Allmark-Kent 218
the power of certain superstitions and thereby refine his
inventory of
determinants” (50). I argue that these ‘links’ are not merely fantasy; they are
links between cause and effect.
The ‘superstitions’ are based on contextual
learning
shared between individuals, occurring with sufficient frequency to be
reinforced and remembered. For instance, it is
considered unlucky to come
across a three-legged hyena, a one-eyed wildebeest, or a crazy warthog (254).
It is not difficult to imagine the pragmatic reasons behind such superstitions; the
hyena and wildebeest may have been injured by nearby dangers and the
warthog may be diseased or may have eaten something poisonous. If a nearby
elephant later becomes ill or injured, and does not correctly attribute cause and
effect, a ‘superstition’ may be created. Although the process is not made
explicit, it is presumably in this way that the elephants draw the
‘links’ between
cause and effect as they experience the world. Furthermore, just as a
‘superstition’ might become part of religion, an individual experiment or
accident
can
become part of medicine: “[Date Bed] would ask the cows why one
treatment was chosen over another [...] and the answer was always a variation
of ‘That’s what works.’” (107).
Rather than anthropomorphic fantasy, what Gowdy presents us with is a
speculation on the production of nonhuman knowledge. It is particularly
reminiscent of Seton’s imaginative explorations on the subject. The story of the
Brierpatch in “Raggylug” had a similar way of extending notions of ‘myths’ to aid
zoocentric discussions of nonhuman knowledge exchange.
As in “Raggylug,”
we can see that through individual
exploration, trial and error, and the creation
of links between cause and effect, nonhuman knowledge is produced and
shared. Culture and language are frequently seen as the defining
characteristics of humans but increasing numbers of studies however are
Allmark-Kent 219
finding groups of animals that are sharing knowledge, skills or problem-solving
techniques with their companions. The exclusive human claim to culture may be
becoming increasingly destabilized. Drawing a link
with Grove’s ‘agricultural
ants,’ it seems that anthropocentric interpretations shape what is ‘unlikely’ for
nonhumans and, therefore, what is
deemed
anthropomorphic
. From this
perspective, then,
we can see Gowdy’s “extreme” and “sustained”
anthropomorphism (Oerleman 184) as an imaginative exploration into the
production of culture f
rom an elephant’s point of view.
In order to explore this production of knowledge and enrich her
zoocentric, elephant perspective, Gowdy explores the learning process of an
individual elephant when she encounters a car wing-mirror for the first time. In a
reference to Tall Time
’s production of knowledge and ‘superstitions,’ Date Bed
regards the place where she found the mirror as potentially
“sacred” because “it
yielded the amazing Thing
” (162). She initially encounters the mirror (or Thing)
during a confrontation with four lionesses:
Her right foot came down on a stone. She snatched it up. Even in her
terror she could feel how unnaturally cold and smooth it was. She swung
it, and a pale beam of light flew over the ground. The lionesses
stepped back from the beam [
…] And while Date Bed continued to
trumpet and brandish the stone, her assailants disappeared. (164)
A mysterious object which frightens and deters lions is an obvious advantage to
an elephant, particularly one alone, weak and wounded in a drought-stricken
landscape; again, we can see that the construction of ‘superstitions’ is
pragmatic (as in
Seton’s ‘brierpatch’ patch story). As soon as the lions are a
safe distance away, when she can
“no longer smell them,” she examines her
“weapon” (164). Reminiscent of
Consider Her Ways
, Date Bed uses her own
frame of reference to explore the object:
It was no stone. It was too cold and too symmetrical: flat on one side,
curved on the other, about the size of an ostrich egg but heavier than
Allmark-Kent 220
that and more elongated; it was like an elongated egg sliced in half. The
curved side shone like slime. The flat side shone like water, and like
water she could see herself in it
… if she held it at a certain angle, with
the moonlight in her eye, and when she did that her image was so
unclouded that she gasped. She pivoted the Thing and waved it where
the lionesses had been. The beam appeared. (164)
Here, Gowdy begins to break down the dichotomy between nature and culture.
A piece of human technology that enables human animals to travel at high
speed through the natural environment is experienced by an elephant as part of
nature
. She compares it to a stone, an egg, slime, and water. It then becomes
Dostları ilə paylaş: