Den finns i stället i Statistisk
årsbok för Stockholms stad 1918–1927 under ”Hälsovård” och ”All-
män översikt över verksamheten vid Stockholms stads slakthus och
saluhallar”. Därtill fanns möjligheter för enskilda, fastighetsvärdar
och ägare till olika typer av verksamhet att göra sig av med avfallet
på egen hand.
9
Förklaring till diagram 1 i kapitel 3
Gödselsoporna delades upp och redovisades under perioden i de
som såldes direkt via järnväg och de som fördes till Lövsta. Diagram
1. ”Avfall från Stockholm uppdelat i kategorier 1901–1927 (ton)” i
kapitel 3, s. 77 bygger på samma siffror som ovanstående tabell 9
men omräknat till vikt. Det visar mängden skräpsopor, latrin, göd-
selsopor samt köksavfall till den kommunala svinuppfödningen i
ton (siffrorna för svinmat kommer från SÅS under ”Hälsovård”).
I gödselmängden ingår gödsel till Lövsta och direkt till verkets
kunder – de båda kategorierna i ovanstående tabell är alltså hop-
slagna i detta diagram. Den markanta nedgången kring 1921 och
ökningen därefter framstår inte som lika drastisk i diagrammet i
kapitel 3 som i tabellen ovan. Det har att göra med att skräpsopor
väger mindre än gödselsopor. En ökning av volymen skräpsopor
samtidigt som gödselsoporna minskar ger en planare kurva för den
totala avfallsmängden mätt i vikt.
I diagram 1 har jag försökt att skatta vikten på avfallet. Med
undantag av latrinvagnarna, vars vikt var stabil, var vikten i förhål-
lande till volymen ojämn. Eftersom de olika sopslagen vägde olika
mycket har jag räknat om antalet järnvägsvagnar till ton med led-
ning av uppgifter om de olika sopslagens vikt per vagn från åren
248
appendix
1912–1927 i Renhållningsverkets årsberättelser. För åren före 1912 har
jag gjort en uppskattning av antalet ton per vagn med ledning av
den vikt som anges för 1912 och de strax därpå följande åren. I
tabell 10 visas de siffror som redovisas i den tryckta statistiken i
renhållningsverkets årsberättelser.
Vad gäller medelvikten för latrinvagnar varierar den mellan 6 och 8
ton under åren 1912–1927 och jag har då valt att ta medianen = 6 över
alla år. Vad gäller mängden skräpsopor anges i renhållningsverkets
årsberättelser 1913–1927 medelvikten för de vagnar som lossades vid
skräpförbränningsanstalten. För åren 1908–1912 har jag uppskattat
medelvikten till 7 ton per vagn med ledning av medelvikten åren
1912–1915. För åren 1912–1927 anges vikten på de vagnar som lasta-
des med skräp vid lastningsstationerna i Stockholm. Räknar man
ut medelvikten på dessa stämmer de i stort sett med medelvikten
som anges vid skräpförbränningsanstalten. Jag har tagit medianen
för åren 1912–1915, 6,5 ton, och låtit den gälla för 1900–1915. Jag har
ingenting som indikerar att lastningen skulle ha förändrats märk-
bart under dessa år.
Snittvikten per vagn gödselsopor som lastades vid Stockholms
sopstationer 1912–1927 gick mot lättare lastade vagnar, från 12 ton
1912 till 10 ton 1927. Samma källa anger för 1913–1927 vikten på lass
av de tre olika komponenterna i gödselsoporna. Jag har för dessa
år räknat ut en snittvikt per lass och gödselavfallssort och kommit
fram till att hushållssoporna (0,62 ton per lass) är lättare än såväl
gatusopor (0,69 ton per lass) som stallströ (0,7 ton per lass). Med
ledning av denna medelvikt och av att mängden hushållssopor gick
stadigt uppåt från strax under 50 procent av den totala mängden
gödselsopor 1913 till 90 procent av alla gödselsopor 1927 uppskattar
jag att varje vagn gödselsopor före 1912 i medeltal vägde tolv ton.
Om andelen lättare avfallsmaterial är en mindre del av den totala
mängden kommer alltså vagnarna att vara tyngre. Min uträkning
av gödselsopornas sammansättning visas i tabell 11.
249
appendix
Tabell 10. Medelvikt per vagn, sopslag och år, 1912–1927 (ton).
År
Skräpsopor
Gödselsopor
Latrin
1912
7
12
6
1913
5
11
7
1914
6
11
6
1915
7
11
6
1916
8
11
6
1917
8
11
6
1918
8
11
6
1919
8
11
7
1920
8
10
7
1921
8
10
6
1922
8
10
7
1923
8
10
6
1924
8
10
6
1925
8
10
6
1926
8
10
7
1927
8
10
8
Källa: RV 1912–1927.
Tabell 11. Fördelning inom kategorin gödselsopor 1913–1927 (viktprocent).
År
Hushållssopor
Gatusopor
Stallströ
1913
48
22
30
1914
51
19
29
1915
54
18
29
1916
54
18
28
1917
56
16
28
1918
61
16
22
1919
63
16
21
1920
62
16
22
1921
68
14
18
1922
77
3
19
1923
78
2
20
1924
80
2
18
1925
84
6
10
1926
86
6
8
1927
90
3
7
Källa: RV 1913–1927.
250
appendix
Förklaring till diagram 7 i kapitel 4
Diagram 7 ”Hushållssopor per person och år. 1929–1965 (kg)” i
kapitel 4, s. 123 är ett försök att visa enbart hushållssoporna per
person. För 1929–1962 har jag använt de siffror i gatukontorets
årsberättelser som anger mängden hushållssopor som andelen av
den totala mängden sopor. I uppgifterna för 1963–1965 finns inte
hushållssopor som enskild kategori och jag har i stället använt den
samlade siffran för ”hussopor och gatusopor” eftersom mängden
gatusopor förmodligen var försvinnande liten. Detta antagande
bygger på en jämförelse mellan kategorin ”hussopor” i den äldre
redovisningsformen och kategorin ”hussopor och gatusopor” i den
nyare redovisningsformen under de överlappande åren 1959–1962.
För tiden efter 1965 finns inte mängden hushållssopor redovisat
kontinuerligt som egen kategori.
Avfallsmängdens förändring 1901–1975
Tabell 12 är ett försök att uppskatta avfallsmängdens förändring över
hela tidsperioden, som samlad mängd och som mängd per person.
Jag har använt statistik från årsberättelserna från renhållningsverket
1909–1927, gatukontoret 1929–1974 och från energiverkets redo-
visning för sin verksamhet år 1975 i fullmäktigehandlingarna år
1976. Ingen av kolumnerna nedan utgår från enbart hushållssopor,
mängden avfall per person anger således inte vad en genomsnitt-
lig stockholmare kan ha slängt utan hur stor mängd avfall staden
genererade per invånare. Uppgifterna om invånarantal kommer
från Stockholms statistiska årsböcker som finns sammanfattade
i en skrift från 2005. Jag har inte undersökt om uppgifterna om
invånarantal baseras på samma yta av staden som sophämtningen.
Under en period efter att Bromma hade inkorporerats i staden hade
stadsdelen till exempel egen hämtning.
251
appendix
Tabell 12. Avfallsmängdens förändring 1901–1975 (ton och kilo).
År
Kolumn 1
Summa avfall
från Stockholm,
ton
Kolumn 2
Avfall per
person, kg
Kolumn 3
Avfall minus
latrin från
Stockholm, ton
Kolumn 4
Avfall per
person, kg
Kolumn 5
Avfall som hanterats
på Lövsta (inklusive
latrin, minus köks-
avfall och avfall som
lagts på andra tippar)
Kolumn 6
Avfall per
person, kg
1901
115 429
383
94 909
315
105 291
349
1902
128 555
421
108 071
354
121 094
397
1903
135 472
438
115 282
372
131 121
423
1904
140 919
443
120 207
378
131 504
414
1905
130 658
403
110 276
340
116 916
360
1906
129 423
389
108 435
326
113 571
341
1907
139 192
412
117 790
349
123 305
365
1908
136 291
401
115 699
341
113 243
333
1909
145 092
424
124 602
365
120 682
353
1910
155 260
452
135 196
393
132 743
386
1911
132 624
383
114 342
330
103 163
298
1912
138 647
395
121 019
345
111 211
317
1913
124 340
325
107 090
280
99 089
259
1914
124 912
323
109 588
284
99 727
258
1915
121 200
309
106 200
271
90 257
230
1916
124 463
304
110 657
271
97 417
238
1917
109 996
266
94 408
229
79 461
192
1918
114 841
281
98 731
242
82 757
203
1919
110 871
267
96 615
233
79 377
191
1920
106 179
253
94 053
224
82 366
196
1921
102 701
243
91 349
216
82 534
196
1922
97 887
230
87 417
206
79 273
187
1923
102 989
240
92 777
216
82 592
192
1924
105 848
241
96 356
220
84 717
193
1925
103 311
233
95 223
215
85 922
194
1926
105 717
233
99 117
219
92 005
203
1927
105 522
227
99 900
215
95 003
204
1928
108 117
228
103 335
218
98 617
208
1929
115 159
237
110 653
228
105 269
217
1930
121 195
241
117 079
233
111 605
222
252
appendix
År
Kolumn 1
Summa avfall
från Stockholm,
ton
Kolumn 2
Avfall per
person, kg
Kolumn 3
Avfall minus
latrin från
Stockholm, ton
Kolumn 4
Avfall per
person, kg
Kolumn 5
Avfall som hanterats
på Lövsta (inklusive
latrin, minus köks-
avfall och avfall som
lagts på andra tippar)
Kolumn 6
Avfall per
person, kg
1931
132 227
257
128 189
249
124 307
242
1932
129 448
249
125 698
242
122 478
236
1933
119 840
230
116 450
223
113 970
218
1934
135 200
257
132 300
252
135 200
257
1935
139 000
260
136 300
255
139 000
260
1936
142 400
262
139 900
257
142 400
262
1937
137 500
247
135 200
243
137 500
247
1938
143 700
252
141 500
248
143 700
252
1939
151 600
260
149 900
257
151 600
260
1940
133 000
225
131 500
223
133 000
225
1941
119 000
198
117 600
196
119 000
198
1942
124 100
202
122 400
199
124 100
202
1943
134 400
212
132 600
209
134 400
212
1944
152 000
232
150 200
229
152 000
232
1945
163 300
243
161 800
241
163 300
243
1946
171 900
250
169 900
247
171 900
250
1947
144 600
206
143 500
205
144 600
206
1948
142 700
201
140 800
198
142 700
201
1949
172 200
235
170 700
233
172 200
235
1950
197 100
265
195 700
263
197 100
265
1951
167 900
223
166 500
221
167 900
223
1952
202 500
266
201 200
264
202 500
266
1953
223 300
290
222 000
289
223 300
290
1954
216 000
278
214 700
277
216 000
278
1955
214 900
274
213 700
272
214 900
274
1956
220 000
277
219 000
276
220000
277
1957
221 000
277
220 000
275
221 000
277
1958
244 000
304
243 000
302
244 000
304
1959
248 000
307
247 000
306
248 000
307
1960
262 000
324
261 000
323
262 000
324
1961
253 000
313
252 000
312
253 000
313
1962
238 000
296
237 000
295
238 000
296
253
appendix
År
Kolumn 1
Summa avfall
från Stockholm,
ton
Kolumn 2
Avfall per
person, kg
Kolumn 3
Avfall minus
latrin från
Stockholm, ton
Kolumn 4
Avfall per
person, kg
Kolumn 5
Avfall som hanterats
på Lövsta (inklusive
latrin, minus köks-
avfall och avfall som
lagts på andra tippar)
Kolumn 6
Avfall per
person, kg
1963
259 000
324
259 000
324
234 300
293
1964
271 000
341
271 000
341
232 100
292
1965
274 000
348
274 000
348
242 600
308
1966
281 672
361
281 672
361
281 672
361
1967
362 500
469
362 500
469
269 200
348
1968
409 700
539
409 700
539
252 400
332
1969
434 200
577
434 200
577
239 100
318
1970
509 800
684
509 800
684
262 300
352
1971
484 100
665
484 100
665
259 100
356
1972
470 000
669
470 000
669
270 000
384
1973
441 470
648
441 470
648
241 470
350
1974
432 100
644
432 100
644
232 100
346
1975
405 100
609
405 100
609
205 100
308
Källa: RV 1909–1927; GK 1929–1974; B 17A/1976, s. 11; USK 2005, s. 55
Kolumn 1 visar mängden avfall från Stockholm inklusive latrin
(fram till och med 1933) samt inklusive matavfall till svinmat under
åren 1916–1927. Efter 1963 ingår avfall som tippades utanför kom-
munen. Kolumn 3 visar denna siffra undantaget latrin. Kolumn 5
visar mängden avfall som hanterades på Lövsta (och Högdalen). För
1901–1927 är därför latrin inräknat men däremot inte matavfall och
inte heller det gödselavfall som per järnväg gick direkt till verkets
kunder. Efter 1963 är inte det avfall som lagts på tipp utanför kom-
munen medräknat. Däremot är avfall från Järfälla som behandlades
i stadens anläggningar medräknat. För 1967–1970 visar kolumn 1
och 3 den sammanlagda mängden avfall, även det som lades på tipp
utanför Stockholms kommun och det som brändes i bostadsbola-
gens regi samt det som gatukontoret behandlade, minus det som
kom från Järfälla.
För 1901–1927 har jag räknat med hjälp av statistikens kategorier
(antal vagnar gödselsopor till Lövsta och direkt till verkets kunder,
antal vagnar skräpsopor till Lövsta, antal vagnar latrin till Lövsta)
254
appendix
och de ovan diskuterade och refererade uppgifterna om vikten av
dessa vagnar och sammansättningen av gödselsopor. För 1928–1933
finns inga närmare uppgifter om fördelningen av mängden skräp-
sopor och gödselsopor eller fördelningen inom kategorin gödselsopor
(däremot fördelningen på soplastningsstationerna) och inte heller
någon uppgift på den totala vikten på avfallet från Stockholm. Jag
uppskattade fördelningen av antalet vagnar med avfall (utom latrin)
till två tredjedelar skräpsopor respektive en tredjedel utifrån att det
1925 till 1927 lastades dubbelt så många vagnar med skräpsopor som
med gödselsopor. Vikten för respektive vagnslast har jag uppskattat
med vägledning av den vikt som angivits tidigare: 8 ton skräpsopor
och 10 ton gödselsopor.
För 1934 och framåt anges avfallets sammanlagda vikt i ton i
gatukontorets berättelser. Latrin ingår som en kategori 1934–1956
i det som anges som summan avfall i ton. För åren 1920, 1925 och
1929–1937 finns det uppgifter på vikten på avfall som togs emot vid
sopstationerna och tipparna samt det som togs emot vid Lövsta.
10
Riktigt hur gatukontoret kom fram till dessa siffror framgår inte
men det anges att de bara är ungefärliga. I de flesta fall stämmer de
bra med min uppskattning men för åren 1929–1933 visar de en något
högre siffra än i min tabell ovan när det gäller hur mycket avfall
som totalt samlades in från staden (kolumn 1), för åren 1934–1937
visar de en något lägre siffra än i tabellen ovan för det avfall som
forslades direkt till Lövsta (kolumn 5). Jag har valt att inte använda
dessa siffror i tabellen utan hålla alla kolumnerna efter samma typ av
uträkning. Däremot kan man alltså konstatera att min uppskattning
på det stora hela kommer nära den uppskattning gatukontoret gjorde.
För hela tabellen gäller att den angivna summan i ton 1959–1962
är samma som kategorin hus- och gatusopor adderad till kategorin
avgiftspliktigt avfall. För 1962 ges i samma årsberättelse två olika
summor; jag använder den som har avrundats uppåt med 500 ton.
För 1963–1965 redovisas avfallsmängden som förts till Lövsta samt
hur mycket som förbrändes i bostadsbolagens regi och hur mycket
som lades på tipp utanför kommunen. Det anges också hur mycket
som togs emot och förbrändes från Järfälla. År 1966 anges ingen
siffra i ton men en ökning av det ”totala avfallet” från Stockholm
255
appendix
med 2,8 procent. Denna ökning från angivna 1965 års summa för
allt avfall (således även det som lades på tipp) ger 281 672 ton. För
år 1966 finns således ingen uppgift om hur mycket avfall som lades
på tipp utanför kommunen.
För 1971–1974 anges i berättelserna enbart det avfall som gatu-
kontoret behandlade i Lövsta och i Högdalen, samt den lilla mängd
som tillvaratogs genom återvinning. För 1975 redovisar energiverket
mängden förbränt i Högdalen och Lövsta. För 1971–1975 har jag
uppskattat mängden Stockholmsavfall som tippades utanför kom-
munen med ledning av att mängden 1970 var 250 000 ton och 1972
hade sjunkit till 200 000 ton.
11
Jag har till den mängd som behand-
lades på Lövsta och Högdalen 1971 lagt 225 000 ton. För 1973–1975
har jag lagt 200 000 ton till det som behandlats på förbrännings-
anläggningarna. Dessa summor är redovisade i kolumn 1 och 3.
Återvinningen har jag inte räknat med i någon av kolumnerna.
Ett skäl är att det är en mycket liten mängd, ett annat är att det
är oklart huruvida en viss typ av återvinning, eller en redovisning
av återvinning, är ny och huruvida allt det återvunna verkligen
kommer från Stockholm. Det mest talande exemplet är återvin-
ningen av matavfall från restauranger som anges i berättelserna för
1971–1974 och gick från 15 000 till 10 000 ton under denna period.
Detta avfall hade även tidigare insamlats men inte redovisats, därtill
uppges endast en fjärdedel komma från Stockholm. Ett annat skäl
att inte ta med det återvunna är att det ofta redovisas i olika mått.
Diskrepansen mellan de olika kolumnerna i tabellen visar på svå-
righeten att utifrån statistiken uppskatta avfallets verkliga mängd
(för att inte tala om den mängd som före renhållningsmonopolet
hanterades privat).
Köpare av skräpsopor
I kapitel 2, s. 70 och kapitel 3, s. 83f hänvisar jag till tidigare forsk-
ning och till arkivhandlingar för att visa att hur mycket och vilka
skräpsopor som plockades ut för försäljning styrdes av några få
företag och hur mycket de var intresserade av att köpa. Tabellerna
13 och 14 visar hur få köpare det fanns.
256
appendix
Tabell 13. Samtliga köpare av skräpsopor år 1907.
Sopslag
Omfattning
Köpare
Papper
3 153 balar
Nyqvarns pappersbruk
Papper
119 balar
Örebro pappersbruk
Lump
773 balar
Fiskeby pappersbruk
Lump, specificerad
(mest tågvirke)
1 409 kg + tomsäckar
Ellrör
Metallskrot
9 köp
Ferro
Metallskrot
3 vagnslaster
Lagergren
Ben
7 387 kg
Destruktionsanstalten
Plankskrot
1 köp
Bröderna Edstrand
Tomsäckar
775 st.
AB Nitramon
Källa: SSA/557 D, Lövstas arkiv, liggare över leverans och försäljning, D IV e, 1907–1912.
Tabell 14. Samtliga köpare av skräpsopor år 1911.
Sopslag
Omfattning
Köpare
Papper
3 093 balar
Marsmann (Tyskland)
Papper
288 balar
Nykvarns pappersbruk
Papper
2 balar
Hr Meyer (Tyskland)
Lump
214 balar
Fiskeby pappersbruk
Lump
1 bal
L. M. Efikseen
Metallskrot
11 köp
Andersén och Pohl
Metallskrot
1 köp
Bröderna Edstrand
Ben
1 köp
Ossator
Mjölkflaskor
178 st.
Mjölkbolaget Andumbla
Skor
1 köp
Hr Meyer (Tyskland)
Skor
1 köp
Ossator
Cementtrummor
165 st.
Rörstrands AB
Gammal ställning
1 st.
Th. Printz
Källa: SSA/557 D, Lövstas arkiv, liggare över leverans och försäljning, D IV e, 1907–1912.
257
Summary
This thesis deals with perceptions of refuse as an asset or as a lia-
bility and the questions of waste management practices, especially
disposal. The aim has been to gain new insights into Stockholm’s
waste management in the period 1900–1975 by studying change
and continuity in municipal practices and the notions that gover-
ned the municipal actors’ actions. The central questions are what
factors determined the city’s waste management, and how an urban
and local (environmental) problem was formulated and addressed
by the local authorities and political bodies. In answering, I have
applied a theory of inertia in large technical–administrative sys-
tems and an analytical framework based on the concept of waste
management regimes.
The focus of the analysis is the course of events which saw local
councillors, civil servants, and experts discuss and act to manage
the Stockholm’s refuse. Until 1972, it was open to property owners
and business proprietors to buy waste management services from
providers other than local authority, provided they followed the
relevant regulations for how the waste was to be handled. It is
likely, however, that most domestic refuse collection services were
provided by the local authority. When it came to industrial waste,
however, the scope and nature of the management regime is not as
well known, but it was certainly not municipalized in the period
1900–1975. The thesis therefore builds on source material in the
form of texts and statistics from Stockholm City Council and the
local authority departments that handled refuse collection and
disposal. The source material has been examined in a longitudinal
study, which makes it possible to trace both significant and minor
changes in both practice and theory.
In addressing change and continuity in waste management
regimes, I have applied the concept of inertia. I have used the
258
summary
Hungarian-American sociologist Zsuzsa Gille’s concept of waste
management regimes, which in turn was inspired by the concept
of regimes as formulated by Oran R. Young. I have also borne in
mind the scope of Gille’s work, although my use of the term waste
management regime applies only on the municipal level as opposed
to Gille’s national level. I hold the term to embody both concepts
and praxis, but while Gille looks at the materiality of the refuse by
considering its quantity and composition, I hold that its materia-
lity was a factor that impacted on disposal practices and notions of
refuse and disposal.
I would argue that any waste management regime will be slow to
change. The inertia stems both from the existing organization and
technology and from the associated ideas and modes of thought.
A waste management regime changes when the standard methods
of disposal encounter difficulties that require different measures
to be taken. It might be something that can reasonably be solved
within the established regime, or that poses such a challenge that
no immediate solution presents itself, or indeed that questions the
management regime’s very existence. The influencing factors or
challenges can be of various types and come from various quarters.
They can concern ideas or material changes, or both, and they are
as likely to be specific as general in character. The system tends to
want to overcome challenges within the existing management regime,
but if the problems are too large, too numerous, or too difficult to
manage, a regime change takes place. Just as various factors can pose
a challenge to a management regime in such a way as it changes, so
they can also contribute to the same regime’s stability and inertia.
In the period 1900–1975, Stockholm’s resource recovery regime
was replaced by an incineration regime. I explain this by viewing
waste disposal and perceptions of refuse in the context of the waste’s
quantity and composition, the factors affecting waste disposal, and
the social climate.
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The resource recovery regime, 1900–1927
At the turn of the last century, the quantity and type of refuse pro-
duced by Stockholm’s rising population, human and equine, was
compounded by increasing consumption. Stockholm already had
a disposal system that was based on the sale of waste as fertilizer.
This was concentrated in Lövsta, on Lake Mälaren on the outskirts
of the capital, where waste was transported from the centre by train
and from where it could then be shipped to the surrounding coun-
tryside by barge. The city’s refuse managers, however, felt that there
were major problems with waste disposal, partly because there was
a growing amount of it (mostly of night soil and horse manure),
while much of it included greater quantities of non-organic waste,
which made it less appropriate—and less in demand—as fertilizer.
In order to find ways to modernize the capital’s waste disposal, Karl
Tingsten, Lövsta’s manager and later the director of municipal waste
services, was sent on a study tour of European and North American
cities. At the time, there was nothing to suggest that Stockholm
would prioritize one particular method over another. Incineration
had been considered, and the countries Tingsten expected to learn
most from were the UK and the US, both of which had long used
the method. However, Tingsten returned from the trip ready to see
the city invest in resource recovery by introducing source separation
in two categories: ‘fertilizer waste’ and ‘non-organic waste’. The lat-
ter category was screened for any material that could be sold. All
household waste was sorted through from 1907 onwards, but as early
as 1901 Stockholm’s Refuse Department had begun to divide it into
fertilizer waste and non-organic waste. Fertilizer sales were relatively
strong in the first decade of the century. Non-organic waste brought
in some income, but its sale was not an effective disposal method.
In practice, the proportion of non-organic waste that was sold was
marginal; the bulk of it was incinerated in the furnace purchased for
Lövsta in 1900. Incineration as a method, however, barely featured
in the statistics and City Council records; it was resource recovery
that was thought important. The argument for resource recovery
was that it had a utility value which, if the waste was handled pro-
perly, would translate into commercial value. Waste separation and
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summary
its subsequent handling were also seen as ‘natural’, according to
the idea that all waste had a natural condition to which it should
return: waste suited for use as fertilizer should return to the land,
other materials to industry. At heart it was an eco-cyclical approach.
Moreover, there was a notion that waste had an obvious value that
was driven by its utility value. This vision, shared by Tingsten, can
be traced to the then common emphasis on thrift.
The establishment of Stockholm’s resource recovery regime at the
beginning of the twentieth century can be explained by the fact that
much of its refuse was suitable for fertilizer and that the regime was
reinforced by a strong sense of public spiritedness. Then there was
the inertia of the existing system, with its extensive arrangements
for collecting and disposing of Stockholm’s refuse which, if only
the waste was sorted, could continue. The inertia resulted from the
long-established ideas and practices that governed resource recovery,
reinforced by the existence of railway infrastructure and a complex
organization. A change of system would have involved conside-
rable investment, both in terms of capital outlay and in altering
Stockholm’s waste disposal objectives. Neither was the continued
use of waste as fertilizer and the increased recovery of other mate-
rials thought out-dated—far from it, it was considered a modern
form of management—and all the sorting and reuse became a way
of maintaining the capital’s links to agrarian surroundings. Mean-
while, adapting to modern urban conditions involved dealing with
more heterogeneous waste in ever greater quantities.
At the same time as the introduction of the two-way division of
waste into fertilizer waste and non-organic waste, the collection of
kitchen waste to be used as pigswill was suggested by the Stock-
holm City Council. The idea was not new—many cities had similar
operations, including in the US—and shortly before the turn of the
century Stockholm had seen a less successful attempt of this kind
when pigs were kept on Lövsta’s large rubbish tip. The pig rearing
that was discussed as a serious option from 1906 onwards was to be
run along more organized lines. Kitchen refuse and scraps would
be collected from individual households and then boiled and sold
directly to pig farmers or used in the city’s municipal pig farms.
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summary
The initiative for this came not from the city’s refuse managers but
from the slaughterhouse industry and the city council department
that ran the municipal slaughterhouse. The refuse managers were
against the proposal, because they felt that pigswill collection would
threaten the key element in the city’s waste management—the sale
of the largest category of waste as fertilizer. They feared a deterio-
ration in the suitability and value of the refuse as fertilizer, regard-
less of whether there was a three-way split between kitchen waste,
fertilizer waste, and non-organic waste or a two-way split between
pigswill and all other refuse. After ten years of inquiries and heated
debate, pigswill collection was gradually introduced across the city in
1916–1918. Once in place, the whole of Stockholm followed a three-
way division into pigswill, fertilizer waste, and non-organic waste.
The process has since been depicted as being a wartime project, but
my study shows that pigswill collection had a far longer history.
The idea of feeding scraps to pigs was one element in the resource
recovery regime, which in society at large reflected a long-standing
emphasis on the utility value of waste. This is shown by the fact
that two city departments’ worth of civil servants ended up fighting
over how the waste’s value might best be realized.
In the 1910s, the demand for fertilizer began to dwindle, which
made it more difficult for the city to get rid of its refuse. The fall in
demand became even more apparent in the 1920s, just as the com-
position of the waste was on the verge of an important change. The
amount of the city’s solid waste had begun to rise after the First
World War. Once the Stockholm City Council permitted lavatories
to be connected to the public sewers in 1909, the number of out-
houses had plummeted, and at much the same time horses began to
vanish from the city, to be replaced by motorized trams and motor
vehicles. These changes brought with new disposal problems. The
city began to use the lakeside at Lövsta as a rubbish tip, and when
poor financial returns and the mass death of pigs in the municipal
piggeries led to the discontinuation of pigswill collections in 1927, the
separation into fertilizer waste and non-organic waste also ceased.
The resource recovery regime, which in practice had been waning
for most of the 1920s, was now definitely over.
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summary
The incineration regime, 1938–1975
The end of waste separation came without any discussion in the
Stockholm City Council. In the 1920s, in the run-up to the deci-
sion, incineration had been suggested as the solution to the capital’s
waste disposal problem, and in the 1930s it became the option of
choice, yet it was not the obvious alternative. After all, this was a
time when many British cities stopped incinerating their refuse and
went over to a more systematic landfill practice known as ‘controlled
tipping’, a cheaper method than incineration, as it did not incur any
significant initial costs provided there was suitable land available. In
Stockholm, however, controlled tipping was contemplated, but was
dismissed as being less interesting. One reason was that the land
at Lövsta where it would have been possible was expected to last
for no more than 16 years’ tipping. Incineration was said to offer
a longer-term solution, added to which Stockholm’s refuse, which
contained a great deal of paper, was well suited to the method.
Another reason was the desire to modernize waste disposal, and
this was felt to equate to the introduction of incineration. There
was much about the arguments in favour of incineration that can
be linked to functionalism, with its emphasis on rationalization
and the emergence of the modern city. Incineration was presented
as a comprehensive solution for all waste, and one that involved less
manual labour. Waste incineration can thus be seen as a parallel to
the arrival of rubbish chutes in apartment buildings, which happened
at much the same time: refuse would quickly, easily, and invisibly be
removed from its source, and then destroyed in an equally efficient
manner. In this approach, its worth was an irrelevancy. Waste was
seen instead as an aesthetic liability.
In 1938, a large, three-furnace incinerator was built at Lövsta—
Sweden’s first modern incineration plant for municipal waste. With
that, given the debate that had long seen it as the best disposal
option, Stockholm can be said to have gone over to a waste incine-
ration regime. There was still some resource recovery, but largely
in order to facilitate incineration. From 1940 onwards, the waste
heat produced by the incineration process was also put to use. This
had in fact been investigated at the planning stage, but in the end
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summary
it was decided that it would not be a worthwhile exercise; however,
following the fuel shortage that hit Stockholm in the Second World
War, a steam turbine was installed so that the plant could produce
steam and electricity for businesses in Lövsta.
The Second World War saw a temporary halt in the rising con-
sumption and development of everyday technology that had started
back in the 1920s. Consumer research has shown that the major
breakthrough for packaged consumer goods came at the end of the
1930s. Between 1930 and 1950, retail sales volumes increased by 70
per cent and food sales doubled. Supermarkets, self-service shops,
and new products added to the increasing quantities of packaging
in circulation, at first mainly paper packaging. Then there were new
disposable products, while the ever-larger quantities of newsprint in
circulation, which had started to rise in the late nineteenth century,
showed no sign of abating. All these changes resulted in an increasing
amount of refuse. In 1954 the city built a fourth furnace at Lövsta,
yet the incineration plant’s capacity was still inadequate to the task
of dealing with the mounting waste problem. Moreover, by the late
1950s the city’s waste managers were facing a new problem. Human
excrement, which with the advent of flushing lavatories and muni-
cipal domestic sewage had ceased to be a concern for the city’s road
department (which since 1929 handled the city’s sanitation), now
returned to the agenda in the shape of sewage sludge: the steadily
declining water quality around Stockholm had hastened the intro-
duction of water treatment plants, which produced large amounts
of sewage sludge that somehow had to be managed.
In 1958 a commission of inquiry was appointed to consider
increased incineration. Initially, a second large incineration plant
was planned that would have been able to burn sewage sludge.
Because of transportation issues, the City Council had been thin-
king of building the new plant in the southern suburbs instead of
at Lövsta; for the same reason, it did not want the plant to be too
far from the city. The possible location became the subject of much
debate and was criticized by city politicians, who were swayed by
NIMBY-like considerations (Not In My Back Yard). In 1963, how-
ever, the choice fell on Högdalen, an area in Stockholm where the
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summary
city already had two vast tips of demolition waste left from the wave
of urban reconstruction in the 1950s. While the new incineration
plant was being planned, Lövsta added a fifth furnace in order to
cope with the mounting quantities of waste produced by the capital.
During the 1960s, environmental issues began to be discussed
in more than aesthetic or purely health-related terms. A geocentric
environmental critique took shape, and this too touched on the
question of waste. In Stockholm, the City Council first arrived at
this point in its discussions about the sewage sludge from the city’s
water treatment plants. Pending the results of the 1958 inquiry, the
sludge had simply been dumped in the Baltic and the Atlantic.
When this was criticized in the late 1950s by the Communist Party,
who argued for an eco-cyclical approach and said that the waste
should be used for fertilizer, they were derided; but just a few years
later there was a volte-face, and the City Council duly decided
that the best answer was to use the sludge as fertilizer. (However,
turning it into fertilizer was not a straightforward business, added
to which there were problems finding buyers for the end product.)
In the late 1960s, the eco-cyclical approach was also applied in the
case of other forms of waste. City representatives went to see how
things were done at composting plants in Denmark, for example.
In addition to this eco-cyclical thinking, there was a social critique
that emphasized the negative consequences of consumer society.
While these ideas took hold in the City Council, planning con-
tinued for the new incinerator in Högdalen. Initially, it was not
intended that the plant be fitted with technology to capture the waste
heat, but the new environmental debate left its mark on this choice.
Högdalen was planned to be modern in the sense that the amount
of air pollution would be minimized. One of the possible methods
to clean particulates and gases from the incinerator emissions lent
itself well to being combined with the steam turbine equipment
for power generation. Such a solution was chosen for Högdalen,
which was completed in 1970—and thus it was not primarily a
question of capitalizing on the value of incineration’s byproducts
that led to the new facility being equipped with the technology to
capture waste heat.
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summary
The amount of waste produced by Stockholm had nearly tripled
between 1922, when it was at its lowest levels, and the mid-1960s.
The late 1960s then saw an even more dramatic increase, as the
amount of packaging continued to rise and the plastic content of
the waste increased. PVC plastic posed a major problem, since when
incinerated it formed hydrochloric acid that corroded the masonry
in the chimney stacks. Another type of waste also increased: bulky
solid waste from private households. Thereafter the quantity of waste
produced declined in the 1970s as the capital’s population fell, while
the city now had two incinerators; however, the refuse problem
was far from being solved. The air pollution from the incinerators
was criticized by the public and some politicians. Pollutants were
measured, and people demanded that better scrubbers be installed.
Both Lövsta and Högdalen were rebuilt with this in mind. It was
pointed out, though, that the technology to clean the emissions of
gases and heavy metals was complex, undeveloped, and expensive.
Criticism of the incinerators’ air pollution did not mean that inci-
neration per se came under attack, of course.
A major problem that was also linked to the environment was the
domestic and industrial hazardous waste that was first recognized
as an issue in the late 1960s. Above all, industrial waste was seen as
particularly worrying, as 90 per cent of its handling and disposal
was an unknown quantity, at least to the municipality. In several
instances in the first half of the 1970s, the City Council discus-
sed increased regulation and a more environmentally appropriate
handling of this waste. There was a consensus that recycling was
the best method of disposal.
Recycling also began to be discussed—and implemented—when
it came to other types of waste, above all household waste in the
form of newsprint and packaging. The City Council established a
number of collection points where households were able to throw
away paper, glass, and metal, but only a minute proportion of the
city’s total waste was recycled in this way. Of greater importance
was a newspaper recycling trial in municipal-run properties. Recy-
cling was also discussed at the national level, and was first adopted
as a waste management goal in a parliamentary Bill in 1975. With
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summary
a new-found interest in resource recovery, the utility value of refuse
once again became topical. However, it was not thought likely that
any utility value would translate into a significant commercial value,
to the extent that it was assumed that recycling for the most part
would cost the City Council more than it earned from it; instead,
recycling was justified using arguments taken from the brand of
environmentalism that emphasized the Earth’s limited resources.
The recycling cause gained momentum following the 1973 oil cri-
sis, when the idea of using the heat from Högdalen’s incinerator in
Stockholm’s district heating network was first mooted. This came
about, but for reasons that long predated the oil crisis and were not
motivated by the world’s finite resources, but rather by the failure
of the capital’s energy distribution system. As of 1963, Stockholm
had a nuclear-powered district heating power plant, which provided
the south of the city with heat. The reactor had been expensive to
build, and oil prices in the 1960s were so low that the city began
to feel that it was a white elephant. As early as 1969, those in the
municipal administration responsible for energy issues had begun to
consider decommissioning the reactor and converting the existing
waste incinerator at Högdalen into a district heating power plant.
When the decision came to use Högdalen’s waste heat in the district
heating system, it was not primarily a matter of disposal, or indeed
an environmental issue—something city politicians were otherwise
careful to stress when it came to waste management.
The environmental concerns that were to become a significant
factor in waste disposal in the 1970s were of a very different kind,
as their impact was hedged about by formal institutions and regula-
tions, while at the same time the more radical solutions were aban-
doned. Much like the wider issue of the environment, waste disposal
became strongly compartmentalized, and the various types of waste
and waste disposal were seen as very different problems with diffe-
rent solutions. This move was the opposite to what had been done
in the early 1930s when the incineration regime was established by
in effect combining waste categories. The differentiation between
various areas of concern regarding waste disposal also reflected a
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summary
more pragmatic stance that came closer to actual implementation
than did the late 1960s visions of eco-cycle-based disposal.
Regime shifts
There are no hard and fast explanations why a particular type of
waste management regime takes shape or why it evolves as it does.
Here I emphasize the quantity and composition of one city’s waste
as a possible explanation for changes in an urban waste management
regime. The quantity and nature of the refuse limits the types of
disposal technology that are possible. Its composition largely deter-
mined the type of any resource recovery regime and its implementa-
tion (in Stockholm, a large amount of suitable waste was necessary
for a strategy based on fertilizer sales, for example), but was not as
significant once an incineration regime was in place. Ideas about
modernity and the environment were far more important. Regarding
both regimes—resource recovery and incineration—I hold inertia as
an important factor in the modification, expansion, or complemen-
ting of the various existing practices at the cost of the introduction
of new methods. I would argue that inertia was equally evident in
specific notions of waste, which of course were strongly linked to
broader notions of the economy, modernity, and the environment.
The notion of waste as an asset or a liability is crucial to every
waste management regime, and plays a role in how it is managed
on the ground. Stockholm’s resource recovery regime had emphasi-
zed the utility value of waste, and it appears that those responsible
for refuse collection took for granted that this would translate into
a commercial value, yet in the event this was something the city
struggled to realize, especially once it was found in the 1910s and
1920s that in reality the demand for waste products was not par-
ticularly great. The incineration regime, meanwhile, saw waste’s
utility value as uninteresting. The various sorts of resource recovery
that the city engaged in were primarily concerned with facilitating
incineration, while the waste was not seen as having any value that
was worth exploiting. Waste was instead an aesthetic and later an
environmental liability. In the late 1960s the rhetoric changed, and
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summary
the utility value of refuse was once again stressed using environ-
mental arguments about the Earth’s limited resources. This time,
however, the Swedish capital did not reckon that the waste’s utility
value might correspond to a commercial value that would offset the
cost of resource recovery.
269
Noter
1. Inledning
1 O’Brien 2008, kap. 2, citat s. 56.
2 Se t.ex. Lagerspetz 2006, s. 249; O’Brien 2008, s. 36.
3 Se t.ex. McNeill 2003, inledningskapitlet.
4 Prop 1975:32.
5 Nygård 2004, s. 334.
6 Lagerspetz 2006, s. 224f.
7 STRUT 1969, s. 22, 52.
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