his studies easy. He had a quick mind and excellent power of
concentration. But he continued to play hard, too. Though he joined
no clubs, he passed his leisure time playing whist, bridge, and poker.
He took part in debate but never tried out for varsity. He also en
joyed chess.
John Foster's first English paper was turned in September 24,
1904 and was entitled, "My Preparation for English". The work was
full of misspellings, but what showed through the piece was "a curious
combination of shyness, intellectual self-confidence, conventional
modesty, and unconventional tendency toward iconolasm." (Beal, 1957,
p. 31) He admitted that he never had an English course yet asserted
that he knew basic grammatical rules from what he picked up from study
ing Latin and Greek. He told how his knowledge of literature came
from reading the "masterpieces"--reading not as a task, which entails
14
dissecting them piecemeal, but rather as a whole, to get a clearer
picture of their entirety. He admitted he wrote few essays and told
of his surprise that he was ever allowed to enter college--"as far
as English preparation is concerned".
Near the end of his junior year, John Foster was invited by his
grandfather to attend the International Peace Conference at The Hague.
This was the second such conference at The Hague. The first, held in
1899, was attended by 26 nations. The second drew representation from
44--virtually every nation on earth. This conference met from June
15 to October 18 and encountered big-power opposition to disarmament
recommendations. Nor could it prevent World War I. The conference
however, achieved many successes. It encouraged the peaceful solution
of international disputes; it adopted rules for warning would-be
victims if hostilities were inevitable; and it urged nations to set
up an international court of justice (which was established after
World War I).
John Foster Dulles was a secretary to the Chinese delegation to
the conference. The delegation members spoke English but not French-
the language of diplomacy. John Foster was fluent in French and be
came the delegation's translator. But his first contribution to the
conference related to protocol. The participants of the conference
could not decide on the order of precedence for courtesy calls on one
another. John Foster was helpful in getting the conference started
by seeing to it that all calling cards were delivered simultaneously.
It was exciting for John Foster to see the most noted statesmen of his
day and the clash of national interests they represented.
15
His experiences at the conference convinced him that increased
cooperation between the nations was possible. These experiences also
deepened a conflict in John Foster--whether to be a Christian minister,
like his father, or a lawyer and a diplomat, like his grandfather.
All through his life, John Foster's father and grandfather repre
sented positions that did not conflict and in fact that complemented
each other. Each man, father and grandfather, had hopes of John Foster
choosing a career following his own. John Foster was at a crossroads.
He had to decide which career to pursue, for he only had one year left
at college and it was necessary to make plans for whatever was to fol
low. He left The Hague Conference still undecided and returned to his
senior year at Princeton.
John Foster's major at Princeton was philosophy, which also en
tailed several courses in psychology. He was elected to Phi Beta
Kappa and did his senior thesis on "The Theory of Judgment," a 19-
page paper on pragmatism. This paper won him the Chancellor Green
Mental Science Fellowship, a $600 scholarship to the Sorbonne in Paris
to study for a year under Henri Bergson, French philosopher and Nobel
Prize winner. John Foster stood second in the Princeton class of 1908
and gave the valedictory speech at the graduation ceremonies. He was
20 years old.
The Dulles family left for Paris in the summer of 1908. While at
the Sorbonne, John Foster developed a life-long appreciation for the
French heritage and a patience with France in her days of political
impotence. This patience was to yield to an "agonizing" feeling when
he felt compelled to "reappraise" U.S.-France relations when he became
16
17
Secretary of State. In addition to philosophy, John Foster also studied
international law at the Sorbonne, and he leaned toward law and diplo
macy as a career. This development greatly pleased his grandfather.
On his return to the United States, John Foster enrolled in George
Washington Law School in Washington, D.C. He chose George Washington
so he could live with his grandparents. John Foster not only completed
the three-year law program in two years, he also kept an active social
life. He was invited to parties which his grandparents also attended
and he became well acquainted with Washington social circles. John
Foster made the highest marks ever achieved at George Washington Law
School, but despite this performance he was refused a degree because
he did not meet the required three years of study. The University did
not award him his degree until some 25 years later, when he was already
a leader of the bar.
After he finished his law program, John Foster returned to Auburn
(where his family had moved a few years previously) to study for the
New York State bar exams. On the one side he prepared for the exams
by cramming, while on the other he took long study breaks so he could
go canoeing with a friend. During the exams he answered enough ques
tions to satisfy himself that he had passed and he left the test early
because he had a date with his canoeing friend, Janet Avery. "It was
while they were canoeing on Owasco Lake that he asked Janet to marry him
and she accepted at once." (Mosley, 1978, p. 28) That night, Foster
told his parents of his engagement and they did not object. Janet's
parents, however, were not so calm about the idea. They knew little
about John Foster and they wondered if he was worthy enough to be
admitted to their family circle. The Averys need not have worried.
John Foster passed the bar exams, as he knew he would, and he was on
his way to New York City to find a job.
For six weeks John Foster applied for jobs with the more notable
New York attorneys without success. These attorneys had their choice
from Harvard, Yale and Columbia Law School graduates, many of whom
also had post-graduate degrees from Oxford and Cambridge. Princeton
was, in those days, a provincial college for would-be clergymen.
Harvard-bred lawyers told Foster they considered his alma mater a
"country club". Washington Law School did not have much standing in
New York. And any tourist could enroll for a summer course at the
Sorbonne. Thus, what John Foster considered to be excellent qualifi
cations for international law, including his mastery of French and
Spanish and his adequate German, the law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell
found to be "commonplace" and did not hire him.
Discouraged but far from crushed, John Foster enlisted the help
of his grandfather. Prior to the Civil War, John Watson Foster had
been associated with the Cincinnati law firm of Algernon S. Sullivan.
Sullivan later moved to New York and founded Sullivan & Cromwell.
Grandfather Foster gave his grandson a letter to the surviving part
ner, William Cromwell, recalling their old association and outlining
young John Foster's qualifications. It was not Cromwell's practice to
interview applicants for his firm, but he made an exception for John
Foster. He decided to give him a chance.
John Foster Dulles received $50 a month as a starting law clerk,
but the experience proved far more rewarding. Sullivan & Cromwell
18
had extensive legal business with Latin America and John Foster, with
his command of the Spanish language, became the firm's representative
in the region. On one of his trips to British Guyana, John Foster con
tracted malaria and nearly died. He was treated with heavy doses of
quinine, a drug which affected his optic nerve and left his sight im
paired. Afterwards, he wore glasses and had a tic in his left eye for
the rest of his life. But by the end of John Foster's first year with
Sullivan & Cromwell, his salary had risen to $100 a month, and he be
came an established member of the firm.
John Foster and Janet were married in Auburn on June 26, 1912.
His grandfather intended to leave $20,000 to each of his grandchild
ren when he died, but he told John Foster he could start drawing on
his inheritance to further his career. With this financial support,
Janet was able to accompany John Foster on his trips abroad. One trip
Janet did not go on, however, was one made by John Foster in 1917 at
19
the prodding of his uncle, Robert Lansing, then Secretary of State under
Woodrow Wilson.
John Foster Dulles accepted a secret assignment in Central America
where he gained the assurances from the Nicaraguan, Costa Rican, and
Panamanian governments that they would align their policies with the
United States in the impending war against Germany. The Latin Ameri
cans also promised they would hunt down German spies and saboteurs
who might interfere with the passage of military supplies through the
Panama Canal.
Dulles: Emerging statesman
Returning to the U.S., John Foster Dulles applied for active
military service but was turned down because of his poor eyesight.
Instead he was commissioned as an Army captain (and was promoted to
major by the end of the war). He was assigned to the War Trade Board
superintending shipments to neutral countries as the assistant to
Vance McCormick, the Board's chairman. Dulles' position also brought
him into contact with Bernard Baruch, one of the more influential
men of the day. Baruch ran the War Industries Board, which mobilized
domestic production. Dulles' position would better serve him in his
future career than would active duty. He learned firsthand how to
deal with foreign governments and with domestic bureaucracies, such
as the War and Navy Departments. Dulles regretted the fact that a
physical infirmity kept him out of the active service.
World War I ended on November 11, 1918. Dulles heard that
President Wilson would personally lead the U.S. delegation to the
treaty negotiations at Versailles and he asked his Uncle Bert (Lansing)
if he (Dulles) might go along to Versailles. But Lansing had had a
falling out of sorts with the President and felt himself lucky to be
going and therefore did not want to press his luck by asking that his
nephew go along with the delegation. There were other ways for Dulles
to get to Versailles. Bernard Baruch was impressed by Dulles' clear
mindedness and his legal and organizing abilities. When Baruch was
named head of the American Delegation on Reparations, he asked Dulles
to serve as the delegation's counsel.
20
The Allies were in bad financial shape after the war. Their
21
citizens had suffered considerable property damage and they also faced
the burden of wartime taxes. Some leaders falsely asserted that Germany
was able and should be requested to pay large amounts of reparations
to the victorious allies. Baruch later reported on this spirit of
vengeance or selfish advantage that was present in the minds of the
framers of the treaty. The U.S., however, was the only delegation
with a definite reparations scheme, and it had been drafted by Dulles.
The scheme would exact from Germany the cost of damages resulting
directly from acts clearly in violation of international law as well
as damages to civilian populations and their property. Other delega
tions merely filed general statements demanding compensation for all
damages--direct and indirect.
It was up to Dulles to argue the U.S. position. He said America
joined with the others in condemning Germany's instigation of war as
an international crime and that the U.S. had a substantial war debt,
too. But he said the delegates must be bound by the pre-Armistice
agreement, which the Allies offered and which the Germans accepted
and which did not call for the heavy reparations that some of the
delegates were seeking.
Gentlemen, if we hold to the domain of reason, we cannot
adopt such methods. To demand the gigantic total of war
costs would be to jeopardize securing that specific re
paration as to which Germany must clearly recognize her
liability, and the satisfactions of which will tax her
resources to the limit. (Beal, 1957, p. 68)
Dulles found himself in agreement with John Maynard Keynes, who also
attended the negotiations. They held to the position that exacting
22
a heavy toll from the Germans, who were unable to pay, would threaten
starvation and sow the seeds of unrest. Dulles wanted Germany as a
productive, stabilizing, consuming nation.
President Wilson asked Dulles to stay on in Europe as American
representative on the Reparations Commission. Dulles was 31 years
old and he found it exciting working with prominent and powerful min
isters from the other countries. Dulles' service ended in the fall of
1919 when the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, under pressure
from postwar isolationists, passed a resolution that the U.S. should
not be represented on the reparations group. Dulles, a Republican,
was disappointed with the isolationists because they were mostly
members of his party. He saw American isolationism as the inability
to face up to international responsibilities to insure the peace.
When Dulles returned from Paris, he had earned international re
spect and recognition as a diplomat and expert on reparations and in
ternational finance. His experiences at Versailles conditioned his
actions for the rest of his life. Thereafter, Dulles was interested
in equitable solutions to international problems. He was also more
sensitive to the need for Senate involvement in and support for Ameri
ca's role in world affairs.
Dulles became a junior partner of Sullivan & Cromwell in 1919
and the senior partner in 1926. He continued to take an active inter
est in German reparations and allied indebtedness to the U.S. Between
1920 and 1923, most of his speeches and writings were on these problems.
He continued to blame Germany for its crimes in World War I. But in
December of 1922, he blamed Wilson for demanding huge reparations from
Germany, which heavily taxed Germany's ability to pay any reparations.
Dulles suggested a moratorium on reparation payments so Germany could
"get its house in order".
(New York Times, December 20, 1922)
In 1924, the Dawes Plan was formulated to provide loans for
Germany and to moderate Germany's payments for a few years. Dulles
supported this plan but felt it was not enough because it did not set
a fixed amount for Germany's obligations. Nor did it set a date when
payments would cease. In 1926 and again in 1928, in speeches to the
Foreign Policy Association, Dulles urged the continuance of loans to
foreign countries, which could in turn buy U.S. exports. "Otherwise,
our neighbors would starve while we had surplus goods rotting in our
warehouses." (New York Times, March 25, 1928)
At a Conference on the Causes of War, Dulles said the greatest
danger to the peace lies in the "impulse to retain such wealth as
we have. Under changing economic conditions men opt for the status
quo. Government is a strong ally in this struggle to retain wealth
and position. Under such conditions, a powerful and ruling class is
apt to use its wealth and position to put into power ... a strong govern
ment." (New York Times, January 21, 1925)
After World War II started in 1939, Dulles formulated a Plan for
Peace which called for limiting national sovereignty. His proposal
involved a willingness on the part of nations to adhere to rules made
by an international organization.
(New York Times, October 29, 1939)
Dulles argued that the U.S. must take the lead in developing an inter
national organization but that it must avoid war in order to devote
full attention to the project.
23
24
Dulles presented his plans in his first book: War, Peace and
Change. He started with the premise that change is inevitable and
desirable. If change is not allowed to occur peacefully, then violent
change will occur. His work was against status quo thinking and the
ideology of nationalism. He hoped to find the causes of war and to
eradicate them. Dulles did not justify the expansionist policies of
Germany, Japan and Italy, as he had been criticized for doing. He
merely explained why they happened. He criticized the self-righteous
attempts to personify nations as either heroes or villains. He re
jected isolationism and he rejected one-world government. The estab
lishment of international agencies not limited or restricted by national
sovereignty would begin "that dilution of sovereignty which all enlight
ened thinkers agree to be indispensable." (New York Times, October 29,
1939)
Dulles: National leadership
Dulles was named Chairman of the Commission on a Just and Durable
Peace, created by the Federal Council of Churches in early 1941. The
Federal Council of Churches was formed in 1908 for the purpose of
greater Christian unity. Goals of the Council focused initially on
the solution of industrial problems; the Council sought to effectuate
the abolition of child labor, to shorten the work week, to establish
a minimtnn wage and to insure the right to organize workers. The Council
was also involved in political issues. It urged President Franklin D.
·Roosevelt (1933-45) to stay out of World War II; it further advocated
a world organization in a letter to Roosevelt where the "sovereignty
25
of the individual state would be limited to the interests of a world
community". (Singer, 1975, p. 104)
As Chairman of the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace, Dulles
was in contact with hundreds of religious leaders (who were predominant
ly Protestant). He sought to move public opinion by encouraging these
leaders to preach to their congregations on the necessity for non
involvement in the "European" war. Dulles defended, even demanded,
Christian involvement in the political process to insure good govern
ment.
In his quest for a lasting peace, Dulles criticized the Atlantic
Charter declaration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston
Churchchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain, because it did not spe
cifically provide for a world organization. Though the Charter pro
vided for "a wider and permanent system of general security," Roosevelt
rejected Churchchill's explicit plan to work for an international
agency.
(Knappen, 1956, pp. 235 & 249) Roosevelt was aware of past
American opposition to international organizations. But friendly
American reception to the Atlantic Charter persuaded him that such a
project might again be politically feasible. Dulles felt the Charter
did not go far enough in promoting a new international system of se
curity. He said the end of the war would find a concentration of power
in one or two hands and that this power must be used, not to per
petuate itself, "but to create, support and eventually give way to
international institutions drawing their vitality from the whole family
of nations". (Beal, 1957, p. 91)
Once the United States entered World War II, Dulles warned Americans
not to think of victory as a "push over". It was an illusion to think
that just because the U.S. was in the war, victory was at hand. Vic
tory would come in the long run. The war itself should be viewed as
a mission to achieve a lasting peace.
As Chairman of the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace, Dulles
formulated his plan for a lasting peace. His plan was known as "Six
Pillars of Peace" and called for, among other things, collaboration
between all nations, assurance of autonomy for subject peoples, con
trol of armaments, and world organization. John D. Rockefeller spoke
in favor of Dulles' plan. Dulles sought to promote his plan to the
American public. Though not enthusiastic about Dulles' plan, Roosevelt
was certain that the American public would support U.S. participation
in a world organization. Roosevelt set Secretary of State Cordell
26
Hull to work on plans for the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, which developed
the scheme for the United Nations.
On April 6, 1945, Dulles became a general advisor to the U.S.
delegation at the San Francisco Conference which formalized the estab
lishment of the United Nations (U.N.). The U.S. delegation agreed not
to leak anything to the press about the behind-the-scenes creation of
the U.N. But everyday Dulles was reportedly out in the hotel corri
dors leaking to newsmen details of the day's discussions. As a gen
eral advisor, Dulles was at the conference to offer suggestions and to
represent the Republicans. He was not an official spokesman. Demo
crats saw Dulles' leaking of news to the media as an attempt by him to
advertise his contributions to the conference, regardless of their
actual importance, and to promote the Republican party. Dulles,
although not on record in response to this point, always desired
strong public support for governmental programs. He apparently justi
fied his actions, correctly or incorrectly, as an attempt to get public
opinion behind the conference's goals and to assure its success.
Republican ideologue on foreign affairs
27
The above example of bipartisan participation was not the first
program in which Dulles participated. In 1944, Thomas Dewey ran for
President on the Republican ticket against Roosevelt. Dulles became
Dewey's foreign policy advisor. The Republicans criticized the
Dwn
barton Oaks conference. Dewey and Dulles feared the proposed interna
tional organization "smacked too much of big-power control of the world,
without adequate representation for little nations". (Beal, 1957, p.
97) The White House denied this accusation and at a press conference,
Secretary Hull announced he would confer with Dewey to explain the
administration's policy. Dewey accepted the invitation but he sent
Dulles to confer with Hull. Dulles and Hull spent hours quibbling
over the terms to describe U.S. policy toward the U.N. Hull wanted to
use the term 'non-partisan', which indicated that issues were not split
by party lines or partisan sentiments. Dulles preferred 'bi-partisan',
indicating that both parties worked together on a solution. Dulles
preferred bi-partisanship because it granted the Republicans equal
status in a politically profitable project. This was the same reason
why Hull and Roosevelt rejected the term. Dulles finally conceded
to Hull's demands. The two agreed that Roosevelt and Dewey should not
campaign on a promise for world organization. Both favored the
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organization, but they had different opinions on how it should be
established. They and their advisors did not want these differences
to be debated in the campaign, thus risking a division of the American
public which could threaten public support for the United Nations.
In 1945, Dulles was involved in another bipartisan conference.
He was the Republican representative and the counselor to Secretary
of State James Byrnes at the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in
London. Byrnes was ready to yield to uncompromising Soviet demands
which would have knocked France and China out of discussions at the
meeting. The Soviets claimed the French and Chinese had no right to
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