mestic) links bringing the energy to the final consumer. The ways energy supply disruptions
mainly consist of equipment malfunctions, system design flaws, operator errors, malicious computer
activities, deficient market and regulatory frameworks, corporate financial problems, labor actions, se-
vere weather and natural events, aggressive acts (e.g. war, terrorism and sabotage), and geopolitical
disruptions. But in practice, the most worrisome disruptions or potential disruptions are those linked
to: 1) extreme weather events; 2) mismatched electricity supply and demand; 3) regulatory failures;
and 4) concentration of oil and gas resources only in certain regions of the world [4]. Currently
the last reason of disruption of energy supply is widely misused by certain energy supplier countries
for the sake of some geopolitics motivations. That’s why the current world system of energy supply
and use is rather unsustainable. Moreover, it is insecure and unreliable, because of the heavy dependence
on conventional oil (e.a.
crude oil)
, coming from limited reserves concentrated in politically volatile
regions, and the inadequate capacity and maintenance of the network infrastructures for delivering gas
and electricity. Insecure energy supplies inhibit development by raising energy costs and
imposing expensive (sometimes life threatening) cuts in services when disruptions actually occur.
On the other hands, nowadays the problem of optimization of energy consumption has two
main vectors. First of all it’s a problem of inefficient, wasteful consumption of energy in production
and personal consumption that conducts to exhaustion of non-renewable resources and excessive
environmental pollution. The second and important problem is extremely different gaps in
consumption levels over the countries, regions and even civilizations. The last issue becomes much
more essential if we consider climatic, technological, socio-economic, civilization differences between
regions [5]. In this regard, it has huge importance to provide uniform, sufficient diversified supply of
energy resources for all regions in the world in order to create an equal energy conditions in
overcoming of global challenges and problems in the context of sustainable global development, and
also for mobilization and involving of all countries, stakeholders for the solution of these global tasks
of humanity.
Thus, taking into account above mentioned issues, the “Southern Gas Corridor” (SGC) project
that is actively realizing by the Republic of Azerbaijan could be considered as a key part of energy
security Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and some European Union countries.
Regarding EU countries, nowadays, many countries in Central and South East Europe are
strongly dependent on a single supplier for natural gas. And in order to facilitate diversification of
their supplies, the SGC aims to expand infrastructure that can bring gas to the EU from the Caspian
Basin, Central Asia, the Middle East, and the Eastern Mediterranean Basin.
According to the project capacity figures, initially, approximately 10 billion cubic meters (bcm)
of gas will flow along this route when it opens in 2019/2020. Given the potential supplies from the
Caspian Region, the Middle East, and the East Mediterranean however, the EU aims to increase this to
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100 bcm of gas per year in the future. In fact, SGC is a combination of four different energy projects:
the offshore development of the Shah Deniz Phase 2 gas; the expansion of the South Caucasus
pipeline from Azerbaijan through Georgia and into Turkey; the construction of the Trans-Anatolian
Pipeline (TANAP) across Turkey; and the construction of the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which
will connect to TANAP and transport natural gas to Greece, Bulgaria, Albania, and Italy. The current
South Caucasus pipeline, fueled by the Shah Deniz oil field in offshore Azerbaijan, provides 8.6 bcm
of natural gas a year to Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. Shah Deniz phase 2 has the potential to
provide an additional 16 billion cubic meters of natural gas to the four European countries served by
TAP. The final investment decision for the second phase of the Shah Deniz project was made in
December of 2013, and the construction of this second phase is underway. Even with the connection
of 3 pipelines in the Southern Corridor sending natural gas to Europe, challenges remain.
First of all, in order to understand the EU position vis-a-vis SGS project, let’s look at the
prehistory of the issue. EU is one the leading consumers of energy resources in the world. It consumes
1,825 mln ton oil equivalents, which makes up 16% of the global energy mix. The EU economy is
based on crude oil and natural gas, however in some member states, such as France or Sweden,
nuclear power is a significant source of energy generation. According the International Energy Agency
nowadays the EU consumes around 535 bcm of gas, and after 15 years this may increase to 600 bcm.
Natural gas for Europe has been traditionally supplied from Northern and Central Europe, and
increasingly through Turkey to the South. But regional energy security vulnerability exacerbated by
some local, regional conflicts (f.e. such as with involvement of Russia and Ukraine etc), as well as by
decrease in supply of some traditional partners such as Netherlands (the plans to close some
production projects because of the recent earthquake in offshore). The mentioned factors and
particularly the conflict are envisaged as a serious threat to the energy security of EU coupled with the
economic sanctions of western countries to Russia. As six of EU members (Germany, Austria, Italy
etc) imported 100% and 9 countries imported 40% of their natural gas from Russia. So looking for
new different energy suppliers to Europe from various regions, and through new routes, is an issue of
the highest priority, particularly when demand for this resource will be increased up 600 bcm next
year. So the geopolitical situation in EU necessities new approaches in energy diversification of the
continent, as is the case with the Southern Gas Corridor. If we look at the EU position regarding SGC,
we could affirm that EU actions for expanding the Southern Gas Corridor
include [6]:
keeping the infrastructure projects needed for the Corridor on the EU's list of
projects of
common interest.
These are projects which can benefit from streamlined permitting process, receive
preferential regulatory treatment, and may apply for EU funding from the
Connecting Europe Facility
cooperating closely with gas suppliers in the region including Azerbaijan, Iraq and
Turkmenistan
cooperating closely with transit countries including Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey
negotiating with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan on a Trans-Caspian pipeline to transport gas
across the Caspian Sea.
Moreover, as it’s described in the EU Energy Diplomacy Action Plan: “foreign policy should
give particular priority to partners and initiatives crucial to EU efforts to strengthen the diversification
of EU energy sources, supplies and routes, as identified in the Energy Union Communication, in
particular in our neighborhoods (e.g. the Southern Gas Corridor), the Euro-Mediterranean energy
cooperation, the East Mediterranean region, Energy Community ([7]). This project will certainly
influence positively the development of inclusive economics of such countries as Greece, Albania etc.
Regarding other countries, with implementation of SGC project Azerbaijan and Turkey are
going to become significant players who will manage to strengthen their position in the relations with
EU and other key actors in the world energy market. Talking about the role of SGC to the sustainable
development of the whole Caspian Basin that embraces the territories of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, and Georgia, as, an important transit route direction (not taking into consideration of
Russia and Iran), first of all let’s make some comparative analysis on total oil and gas reserves of the
region. It varies widely, as many experts speculate that only a fraction of the hydrocarbon deposits
have actually been found. To put these figures in perspective, the proven oil reserves of the entire
region (Kashagan fields in Kazakhstan and gas the Shah Deniz field of Azerbaijan) are under a third of
those for Iran or Iraq, the proven gas reserves are about half as much as Qatar's. If one considers,
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however, possible reserves, the totals become far more impressive, comparable (at the high end) to the
proven reserves of Saudi Arabia or the proven reserves of Iran and Iraq combined. As for gas,
Turkmenistan's total possible reserves equal the proven reserves of Saudi Arabia, and the total possible
reserves for the region as a whole equal the proven reserves of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the United Arab
Emirates combined. Clearly, some early pronouncements of a “new Persian Gulf” might have been
exaggerated, but, considering that potential oil reserves (1.5 trillion bcm of gas and 6.8 billion barrels
of oil) are more than the proven reserves of Venezuela, Nigeria, Libya, and Norway combined ([8,9]).
Competition over energy reserves in the Caspian Basin has been going between main political
actors (Russia, US, China and EU) for many years. Iran is also an important player if not main,
although it has been hobbled on the following account: its failure to settle the legal status of the
Caspian (blamed by the Iranians on the Russians) has limited off-shore Iranian exploration. The
dynamics of energy rivalry in the region depends upon a number of factors, including security issues,
global energy demand, domestic politics within the region, and the strategies of external actors. But
the analysis of this rivalry proves no outside power has been able to establish overwhelming
dominance in the region (12-14). Instead, the competition among external actors has given local states
significant freedom to maneuver.
Thus, SGC gives the Caspian Basin countries a unique chance to neutralize any serious
geopolitical risks from the relevant political actors and to get all the necessary conditions for
sustainable development for the long period.
In addition, after lifting all international sanctions against Iran, this project offers a huge
potential to official Tehran to enlarge its presence in European energy-market by joining to SGC and
to upgrade its whole ecosystem, as well as to attract foreign investments (particularly from EU) to its
rapidly developing economy.
As regards Turkey, besides the fact that the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP) as one of
the main parts of the SGC making this country an important gas-hub in the region, these projects
stipulate an integration of the Turkish energy market with the EU, especially development in accession
negotiations, the opening of Energy Chapter, and regional cooperation and integration in the Energy
Community and the Mediterranean. It was clearly stated at the meeting of EU Commissioner for
Climate Action and Energy Miguel Arias Cañete and Minister Albayrak on January 2016 that closer
energy cooperation between EU-Turkey (e.g. SGC) ([11-12]) and the necessity to focus on such issues
as energy efficiency and renewable, climate change and follow-up on COP 21, gas markets and
interconnections that were among the key instruments of sustainable development of each country.
The transportation capacity of SGC will be raised till 23 bcm by 2023 and 31 bcm by 2026 that
will give a huge impact to the ecosystem, sustainable development of the whole region. SGC is an
outcome of successful energy diplomacy of the Republic of Azerbaijan. As it’s argued in the current
paper the SGC project has a huge impact to the sustainable development of Azerbaijan and the whole
Caspian Basin region and EU by promotion of energy security aspects. These sustainable development
principles in Azerbaijan are broadly reflected in the development concept “Azerbaijan 2020: Future
Vision” approved in 2012 by the President Ilham Aliyev (par-graphs 3, 12) and our country is steadily
realizing all steps in order to achieve the goals of this concept. By the way on March 18, 2016
Southern Gas Corridor Company (Cənub Qaz Dəhlizi QSC) which has been rated BB++ by the
relevant raiting agencies, placed 10-year $1bn Eurobonds, yielding 6,875%. US and English investors
showed an extremely high interest for the company's Eurobonds and this fact proves once more a high
importance of SGC in the world energy market.
REFERENCES:
1.
U.K.Ələkbərov, Davamlı inkişaf və ekoloji sivilizasiyanın əsasları. Ali məktəblər üçün dərslik. Bakı, 2013, 214 s.
2.
http://www.scs.gov.az/userfiles/files/1_3_7_Azerbaycan2020.pdf
3.
http://stephenschneider.stanford.edu/Publications/PDF_Papers/AESR2003.pdf
4.
http://www.oecd.org/greengrowth/38509686.pdf_
5.
N.İ.Nazarbayev, Global energy-ecological strategy for sustainable development in the XXI , (scientific vision).
Moscow, Economics, 2011.-54s.
6.
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/imports-and-secure-supplies/gas-and-oil-supply-routes
7.
http://europeanmemoranda.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/files/2015/07/Unnumbered_Doc_EU_Energy_Diplomacy_Action_Pla
n_(29860).pdf
8.
http://www.eia.gov/emeu/cabs/Caspian/images/Caspian_balances.pdf
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9.
M.B.Olcott, Pipelines and Pipe Dreams: Energy Development and Caspian Society,” Journal of International Affairs,
vol. 53 (Fall 1999): 305–323.
10. Y.N.Zabortseva, From the ‘forgotten region’ to the ‘great game’ region: On the development of geopolitics in Central
Asia, Journal of Eurasian Studies 3(2) 2012: 168–176.
11. http://www.pubaffairsbruxelles.eu/energy-diplomacy-eu-and-turkey-to-intensify-energy-relations-at-high-level-energy-
dialogue-in-istanbul-european-commission-daily-news/
12.
F.D.Humbatov, Energy diplomacy in modern international relations, 2018, 356 pp.
TRİLEMMA HİPOTEZİ VE ONUN PARA POLİTİKASI
AÇISINDAN ÖNEMİ
Fərid CƏBİYEV
Bakı Mühəndislik Universiteti
fcebiyev@beu.edu.az
Cevat GERNİ
Doğuş Universiteti
cgerni@dogus.edu.tr
Kerem KARABULUT
Atatürk Universiteti
kerem@atauni.edu.tr
ÖZET
Ülke ekonomilerinin son derece entegre ve pazarların bir-birinden bağımlı olduğu modern dünyada, özel-
likle ekonomik sorunlar bağlamında devletlerin ülke ekonomilerini kontrol etmeleri çok karmaşık bir konu hali-
ne gelmiştir. Tarihe bakıldığında, parasal rejimlerin aniden sona erdiği durumlardan en önemlisi olan Bretton-
Woods sisteminin 1970'lerin başlarında dağılmasının 1980-1990 yılları arasında gelişmekte olan bir çok ülkeler-
de mali krizlere neden olduğu ve böyle bir ani rejim çöküşünün her zaman krizleri ve bazı finansal sorunları da
beraberinde getirdiği görülmektedir. Önceki parasal rejimlerin yerini hangi uluslarası sistem veya rejim alırsa alsın
ülkelerin karşılaştıkları üç politika hedefinden (döviz kuru istikrarı, parasal bağımsızlık ve finansal entegrasyon)
her birini hangi düzeyde ve hangi birleşim ile elde edebileceği temel sorun olarak kalmıştır. Bu, açık makropolitik
yönetimi dikte eden, temeli Kanadalı iktisatçı, Nobel Ödüllü Robert Mundell ve İngiliz iktisatçı ve devlet adamı
Marcus Fleming tarafından geliştirilen trilemma hipotezidir. Hipotez ülkelerin bireysel olarak bu üç politika
bileşimiden tam olarak sadece ikisini tercih edebileceğini yani, aynı anda bunlardan sadece ikisine tam şekilde
ulaşılabileceğini öngörmektedir. Alternatif olarak, ülkeler üç politika hedefinden her birine orta düzeyde ulaşım
imkanı sağlayabilmektedirler. Bu çalışmada trilemma hipotezi teorik olarak incelenmiş ve onun para politikası
açısından önemine yer verilmiştir.
Anahtar kelimeler: trilemma hipotezi, döviz kuru istikrarı, bağımsız para politikası, finansal entegrasyon
TRILEMMA HYPOTHESIS AND ITS IMPORTANCE FROM MONETARY POLICY POINT
ABSTRACT
In the modern world, where the economies of the countries are highly integrated and dependent on one-
on-one markets, it has become a very complex issue for governments to control their economies, especially in
the context of economic problems. Historically, the breakdown of the Bretton-Woods system, is one of the most
important cases in which monetary regimes ended suddenly, caused financial crises in many developing countries
between 1980 and 1990, and such a sudden regime collapse always accompanied by crises and some financial
problems. The main problem remains as to what level and with which combination of the three policy objectives
(exchange rate stability, monetary independence and financial integration) that the countries face, regardless of
which international system or regime they take, replaces the previous monetary regimes. This is the trilemma
hypothesis that dictates open macropolitical management, developed by the Canadian economist, Nobel Prize
winner Robert Mundell and the English economist and statesman Marcus Fleming. The hypothesis predicts that
countries can only choose exactly two of these three policy combinations, that is, only two of them can be reached
at the same time. Alternatively, countries can provide moderate access to each of the three policy objectives. In
this study, the trilemma hypothesis is theoretically examined and its importance for monetary policy is given.
Keywords: trilemma hypothesis, exchange rate stability, monetary independence, financial integration
THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMY AND ADMINISTRATION: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES
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Giriş
Her bir ülkenin döviz kuru rejimi, para politikaları ve sermaye akımlarının açıklık oranının
öğrenilmesi, o ülkenin ekonomisinin araştırılması ve sonuçların doğru yorumlanması açısından
önemlidir. Döviz kuru rejiminin para politikası üzerindeki etkisinin ampirik olarak ifadesi oldukça
karmaşıktır. Fakat buna rağmen, teorik tahmini için genel bir görüş vardır. Birçok araştırmacı, örneğin
Shambaugh, Mojon ve Svenson döviz kuru rejimlerini ve para politikası üzerindeki etkilerini
öğrenmeye çalışmışlardır. Bu çalışmalarda, döviz kuru rejiminin türünü niteleyen veritabanı analizleri
ve kodlama sistemleri kullanılmıştır. Ampirik çalışmaların büyük kısmı Robert Mundell'in araştırması
baz alınarak yürütülmüştür. Mundell sabit döviz kuru rejiminde para politikasının gelir düzeyini
devamlı olarak etkilemiyeceği fikrini savunmuştur. Mishkin sermaye piyasasının açık olduğu bir
ülkede döviz kuru üzerinde sabitlenen faiz oranlarının baz olarak ele alınan ülkenin faiz oranlarıyla
yakından ilişkili olduğunu doğrulamaktadır [1]. Bu nedenle, ulusal para birimini başka bir ülkenin
para birimine sabitleyen ülke, iç şoklara tepki vermek için para politikasını kullanma fırsatını
kaybetmektedir.
Trilemma hipotezi
Ekonomideki üçlü açmaz (trilemma) hipotezine göre, serbest sermaye hareketliliği, sabit döviz
kuru ve bağımsız bir para politikası aynı anda uygulanamaz. Eğer bir ekonomide serbest sermaye
hareketliliğine izin veriliyorsa ve ekonomide sabit döviz kuru rejimi uygulanıyorsa o zaman bağımsız
para politikası uygulamak imkansızdır. Eğer bir ekonomide sermaye hareketleri denetim altındaysa
sabit döviz kuru rejimi tercih edilebileceği gibi bağımsız para politikası da tercih edilebilir [4].
Şekil 1`de bağımsız para politikası, kur istikrarı ve sermaye hareketleri serbestliğini ifade eden
üçgenin üç tarafı potansiyel olarak politika hedeflerini göstermektedir. Oysa, üçgenin her üç tarafına
aynı anda ulaşmak mümkün değildir. Üçgenin köşelerinden sadece ikisinin tercih edilmesi, üçüncü
köşede belirtilen başka bir amaçtan vazgeçilmesi anlamına gelmektedir. Üç amaçtan ikisinin tercih
edilmesiyle, vazgeçilen üçüncü amaç üçgenin kenarlarında gösterilmektedir. Örneğin, para politikası
oluşturmada takdir haklarının olmasını ve kurlarda istikrarı öncelikli amaç olarak belirleyen
hükümetler, sermaye hareketleri serbestliğinden vazgeçmelidir (sermaye kontrolü) [9]. Bu politika
1980'lerin ortalarında ve sonlarında gelişmekte olan ülkelerin çoğu tarafından tercih edilmiştir. Ülkeler
bağımsız para politikası ve sermaye hareketliliğinin tam serbest olmasını isterlerse o zaman kur
istikrarı amacından vazgeçerek dalgalı kur sistemini kabullenmeleri gerekir. ABD'de son 30 yıl içinde
bu politika tercihi yani, dalgalanan döviz kuru rejimi hüküm sürüyor. Sabit kur rejimi ve tam sermaye
hareketliliği uygulanır ise o zaman da bağımsız para politikası uygulamasını terk etmek gerekecektir
(para kurulu). Bağımsız para politikasından vazgeçilmesi 1990'larda Euro bloğunu (para birliği) kuran
ülkelerde ve Arjantin'de mevcut olmuştur.
Ülkelerin hangi kombinasyonu seçecekleri, içinde bulundukları koşullara göre değişecektir.
Döviz kuru istikrarı önemli ise para politikası bağımsızlığı veya sermaye hareketleri serbestliğinden
vazgeçilirken, sık sık reel şoklarla karşılaşılan bir ülkede para politikası bağımsızlığı veya dalgalı
döviz kuru, şokların absorbe edilmesi açısından tercih önceliğine sahip olacaktır. Son yıllarda finansal
serbestleşmenin yaygınlaşması ile birlikte, sermayenin ülkelerarası hareketliliği artmıştır. Bu durumda,
politika tercihi döviz kuru istikrarı veya bağımsız para politikası arasındaki seçime indirgenmiştir [8].
Şekil 1 Trilemma Hipotezinde Karşılaşılan İkili Seçimler.
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