Karshi state university master of arts department

3.2. Phraseology of the illocutionary force of an utterance
Let us remind that the notion of illocutionary force is complex. It includes along with the illocutionary purpose, which unites speech acts into classes, its intensity, the way of achieving the illocutionary purpose, conditions of propositional content, preconditions, sincerity conditions and intensity of sincerity conditions⁵⁴. To analyze the contextual and discursive characteristics of FI we find the most important components of illocutionary force such as the intensity of the illocutionary purpose and the intensity of the sincerity conditions.
Let us begin with the intensity of the illocutionary purpose. The illocutionary purpose can be expressed with more or less intensity. Of course, direct comparisons of degrees of intensity make sense only within the same illocutionary goal. As it turned out, the most numerous group among the investigated speech acts with FI were statements with an assertive illocutionary purpose. According to our classification of speech acts, the assertive illocutionary purpose is «to tell how things are»⁵⁵. Let us compare two utterances that are synonymous at the propositional level and belong to the same addressee. However, these statements differ in terms of the intensity of the illocutionary purpose.
“I think you’re guilty”, she said quietly. “I think you’re guilty as hell”. One cannot help but notice that the first statement is weaker than the second. The illocutionary purpose of the second statement is expressed with greater intensity than that of the first statement. The addressee uses the FI as hell in the second statement in order to make the addressee recognize that this proposition represents the actual state of affairs in the world of the utterance. By increasing the intensity of the expression of the illocutionary purpose, the FI thereby contributes to the build-up of assertive illocative power. Let us turn to another example demonstrating an increase in assertive illocutionary power.
«So,» she said, «tell me about Jane.»
«Janie,» he said, eyes and voice suddenly filling with pride, «is quite a girl. She’s almost fifteen - tall - blond - dark-eyed, which makes for a combination - everything in the right proportions and getting more so - charming - lovable - extremely intelligent - quick-witted - just a hell of a bright kid».
The author of these statements makes a sequence of assertives in order to express the intensional state of pride in his daughter. As the internal tension associated with the experience of the intensional state increases, the intensity of the assertive illocative force increases. The increase in the assertive illocutionary force in terms of intensity is verbally expressed by intensifiers, first lexical (quite, extremely) and then by the FI a hell of a. We see that the use of FI in this example falls at the moment when the aggregate assertive allocative force reaches the maximum degree of intensity, i.e. at the moment of the release of the internal tension conditioned by the achievement of the optimal mode of expression.
Assertive illocutionary purpose can also be expressed through statements, messages, predictions, and assumptions. «A speaker who states, reports, predicts, or speculates that P expresses, with varying degrees of intensity, the assumption that P». The intensity with which the illocutionary goal is presented will depend, in each case, on the intensity associated with the mode of achievement. For example, the intensity of the mode of attainment associated with an assertion is stronger than the intensity with which the illocutionary goal of a supposition or conjecture is attained. Using the conventions of illocutionary logic, this position can be represented as follows: degree (assert)> degree (guess). In support of the above, here are examples of assertive acts of conjecture and supposition.
I tried to catch them, but I guess they were good and scared, because they ran too fast for me (Kenkyusha).

1. 
   Old Sally’s ankles kept bending in until they were practically on the ice.
   

They not only looked stupid, but they probably hurt like hell too. She was killing herself. It was brutal. I really felt sorry for her. She wasn’t looking too happy.
In the first statement, the speaker makes a guess about the reason for the failed attempt to perform the action he or she has taken. The illocutionary force of this speech act is expressed by the performative «guess» «to guess». «Guess» is close in illocution to the other performative «suppose,» which expresses the illocative power of the second assertive-presumption, which includes the FI. Both mean «to assert some proposition with a low degree of commitment to what is true»⁵⁶. In our view, in order to increase the degree of commitment to the truth of what the proposition asserts, the speaker uses the FI good and ... in the first example and like hell in the second. However, unlike the verb «guess» the verb «assume» provides, as D. Vanderveken notes, obligatory evidence or proof⁵⁷. Therefore, in the second example, describing her school friend’s unfortunate skating experience, the author of the presupposition provides evidence that Sally experienced terrible pain while skating because her ankles twisted and rubbed against the ice. A weighty evidence is also the speaker’s intentional state of regret, which in turn determines in this case the type of illocution (assertive) and the choice of lexical means ( to kill, brutal, not happy). Thus, the assumption expressed by the speaker is justified, hence we can conclude that the assertive meets the conditions of sincerity and truthfulness and the words turn out to be «adapted to the world». Another example in which the FI contributes to the intensity of the assertive illocutionary purpose is the statement below.

1. 
   «Did it hurt?»
   
2. 
   «You may take it as definitely official that it hurt like blazes.»
   
3. 
   «Coo! I’m sorry. I mistook you for the burglar» (P.G.Wodehouse «Joy in the Morning,» ch. XVII, p. 144).
   
4. 
   The author of this statement, walking in a summer garden at night, was mistaken for a burglar and hit hard.
   

When asked by the abuser whether it hurt, the victim responds by making an assertive statement, the underlying meaning of which consists of the performative «declare: «You can take it quite officially that it hurt terribly». In order to succeed in achieving the assertive illocative goal, i.e. to make the addressee (the offender) acknowledge the truth of the propositional content, the addressee reinforces the expression of the illocative goal by using the FI like blazes, and thus he succeeds in achieving the illocative goal. The addressee realizes that the blow he struck really hurt him badly and this leads him to an intensional state of regret, which he verbalizes with the interjection «Coo!» and the expression «I’m sorry».
Phraseological utterances considered above demonstrated assertive illocution of varying strength or intensity related to the way the illocutionary goal is achieved. Assertive statements were represented by assertion, supposition, conjecture, and statement. The directive illocutionary goal also has different modes of achievement. The illocutionary purpose of directives, according to J. Searle’s classification that we have adopted, is «that they represent attempts on the part of the speaker to get the hearer to do something». Directives can also be very modest attempts, as when I advise you to do something or suggest it to you in an unobtrusive way; but they can also be very aggressive attempts if, for example, I demand or order you to do it. Let’s look at two examples of speech acts whose directive purpose can be achieved in ways consistent with an order and a request.
1.Put your handkerchiefs over your noses and run like hell!
2. «Would it be too much to ask you to fly like a bat out of hell? I’ve a date,» Biff said. Mr. Mr. Scarborough assured him that he would be back in twenty minutes, if not sooner, and his promise was fulfilled.
The illocutionary purpose of the first directive has a method of achievement that corresponds to an order and consists in trying to make the listener run faster. The second directive act is a request, the purpose of which is to change the nature of the action. J. Searle and D. Vanderveken write: «the speaker succeeds in achieving the directive illocutionary goal if and only if in a given text and at a given utterance he makes an attempt to induce the listener to realize the line of action represented by the proposition»⁵⁸ and further «...each possible mode of achievement requires some minimum intensity with which the illocutionary goal must be achieved»⁵⁹. Thus, to achieve an illocutionary goal with some intensity is to achieve it with any lower intensity. For example, if a person demands that someone do something, then he has already achieved the directive illocutionary goal with an intensity corresponding to the request. Consequently, the mode of achievement corresponding to the order requires that the intensity of the illocutionary goal be high, this is precisely what the FI like hell in the first example contributes to. In this case, the intensity of the expression of the illocutionary goal of the directive degree (F) is equal to the intensity determined by its mode of achievement /mode (F)/. Applying the notation used in illocutionary logic, this clause can be represented as follows: degree (F) = /mode (F)/; degree (demand) = /mode (order)/. Any directive-type utterance is designed to have a perlocutionary effect. The difference between an order and a request consists, according to A. Vezbitskaya, in the initial assumptions: «...an order contains in its underlying structure the assumption that the hearer must do what the speaker wants. The request contains the assumption that the hearer may or may not do what the speaker wants him to do». Thus, in order to achieve the illocutionary purpose of the request, the intensity of the expression of the illocutionary purpose must be greater than the intensity determined by its mode. The context of the situation in the second example shows us that the speaker achieves the perlocutionary effect by strengthening the illocutionary goal of the indirect speech act of request with the help of the FI like a bat out of hell.
By performing the directive speech act, the speaker tries to adjust the world to the words. The commissive illocutionary force has a similar direction of accommodation, which, as part of its illocutionary goal, has the desire to make the world conform to the words. The authors of the statements with FI given below form intentions to commit future actions, which, along with the intensional state, defines intensionality as a necessary condition for the generation of speech acts, in these examples - commissives.
Bob: I’m not feeling too good myself
Frank: I’m going to miss you a hell of a lot.
Bob: Same here.
2. «I don’t owe you five bucks,» I said. «If you rough me up, I’ll yell like hell».
The illocutionary power of commissions, which is reinforced by the FIs a hell of a lot and like hell, can be defined as a «guarantee», which is, according to D. Vanderveken’s definition, both a statement and a promise, conditioned by the situation.
Let us recall that, according to J. Searle and D. Vanderveken, the condition of sincerity is the psychological state of the speaker expressed by him when committing an illocutionary act. We explain the reflection in discourse of the speaker’s psychological state within the framework of J. Searle’s theory of intentional states, who noted that: «In the performance of every speech act that has propositional content, we express a certain intentional state with a given propositional content, and this intentional state is the condition for the sincerity of such a speech act. It seems that the verbalization of the corresponding intentional state is carried out by means of the speech act, which includes phraseology.