Allmark-Kent 56
her
introduction, “The cock that Hazard Lepage peddles is presumably that of
his stallion, Poseidon; but the cock that gets the most action is his own” (vi).
Hazard’s efforts to perpetuate his rare breed of horse, which carries his own
name, becomes entangled with his own identity and sexuality. As indicated by
references to the “Lepage stud,” I argue that Hazard
attempts to construct
himself as a
stud horseman
(77). As the novel progresses, the distinctions
between man and horse become increasingly blurred. Hazard even encourages
horses to share his decrepit mansion, in which the headboards of beds are
decorated with the names of Lapage stallions: “The sixth, without sheets or a
pillow, bore the name POSEIDON” (187). Yet, at the end of the novel, Poseidon
attacks Hazard without warning:
[T]he first cry came from the rooms beyond the library: the exquisitely
piercing mortal cry, the cry half horse, half man, the horse-man cry of
pain or delight […] the two heads were together, the man’s, the stallion’s.
The stallion’s yellow teeth closed on the arm of the man. And Hazard
Lepage flew upward through the air as if he were
a spirit rising to the sky;
but his body came back to earth, under the sickening crunch of the
stallion’s hoofs. (198, 201).
Hazard lies “crushed,” while Poseidon disappears with a “crash” through a bay
window (201). Poseidon severs the connection between studhorse and
studhorse man (or stud horseman), whether intentionally or not. Again,
however, the animal’s actions are both unexpected and incomprehensible.
The abrupt disappearance of the tiger,
Richard Parker, at the end of
Life
of Pi
also follows this pattern:
“I still cannot understand how he could abandon
me so unceremoniously, without any sort of goodbye, without looking back even
once” (Martel 7). After spending months stranded in a lifeboat together, Pi’s
confusion indicates that he still does not know the tiger, the nature of their
relationship, or the tiger’s perception of him. In “Lick Me, Bite Me, Hear Me,
Write Me,” Travis Mason observes: “During the closing chapters especially,
Life
Allmark-Kent 57
of Pi
concerns itself with problems of anthropomorphism more overtly than
Bear
” (118). Here, rather than the attribution of human characteristics onto
animals, anthropomorphism is
used to describe
any
human attempts to know or
understand the nonhuman. Early in the text, for instance, assertions are made
against the danger of
“Animalus anthropomorphicus
, the animal as seen
through human eyes […] we look at an animal and see a mirror” (Martel 39).
This statement is certainly true of the ‘failure of knowing’ narratives, at least. In
each text, one or both participants in a human-animal relationship experience
some form of violence as a consequence of the human’s
inability to understand
or interpret the animal. As such, there is often also a sense of loss or
disappointment associated with the animal’s defiance of human expectations,
hopes, and fantasies. There is no doubt, however, that in these extreme
(sometimes obsessive) relationships, the nonhuman presence is both
fascinating and confusing for the human protagonist.
Alternatively, the ‘acceptance of not-knowing’ attaches no such negativity
to the nonhuman’s ability to resist categorization. In “The Coyote Came Back,”
for instance, John Sandlos describes Coyote’s subversive strength as a trickster
figure:
The ancient myth-character of Coyote is
an enigmatic paradox whose
‘nature’ is both multi-faceted and constantly shifting. […] His
contradictory nature and locally-coloured personality resists
universalizing academic interpretations, but is, in each of his
manifestations, merely one aspect of an elusive protagonist. (101)
Thus, there is n
o ‘failure’ of knowing the animal here; the acceptance of not-
knowing is to be expected from both characters and readers. For instance, one
of the ways King uses
the trickster figure in
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