Water Resources Management in Central Asia

Security implications
Throughout history, there have been hardly any cases of two coun-
tries going to war over water. Experts note that “water disputes between 
countries, though typically not leading to war directly, have fuelled dec-
ades of regional tensions, thwarted economic development, and risked 
provoking larger conflicts before eventually giving way to cooperation” 
(Postel; Wolf, 2001).
Johannes F. Linn, Senior Fellow and Executive Director of the 
Wolfenson Center for Development at the Brookings Institution, who 
has been extensively engaged in assessment of the region’s security and 
development prospects, foresees the coming of a major humanitarian, 
economic and political crisis for the region, given the current state of 
water and energy situation, “that is already difficult and tense at best 

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Anar Khamzayeva
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Documentos CIDOB, Asia
Water resources management in Central Asia
during years of normal weather”… with “the looming crisis having the 
potential to result in cross-border conflicts at the community and state 
level” (Linn, 2008).
The principle discourse on Central Asia has been largely centred on 
the plausibility of imminent danger and threats. The region harbours 
serious long-term security risks, such as the drug trade, illegal migra-
tion and religious extremism. In the view of one expert: “in the longer 
term, the conflicts that can arise out of water resource tensions (not to 
mention other tensions) in Central Asia threaten not only to embroil 
the states of the region, but also Russia, China, Iran, Afghanistan, and 
Azerbaijan. This list of possibly-involved states is another indication of 
the geopolitical importance of Central Asia and draws attention to the 
critical need to at least prevent Central Asia’s water resource tensions 
from deepening any further” (Sievers, 2002, p.400).
For Central Asian states, especially for countries such as Uzbekistan 
and Turkmenistan, water issues stand at the very core of their proclaimed 
national interests. Understanding this factor has led scholars to examine 
trends that characterise the hydro-politics of the region. Studies have been 
undertaken on the hydro-hegemony concept and how it is relevant in the 
context of Central Asian regional developments. In particular, Wegerich 
argues that “independence manifested inequitable water allocation, giving 
rise to the perception that especially Uzbekistan is the hydro-hegemon in 
the Amu-Darya basin”, yet the analysis undertaken “suggest that there is 
as yet no real hegemon. Instead the different riparian states are currently 
engaged in strategic resource capture, by increasing their water demand 
without renegotiating the official agreements” (Wegerich, 2008).
Another study of hydro-hegemonies and co-existence of conflict 
and cooperation in the Aral Sea basin with Transboundary Freshwater 
Interaction Nexus (TWINS) approach, carried out by Suvi Sojamo 
of the University of Helsinki, should also be mentioned. Sojamo 
states in fact that geopolitical power play is at the root of the basin’s 
water relations, with power-asymmetries complicating water man-

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Water resources management in Central Asia
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Número 25, 2009
agement process as “hydro- and energy-imperatives of upstream and 
downstream states have started to collide” (Sojamo, 2008, p. 76). 
The author utilises the TWINS approach that examines how the 
dynamics of power manifest themselves in water governance, in the 
context of Central Asia. While focusing primarily on Uzbekistan’s 
securitised water related bargaining and coercive tactics, the author 
claims that the transboundary management is complicated by clearly 
prevailing regional imbalances in power relations, with the politics of 
water being dynamic due to the fact that “hegemonic actions of the 
downstream states have aroused counter-hegemonic actions from the 
upstream states” (Sojamo, 2008, p.80).
On the whole, as the author claims, there are conflictual and coop-
erative tendencies present in the process of interaction between the 
regional states on water issues that must be viewed through a holistic 
approach to examining politics of water and water management. The 
author concludes on a rather pessimistic note, arguing that establishing 
an equal and sustainable transboundary water management in the Aral 
Sea Basin involves a strong commitment on the part of all regional states 
to cooperate, yet “instead of forming a strong union, the states are today 
yearning to break free from the regional interdependencies” (Sojamo, 
2008, p.85).
This ultimately means that all countries in the region will sus-
tain water-related issues as their national security imperatives. In 
Kazakhstan, in 2001, the National Security Council began assuming 
authority for forming and implementing that state’s water policies. A 
decision has been taken recently to build the Koksarai reservoir, which 
will aid in preventing winter flood situations in the southern regions of 
Kazakhstan. However, it is difficult and expensive to build reservoirs 
in the lowlands of the region. Observers are assured that “Kazakhstan 
could avoid the necessity of doing so, had they worked out a mutu-
ally advantageous water and energy resource running scheme with 
Kyrgyzstan” (Arbenin, 2008).

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Anar Khamzayeva
18
Documentos CIDOB, Asia
Water resources management in Central Asia
Apart from Kazakhstan, other Central Asian states have also been 
developing plans for more infrastructures that they believe would 
increase their control over resources in the context of their national 
policies on water issues. A critical goal for most of the region’s coun-
tries is to expand irrigated land over its territory by intakes from the 
transboundary rivers. Let us examine closely some of the “projected 
water infrastructure or management plans with conflict or international 
dimension”, illustrated on the following map: