Power Blackout Risks


blackout 2003, italy/swiss



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blackout 2003, italy/swiss
17/18/19
 
what happened?

28th September 2003: Italian power system faced its worst disruption in 50 years, which also affected
parts of Switzerland with 56 million people in total

Electricity was restored after 1.5 hours (CH) and 18 hours (Italy)
causes:

Inability of the Swiss system operator to reclose the Mettlen-Lavorgo line after its initial failure.

Ineffective communication and subsequent slow and ineffective emergency responses by the Swiss
and Italian system operators.

Angle and voltage instability in Italy just prior to its collapse. 

Insufficient tree cutting under the power lines. 
impacts:

Beside Switzerland and Italy, the networks in France, Slovenia, and Austria were affected and the blackout
led to a domino effect that ultimately resulted in the separation of the Italian system from the rest of the 
European grid. >
17
Project Understand, White Paper on Security of European Electricity Distribution, 20.6.2007
(http://www.understand.se/docs/White_Paper_EN.doc)
18
http://www.solarstorms.org/Italy2003.html
19
http://www.semissourian.com/story/121022.html


28

30,000 people were trapped on trains. 

Several hundred passengers were stranded on underground transit systems.

Significant knock-on effects across other critical infrastructures, commercial and domestic users which 
suffered disruption up to 48 hours.

Subway had to be evacuated. 

Cost to restaurants and bars in spoiled products and lost sales totalled up to USD 139 m.
blackout 2006, germany incl. western europe 
20/21/22/23

what happened?

On November 4, 2006 the German TSO E.ON Netz had to switch off a high voltage line to let a ship
pass underneath.

Simultaneously there was a high amount of wind electricity which fed into the grid 10,000 MW from
wind turbines to Western and Southern Europe grids.

Insufficient communication about this switch-off led to instabilities of the frequency in the grid and
to overloading of lines. 

Devices had to switch customers off in the countries affected to cope with this lack of power in the
Western zone automatic.

The blackout lasted up to two hours.
causes:

After manual disconnection of the high-voltage line the n-1 criterion of process security was not fulfilled.
N-1 criterion means that any component may fail and all other components are still below their limit.
As a result, even a relatively small power flow deviation could trigger the cascade of line tripping.

Insufficient co-ordination between transmission system operators.

No access to real-time data from the power units connected to the distribution grids.

Lack of joint simulation training with neighbouring transmission system operators.

Lack of coordination between operators’ internal procedures regarding grid-related, market-related and
other adjustments.

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