Power Blackout Risks

figure 4: outages per year and duration, 2009
7
7
World Bank study, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTESC/Resources/Approach_paper_annexes_14_October_2009.pdf 
8
http://www.oe.energy.gov/DocumentsandMedia/Attachment_1_Nextgen_Energy_Council_Lights_Out_Study.pdf.pdf 
Source: World Bank
Countries grouping
Average duration
of each outage 
in hours
Average number 
of outages
per year
3.2.3. average blackout duration per country
1400
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
Av
er
ag
e d
ur
at
io
n o
f e
ac
h p
ow
er o
ut
ag
e (
ho
ur
s)
Av
er
ag
e n
um
be
r o
f p
ow
er o
ut
ag
e p
er y
ea
r
All
countries
East Asia
& Pacific
Eastern 
Europe & 
Central Asia
Latin 
America & 
Caribbean
Middle East 
& North 
Africa
OECD
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa
South Asia

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4. Potential blackout scenario
A regional blackout lasting more than several days already could be considered as a “worst case” scenario.
Most back-up and security systems will fail after a longer period without electric power, leading to an almost 
complete failure of most critical infrastructures.
As shown before such a scenario could be caused by a wide range of events. 
For example, during the European heat wave of 2003, generation of electricity of power plants, incl. nuclear 
plants, had to be reduced due to the scarcity and high temperatures of the adjacent water bodies which are 
substantial for cooling purposes. Almost all rivers had record low water levels leading to reduced hydroelectric 
generation. Due to the massive lack of wind even wind generation capacity was down significantly. Prolonged 
heat waves may additionally result in a drop in biomass production due to reduced growth of plants.
If such preconditions coincide with a high electricity demand and increasing instability in the power grid, there
is the potential for a supra regional collapse.
A comparable collapse can also be caused by a severe geomagnetic storm or an HEMP attack, due to the simul-
taneous damage to several key transformer locations and/or high voltage transmission lines. (OECD report 2011.
9
)
4.1. Consequences
Most critical systems such as hospitals, first responder facilities, water and sewage systems and stock 
exchanges have backup power generation in place. However, these typically have only enough fuel for several 
hours to a maximum of a few days.
Immediately after a blackout, it is not possible to purchase any goods without cash as no electronic payment
is possible. The 2003 blackout illustrated that after 3 to 6 hours without power most fuel stations and the 
refineries had to close down, leaving the public without fuel for cars or backup generators as the pumps did
not operate. Aluminium melting furnaces will already sustain irreversible physical damage after 4-5 hours without 
electricity.
Governments have typically, however, implemented emergency fuel storages to keep most critical facilities
alive for several weeks up to a month.
After one month with no electrical power, water, transportation, emergency services, critical manufacturing,
and chemical sectors can face widespread outages within the affected region. The loss of water systems due
to a power outage leads to many cascading effects. Hospitals, schools, nursing homes, restaurants, and office 
buildings all rely on water to operate. Water is used for drinking, sanitation, and heating and cooling systems
in those facilities. Many manufacturing operations either use water as an ingredient in their processes or rely on 
wastewater systems to remove and process their manufacturing waste. Fire fighters depend on water to carry 
out their emergency response, and access to safe water is necessary for providing mass care services and 
preventing the spread of disease. Without electricity most heating systems do not operate. During winter typical 
homes can cool to below freezing level within few days. It must be expected that people will try to heat their 
homes using open fires, leading to many homes burning while there is no water for emergency response teams.
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http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/25/46891645.pdf 

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