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Anahtar Kelimeler: Epistemoloji, Ontoloji, Eleştirel Realizm, Viyana Çevresi, Epistemolojik Dönüş. 
Abstract 
The problem of science is about to explain and / or modeling how science that has actually changed the world 
has succeeded in doing so. If the logic of scientific research can be clearly understood and explained, 
epistemological modeling will be possible. The theoretical positioning of this modeling is historically based on 
philosophy. However, when the epistemological model is proposed to present a schematic criterion for 
emancipation from metaphysics, which is seen as the reason of earlier failure to knowing and explaining the 
reality, the philosophy about science problem is experiencing a rupture in itself. When the science problem is 
positioned as an epistemological problem, emancipation from metaphysics reduces the ontological dimension of 
the problem to epistemology. Thus, epistemology becomes the first and only philosophy with neo-positivism. 
This is called epistemological turn. On the contrary, ontology is still the first philosophy in the Continental 
Europe ecole and it deals with the science critically from an ontological position, but not as a modeling object.
The meta-problem that emerged here is whether the problem of science that can be addressed by epistemological 
turn and the problem that can be seen from an ontological positioning overlap. In other words, are the 
epistemological problem and the ontological problem the same or different? The basic hypothesis of the article is 
that different positions (epistemological and ontological) have the same problem: The problem of science. The 
internal perspective, which is traced in the light of this hypothesis, demonstrates that the theory of knowledge on 
the path from the Vienna Circle to Popper and Hacking met again with ontology in inherently and evolutionary 
way with a pragmatic criterion. On the other hand, the external perspective also shows that the ontological 
criticism of Adorno, Horkheimer and Heidegger from the Continental Europe ecole coincides with the 
epistemological problem detection. The focus of this overlap is Bhaskar's critical realism. The demonstration of 
*
Doç. Dr., Ankara Üniversitesi, Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi, Felsefe Bölümü, [e-mail]

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EPİSTEMOLOJİK DÖNÜŞ VE BİLİM FELSEFESİNİN ONTOLOJİSİ 
-BİLİMSEL DÜNYA KAVRAYIŞI’NDAN ELEŞTİREL REALİZME ONTOLOJİNİN EPİSTEMOLOJİ İLE TEMELLENDİRİLMESİ- 
737 
the intersection of these two different (seen as irreconcilable) positions shows that the science problem is a real 
problem and the inevitability of a result. The result is that philosophy of science is caught in a cleft stick. With 
the new epistemology it cannot go back. But without a new ontology it cannot go forward.