Allmark-Kent 17
A potential solution to these conflicts could lie in how we classify the
research itself. For instance, in “From Animal to Animality Studies,” Michael
Lundblad argues that the phrase “animal studies” is
too limiting to encompass
the multiplicity of academic work regarding animals, and is “too easily mistaken
for a unified call for universal advocacy for animals” (496). He wishes to solidify
our understanding of animal studies and associate it even further with both
advocacy and work explicitly concerned with the treatment of nonhuman
animals. Conversely, he suggests a new term, “animality studies,”
to describe
“work that expresses no explicit interest in advocacy,” even though it “shares an
interest in how we think about ‘real’ animals (496). He admits that such a
methodology could be described as speciesist, but is necessary to “open up a
space for new critical work that might have different priorities, without an
imperative to claim the advocacy for nonhuman animals that runs through much
of the recent work in animal studies” (467). Whilst
the multiplicity of animal
studies has been necessary for the growth and vitality of this minor field,
perhaps the profusion of varied and increasingly specialized research suggests
that we are approaching a point at which we can begin to define and classify
these conflicting perspectives. Although this could seem divisive, it may be
necessary for animal studies scholars to begin declaring their allegiances, if we
are ever to achieve cohesion.
In light of this, then, I am obliged to declare my own allegiance. I position
my work in alignment with the ‘pro-animal’ or ‘animal-endorsing’ scholarship. I
concur with Bergman that we must never efface the nonhuman presence, or the
realities of exploitation, from our discussions. In a joint editorial for
Society &
Animals
, “Toward a Critical Theory of Animal
Issues in Fiction,” Kenneth
Shapiro and Marion Copeland propose three methods for literary animal
Allmark-Kent 18
studies: firstly, to deconstruct “reductive, disrespectful ways of presenting
nonhuman animals”; secondly, to evaluate “the degree to which the author
presents the animal ‘in itself,’ both as an experiencing individual and as a
species-
typical way of living in the world”;
and thirdly, to explicate the forms of
animal-
human relationships in the work at hand and place them in the “universe
of possible relationships
—from the animal as forgotten resource for a consumer
[…] to the animal as more or less equal partner in a relationship—the fruit of
which is a com
mon project, a shared world” (345). In what I sense as the
implicit formation of a pro-animal literary canon, the authors call for articles
prioritizing texts that “give a more robust and respectful presentation of animals”
as well as making “observation[s] about the history and development of the
human-
nonhuman animal bond” (345). In a similar vein, I also agree with John
Simons
’ assertions in
Animal Rights and the Politics of Literary Representation
(2002) that while we cannot fully “dissociate ourselves and enter
an animal
world […] we can imagine and we can speculate,” and thus it is “the imaginative
and speculative acts of literature” coming “closest to the animal experience in
itself” that deserve recognition (7).
Dostları ilə paylaş: