Time in the Teachings of Rabbi Shneur Zalman of Liadi

yud
” [
b
Menahot 
29b]. See LT 
Re’eh 
33c. In numerous places (e.g. LT 
Pinhas
76c, 
Shemini ‘atseret 
83d), the 
yud 
is 
associated with the contraction and with the restricting powers of G
evurot
. 
159
See LT 
Devarim 
1b. In LT 
Shemini ‘atseret 
85d-86a, Rabbi Eleazar ben Durdaya is presented as a 
paragon of radical transformation through repentance (see 
b
‘Avodah zarah 17a). This stands in 
apparent contradiction to Rashaz's definition in 
Tanya
of the complete
tsadik 
as one who has never 

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156 
This scope for redemption is further associated with the existence of free will 
in this world as against its absence from the world-to-come. Notably, the concept of 
free will seemingly clashes with the concept of God's omniscience (the paradox of 
yedi’ah u-vehirah
160
). In Rashaz’s view, free will is associated with the equal access 
to the transcendent light that is granted to everyone, 
161
but when he raises the 
question of free will in other contexts, he links it to the immanent light [
memale
] 
while associating divine omniscience with the transcendent light [
sovev
].
162
Nevertheless, there is no contradiction between these two positions, as while in this 
world, one can always transcend oneself, reach out to the aspect of 
sovev
and 
become a better person than before, in the world-to-come, the two types of light are 
no longer distinguishable from each other, as the transcendent light shines also upon 
the immanency.
163
Consequently, in the world-to-come, individuals are no longer 
able to access any distinctly transcendent divine force by means of which to improve 
and rise up the hierarchy of beings; rather, they remain permanently fixed at the 
even harboured a sinful thought [T1, 10:14b-15]. However, 
teshuvah
transcends time and can 
therefore undo whatever has been done within time’s boundaries. On Rashaz’s concept of 
tsadik
see a 
Halamish, “Mishnato ha-iyunit,” 352-63; Loewenthal, “Self-Sacrifice,” 458-60. The confusion 
between divine and ostensibly non-divine elements in exilic reality prompts Rashaz to compare it to a 
dream [
halom
], which is characterised by the “withdrawal of consciousness” [
histalkut ha-mohin
]. 
According to this analogy, the wakeful mind perceives reality as a divine wholeness, whereas the 
imagination, which is active in a dream, tends to divide its object into separate and independent 
entities (see TO 28c-d). However, a dream can also combine “two opposites in one subject” [
shenei 
hafakhim be-nose ehad
]: 
sacrum
and 
profanum
, Godliness and materiality, and so on (see MAHZ 
5565
, i, 184-5). While the imagination generating the dream-like reality of the individual living in 
exile does not provide the sharp and explicit cognition of the divine reality that is available to the 
wakeful consciousness of the redeemed individual, it nevertheless, makes it possible to overcome the 
chaos of exile by finding Godliness within the separate beings that inhabit the lower worlds. See 
Wolfson, 
A Dream
, 203-17. The states of sleeping and dreaming evoke also other association with the 
exile: the dream is the debris of materiality that remain in the body after the divine vitality [
hiyut
]
 
has 
departed from it while the person is asleep. Analogously, the state of confusion in the exilic world 
constitutes the material waste that is being purified in the course of the exile; see MAHZ